208Do 8195(a) General traffic obstruction

(b) Interference with business;

Defendant

Defendant

Suwon District Court Decision 2008No 2455 decided August 26, 2008

January 30, 2009

The judgment of the court of first instance shall be reversed, and the case Eul shall be remanded to the Panel Division of the court of first instance at the Suwon District Court.

The grounds of appeal are determined.

1. As to the obstruction of general traffic

The crime of interference with general traffic under Article 185 of the Criminal Act refers to a place that is commonly used in the traffic of the general public, i.e., a place that has a public nature in which many and unspecified persons, or vehicles and horses are free to walk (see Supreme Court Decisions 83Do2617, Sept. 11, 1984; 9Do401, Apr. 27, 1999, etc.).

In light of the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the road of this case is located on the lurged site of this case (number 1 omitted), which is located on the lurged site of this case, by setting the boundary number of Defendant 1, which is located on the lurg, and which is located on the lurg (road number 2 omitted). The road of this case is located on the lurgian boundary of this case, which is located on the lurg boundary of Defendant 1, but which is located on the lurg (road number 2 omitted), and the road of this case, which is located on the lurgian boundary of Defendant 1, which is located on the lurgian boundary of this case, and which is located on the lurgiang boundary of Defendant 1, which is located on the lurgiang boundary of this case, and it is clearly distinguishable from the lurgiang road of this case.

Nevertheless, the court below found that part of the lurgian (number 1 omitted) site of the road in this case constituted the passage of the land that is in fact public use on the passage of the general public, and found guilty of the fact that the road in this case constitutes a common traffic obstruction. The judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the obstruction of general traffic, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

2. As seen earlier with respect to the crime of interference with business by Defendant B, the part on which Defendant B left the ground that the part on the part on the part on the part on which Defendant B occupied is not provided for the passage of the general public, and it does not constitute an obligation to allow the passage of the complainant to be allowed by the general public, and there is no other recognized data. Thus, even if the Defendant’s obstruction of the passage of the vehicle on the part on the part on the part on which the Defendant used to listen to herme, this cannot be deemed to have interfered with the victim’s business by force to prevent the victim’s own possession, use the land on the part on which the Defendant occupied, or exclude unfair interference (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Do4893, Jul. 13, 2007; 2008Do7897, Jul. 27, 2008).

Nevertheless, the court below held that part of the last part of the site Maldong (number 1 omitted) corresponds to the passage of the land which is actually a common use on the passage of the general public along with the road in this case. The court below held that the act of listening to the road by Defendant 1 constitutes a obstruction of business. The court below erred in the misapprehension of the legal principles on obstruction of business or in violation of documentary evidence, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is justified.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court of original instance is reversed, and the case B is remanded to the court of original instance so that it can be tried and judged again, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Si-hwan

Justices Yang Sung-tae

Justices Park Il-hwan

Justices Kim Nung-hwan