(a) Whether the protocol of statement prepared by the public prosecutor after the witness testified in the court and summons the witness to the public prosecutor's office may be used as evidence of guilt in the case by means of unilateral examination;

(b) The case holding that the above written statement may be used as evidence of guilt in case where Gap's written statement was submitted by the prosecutor after Gap's testimony was made to the effect that the testimony was not true after Gap's testimony was conducted, but Gap again asked Gap as a witness and provided the defendant with an opportunity to cross-examine the contents on the later trial date;

A. The protocol of statement prepared by a public prosecutor after the witness testified at the court and summoned the witness to the public prosecutor’s office by a unilateral examination method, shall not be considered as evidence of guilt since the defendant or defense counsel’s cross-examination opportunity is reversed by the unilateral examination of the public prosecutor.

B. The case holding that the above written statement may be used as evidence of guilt, in case where Gap's written statement as to Gap's written statement, and the written statement as to Gap's written statement was entered before the prosecutor's testimony was completed at the court of first instance, and the prosecutor again asked the contents of testimony in the court and received the statement from Gap to the effect that the contents of the testimony are not true, but Gap again returned Gap to witness at the court of first instance at the court of first instance, and it was given the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the above written statement.

Article 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee Jin-he

Seoul High Court Decision 92No841 delivered on June 2, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The number of detention days after an appeal shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

The grounds of appeal by the Defendant and the defense counsel are also examined.

1. According to the record, in this case, the core evidence of who driven an accident vehicle at the time of the accident is the statement of the victim's full-time witness who directly appeared in the defendant and the co-defendant of the first instance trial. The witness stated that the driver of the accident vehicle was the defendant with a white background as consistent from the police investigation to the court below's decision, and even after examining the record, there is no evidence to deny the credibility of the victim's statement.

2. According to the records, co-defendants of the first instance court voluntarily led to the confession of himself/herself before the time of interrogation of the suspect, and denies the facts of his/her driving by reversing his/her statement from the time of the second interrogation of the suspect. In light of the above details of the confession made by co-defendants of the prosecutor's office and the court of first instance, and the contents of each statement made by the prosecutor's office and the prosecutor's office of all of the above victims and the court of first instance, the confessions of the above co-defendants of the first instance

3. The date of the use of the non-indicted who was accompanied by the accident vehicle at the time of the accident, and the testimony of the witness at the scene of the accident at the time of the accident, but their statements at the prosecutor's office and at the court of the first and the second instances are in conflict with each other and are inconsistent before and after the accident. In light of the above contents of the statement at the time of the accident, the co-defendant at the court of the first and the second instances where the co-defendant at the court of the first instance withdrawn the confession at the prosecutor's office, it is difficult to recognize the credibility of each testimony at the court of the first and second instances where the non-indicted

4. However, according to the record, the statement of November 22, 1991, on the date of use by the prosecutor who was employed by the first instance court as evidence of guilt, the above date of use, which was made before the public prosecutor after the completion of testimony at the court of first instance, is stated as being paid by the public prosecutor to the effect that the contents of testimony at the court of first instance are not true by again pursuing the contents of testimony at the court of first instance.

As such, the protocol of statement prepared by a public prosecutor after the witness testified in the court and after summonsing the witness to the public prosecutor's office by a unilateral examination method shall not be considered as evidence for conviction of the case concerned, since the defendant or defense counsel's opportunity to cross-examine the court's testimony secured by the unilateral examination of the public prosecutor. However, in this case, it is recognized that the above date of use was returned to the witness again on the fifth public trial date ( December 14, 191) and the above contents of the above protocol of statement were given an opportunity to cross-examine the defendant, so it shall not be deemed that the court below erred by the above recruitment of evidence.

5. Ultimately, the court below's decision is justified in maintaining the judgment of the court of first instance which recognized the defendant's criminal facts, and there is no error of law in finding facts due to the evidence preparation in violation of the rules of evidence, as alleged in the theory of lawsuit. Therefore, it is without merit.

6. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed, and thirty days of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Song Man-man (Presiding Justice)