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1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Reasons
1. In the course of the disposition, the following facts: (a) the status of stay exemption (B-1) on April 2, 2016 of the date of entry into the Republic of Korea of the Federation of Russia; (b) the date of the application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on December 5, 2016; (b) the date of the application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “instant disposition”); (c) May 26, 2017; (d) there is no dispute over the grounds for recognition of the decision to dismiss the decision on December 27, 2017; (d) the facts that there is no ground for recognition of the decision to dismiss the decision on December 27, 2017; (e) Party A’s evidence Nos. 1, 2, 1, and 2; and
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The Plaintiff’s assertion is a national of the Russia Federation (hereinafter “ Russia”) and an Uzbekistan.
In Russia, conflicts among different peoples occur.
The plaintiff's remaining dynamics were killed by other national people.
Accordingly, the plaintiff has been in the Republic of Korea since Russia.
As such, if the Plaintiff returned to Russia, the Plaintiff is likely to be detrimental to persecution on the ground that the nation is different, and thus, the Plaintiff should be recognized as a refugee.
B. Determination 1) Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act defines refugee status as “a foreigner who is unable to be protected or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion, or a foreigner who is a state of nationality not having been unable to return to or does not want to return to the country in which he/she had resided before entering the Republic of Korea due to such fear.” 2) In full view of the evidence and evidence as mentioned above and evidence No. 3, the Plaintiff cannot be seen as “a well-founded fear of being injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion,” and there is evidence to prove otherwise.