1. The judgment of the court of first instance is modified as follows.

In the case of the senior auction of real estate C with the Goyang District Court.

Basic Facts

Around November 22, 2010, the Defendant entered into a lease agreement (hereinafter “instant lease agreement”) with D on the lease deposit to lease the land and housing owned by the Plaintiff in Yongsan-gu, Yongsan-gu (hereinafter referred to as “instant housing”; and when the said land and housing are collectively referred to, “the instant real estate”) with the lease deposit amount of KRW 130 million; and from May 30, 201 to May 29, 2013, the lease deposit was paid and resided in the instant housing after paying the lease deposit.

The Pakistan-do Livestock Cooperatives, the mortgagee of the instant real estate, applied for a voluntary auction of real estate under Paragraph (1) of the Disposition and commenced the procedure.

On April 10, 2014, the above court prepared a distribution schedule stating that KRW 363,706,692 out of the amount of KRW 468,264,901, which shall be distributed as dividends, shall be distributed to the Pakistan Livestock Cooperatives, and the remainder of KRW 104,558,209 shall be distributed to the Defendant, who is the lessee.

The Plaintiff appeared on the date of distribution, and stated an objection to the whole amount of distribution to the Defendant, and filed the instant lawsuit on April 15, 2014, which was within one week thereafter.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 4, Eul evidence Nos. 1, Eul evidence No. 2-1 through 18, and the gist of the argument by the parties concerned as to the purport of the whole pleadings is that the plaintiff defendant leased the real estate of this case from Eul who has no authority to lease the real estate of this case and is not a legitimate lessee. Thus, the amount of dividends to the defendant among the distribution schedule of this case should be deleted and distributed to the plaintiff who is

Defendant D had the power to conclude the instant lease agreement on behalf of the Plaintiff.

However, even if it is not so, D has the authority to conclude a lease contract of this case by August 2009, and thus, the Plaintiff is liable to act as an expression agent under Article 129 or 126 of the Civil Act (in cases of beyond its authority) with respect to the lease contract of this case.

the board to D.