1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

1. The reasons why the court is to use for this case are as follows, except for the dismissal as set forth in the following 2.2. Thus, it is identical to the entry of the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. On December 24, 2014, the Defendant: (a) received medical treatment from Franchisium on or around December 24, 2014; (b) prior to being notified by the hospital that the Plaintiff had withdrawn the payment guarantee, the Defendant did not have to exercise a separate right; (c) the hospital did not have to file a separate claim against the Plaintiff for medical expenses due to negligence; and (d) the hospital’s failure to claim medical expenses against the Plaintiff by negligence did not have any relation with the Defendant; and (c) thus, (d) the Defendant’s assertion that the extinctive prescription has not been terminated pursuant

According to the overall purport of the statements and arguments in Eul evidence Nos. 3 and 4 (including paper numbers, hereinafter the same), it is recognized that the plaintiff guaranteed the payment of the defendant's medical expenses incurred by the accident of this case at the time of the occurrence of the accident of this case, and that the defendant had received regular medical treatment due to the accident of this case at intervals of about 1 to 3 months from the E hospital, the YY Hospital, and the FY from June 25, 2007 to the time of the lawsuit of this case, and that the payment of the plaintiff's medical expenses and the payment guarantee against the defendant can be deemed as the approval of the obligation. Thus, the extinctive prescription of the defendant's right to claim damages against the plaintiff of this case should be deemed as suspended at least until December 24, 2014, which is the date of withdrawal

Therefore, the defendant's re-appeal to the interruption of extinctive prescription is reasonable, and the extinctive prescription of the defendant's right to claim damages against the plaintiff cannot be deemed completed.

As to this, the plaintiff has already been extinctive prescription of the defendant's right to claim damages at the time when 3 years elapsed from June 25, 2007.