Do 2015 4122 A. Violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act

(b) interference with general traffic;

A

Prosecutor

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2013Do4011, 20142652 (Joint) decided February 13, 2015

Judgment

March 10, 2016

Of the original judgment, the part concerning the point of interference with general traffic on June 16, 2012 is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Central District Court.

The remaining final appeals shall be dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are determined.

1. The point of interference with general traffic on June 16, 2012;

A. On June 16, 2012, among the facts charged in the instant case, the summary of the charge of interference with the general traffic of the Defendant is as follows.

6. From 15:15 around 16:40 to around 16:40, 2 other participants participating in an assembly on the name of the "Stong-gu Stong-gu", and 398-1 around Jung-gu, Jung-gu, Seoul, Jung-gu, Jung-gu, Seoul, Ga-ro 2 moved to the right entrance of the Northwest-gu, Jung-gu, Seoul, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, and moved to the right entrance of the Northwest-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Jung-gu, Seoul, and walked along a way to interfere with the traffic of the vehicle.

B. According to the reasoning of the original judgment, the original judgment reversed the judgment of the first instance and rendered a verdict of not guilty on the ground that the evidence submitted by the public prosecutor alone was insufficient to conclude that the passage of Defendant 1 was impossible or substantially difficult.

C. However, the above determination by the court below is difficult to accept for the following reasons. (1) Interference with the general traffic safety under Article 185 of the Criminal Act is an offense that interferes with the traffic safety of the general public, such as land, etc., and its purpose is to punish all acts that interfered with the traffic or make it considerably difficult for the traffic due to any other means (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Do1926, Jul. 10, 201). Since the traffic obstruction of general traffic falls under the so-called abstract dangerous crime, it is difficult to separate the traffic interference from the above 6-lane road from the above 6-lane road, and it is difficult for the traffic interference to take place only on the 6-lane road without any justifiable reason (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 201Do1926, Dec. 26, 207).

Nevertheless, the lower court rendered a judgment not guilty on this part of the facts charged on the ground that it cannot be deemed that the Defendant’s passage of the vehicle was impossible or interfered with traffic to the extent that it substantially obstructed the passage of the vehicle, solely on the grounds as indicated in its holding, and that this part of the indictment was not guilty. This is a kind of judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on interference with general traffic.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance court, the court below reversed the part convicting Defendant 1 of this part of the judgment of the first instance on the grounds that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is insufficient to recognize Defendant 18:40 to 19:30, the other union members in front of the Hyundai Motor Vehicle, as well as the three-lanes of the other union members in front of the Hyundai Motor Vehicle at around 18:40 to 19:30, on the ground that the facts charged in the instant case are likely to cause interference with ordinary traffic by ordinary people on May 15, 2013 among the facts charged.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error of misapprehending the legal principles concerning obstruction of general traffic in an assembly reported or reported at an assembly beyond the limit of free conviction due to the logical and empirical rules.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, among the judgment of the court below, the part concerning the point of general traffic obstruction of June 16, 2012 among the judgment of the court below is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion, and the remaining appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Kim So-young

State Core Ki-taik