[1] The case holding that the dismissal of an employee who discontinued a business division accumulated by the enemy is justifiable

[2] In a case where a trade union entered into a collective agreement with an employer to modify the working conditions disadvantageously, whether such agreement is null and void (negative), and whether a trade union needs to obtain individual consent or authorization from an employee for such agreement (negative), and whether a collective agreement significantly lacks rationality

[3] Whether a trade union can conduct a disposition such as waiver or postponement of payment of individual workers' wages or retirement allowances for which the right to claim the payment has already occurred only by a collective agreement between the employer and the employer (negative with qualification)

[1] Article 31 of the Labor Standards Act / [2] Articles 29 and 33 of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, Article 105 of the Civil Act / [3] Article 29 of the Labor Union and Labor

[2] [3] Supreme Court Decision 99Da67536 delivered on September 29, 2000 (Gong2000Ha, 2195)

1. The case where the plaintiff et al. (Attorneys Kim Young-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Same-sex Co., Ltd. (Attorney Song Young-young, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Daejeon High Court Decision 99Na6430 delivered on February 2, 2001

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

According to Article 31(1) through (3) of the Labor Standards Act, where an employer intends to dismiss a worker for managerial reasons, there must be an urgent administrative necessity, and efforts to avoid dismissal shall be made, and persons subject to dismissal shall be selected in accordance with reasonable and fair standards, and the methods and criteria for avoiding dismissal shall be notified to the labor union organized by a majority of workers or the representative of workers, and shall consult in good faith with the labor union organized by a majority of workers at least 60 days prior to the date of dismissal. The urgent managerial necessity here does not necessarily include cases where the number of employees is objectively deemed reasonable in order to cope with possible crisis in the future, but it shall be deemed that the number of employees is included in cases where the number of employees is objectively deemed reasonable in order to cope with the possible crisis in the future. The detailed contents of each requirement are not conclusive and fixed, but are determined in relation to the degree of satisfaction of other requirements in specific cases. Thus, whether the relevant dismissal by administrative reasons satisfies all the above requirements should be determined by comprehensively considering individual circumstances that constitute each of the above requirements (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Da29452, Jul. 29, 202

The court below's decision 9. It found that the defendant company was not obligated to voluntarily dismiss the defendant company's 9. The defendant company's 9. The defendant company's 19. The defendant company's 9. The defendant company's 19. The defendant company's 19. The defendant company's 19. The defendant company's 9. The defendant company's 19. The defendant company's 9.1 company's 9.7 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 9 company's 19 company'.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the recognition and decision of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to mistake of facts or layoff due to violation of the rules of evidence as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

The court below determined on March 23, 1998 that the agreement between labor and management was null and void since it took into account the possibility that the defendant company and the defendant labor union representing workers would be working again at the defendant company's factory and the defendant company's factory, and that the defendant company's factory was actually closed at the time of the agreement, and it did not provide workers with work at the defendant factory from March 23, 1998 to October 24, 1998, and that the worker's duty to provide labor and the employer's right to claim wages in principle for the above period, and that the plaintiffs' financial structure of the defendant company and the plaintiffs' right to claim wages in consideration of all the circumstances such as the financial structure of the company for the above period, circumstances leading to the agreement between the plaintiffs, etc., and that the agreement between labor and management on March 23, 1998 was null and void.

Under the principle of autonomy of an agreement, a trade union may enter into a collective agreement with an employer to change terms and conditions of employment in favor of an employer as well as a collective agreement to change terms and conditions of employment so that such agreement may not be deemed null and void unless there are special circumstances, such as where a collective agreement to change terms and conditions of employment may be deemed to be so unreasonable that it goes beyond the purpose of a trade union. A trade union need not obtain individual consent or authorization from employees for such agreement, and whether a collective agreement has significantly lacks rationality shall be determined in light of the contents of the collective agreement, the process of its conclusion, and the management status of the employer at the time of the agreement (see Supreme Court Decision 9Da67536, Sept. 29, 200, etc.).

According to the above legal principles and records, it is acceptable that the court below determined that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the collective agreement between labor and management on July 15, 1998 is a conditional agreement on condition that the labor and management should not be dismissed, and (2) also, the agreement between the plaintiffs and management on March 23, 1998 and July 15, 198 that the company will take a leave of absence until April 30, 1998 and July 15, 198 is a collective agreement to modify working conditions disadvantageously. However, in light of various circumstances such as the contents of each collective agreement, its execution process, management situation at the time, etc., there is no special circumstance to deem that the collective agreement as above goes beyond the purpose of the trade union, and as a trade union, there is no need to obtain prior consent or authorization from each worker for such agreement, and therefore, even if there is no individual consent or authorization from the plaintiffs, the agreement between the above labor and management cannot be deemed null and void.

On the other hand, wages for which the right to claim the payment has already occurred are transferred to the worker's private property area and entrusted to the worker's disposition, and the trade union cannot waive them by a collective agreement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Da67536, Jul. 15, 1998; 9Da67536, Apr. 25, 1998; 9Da67536, Apr. 198; 1998; 200Da477, Apr. 14, 1998; 3000Da888, Feb. 14, 1998). However, according to the records, it is reasonable that the plaintiffs have given their consent by signing and sealing the labor-management agreement to the retroactive implementation of the above unpaid leave (see, e.g., evidence 15-1 to 10).

Although the reasoning of the court below is somewhat inappropriate, it is just in the conclusion that the plaintiffs rejected their claim for wages from March 23, 1998 to October 24, 1998 from the time of the unpaid leave agreement on March 23, 1998, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of facts against the rules of evidence, or misunderstanding of legal principles as to the waiver of wages or the leave allowances.

3. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Ji-dam (Presiding Justice)