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무죄
(영문) 서울형사지법 1984. 7. 5. 선고 84고단2914 판결 : 항소
[교통사고처리특례법위반등피고사건][하집1984(3),437]
Main Issues

Whether the horse-going flag is included in a motor vehicle under Article 2 subparagraph 10 of the former Road Traffic Act (amended by Act No. 3744 of Aug. 4, 1984)

Summary of Judgment

It is connected to the loading of two wheelss on an agricultural machine, which is manufactured for the purpose of horse transport. However, it cannot be viewed as only the first class of the agricultural machine as stipulated in Article 2 of the Agricultural Mechanization Promotion Act, but also the motor vehicle as stipulated in Table 1 of the Enforcement Rule of the Road Transport Vehicles Act. Thus, it does not include a motor vehicle as defined in Article 2 subparagraph 10 of the former Road Traffic Act (amended by Act No. 3744, Aug. 4, 1984).

[Reference Provisions]

Article 2 subparagraph 10 of the former Road Traffic Act

Escopics

Defendant

Text

Of the facts charged in this case, the charge of violation of the Road Traffic Act is acquitted.

Of the facts charged in this case, the prosecution against violation of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents is dismissed.

Reasons

1. First, we examine the facts charged as to the violation of the Road Traffic Act.

The summary of the facts charged is that the defendant does not obtain a driver's license, while the defendant is in the state of drinking alcohol concentration of 1.2 mills, 16:50 on April 27, 1984, 45-2 of Eunpyeong-gu, Seoul, and 81-year light railing in a garbage transshipment area. As the applicable provisions of Article 75 subparagraph 1, Article 38 of the Road Traffic Act, Article 75 subparagraph 2, and Article 39 (1) of the Road Traffic Act as to driving without a license. However, according to the evidence of this case, it is recognized that the defendant's act of driving of the above light vehicle is included in a small-sized motor vehicle with no driver's license, and it is usually defined in the Enforcement Rule of the Road Traffic Act as a type of motor vehicle or a small-sized motor vehicle with no driver's license. Thus, it is possible to see that the defendant's act of driving of the above light motor vehicle is in violation of the above provision of the Road Traffic Act, and it is usually defined by Ordinance No. 3 of the Road Traffic Act.

On the other hand, Article 38 of the Road Traffic Act provides that "No person shall drive a motor vehicle without obtaining a driver's license (referring to a motor vehicle, etc., and a motor vehicle, etc., referring to Article 13 of the same Act)" and Article 39 (1) of the same Act provides that "no person shall drive a motor vehicle, etc. while driving the motor vehicle, etc. even though he/she is granted a driver's license." Thus, it is evident that a person without a license, or a drunk driving is driving a motor vehicle (or motor vehicle), which is subject to control under each of the above laws, and therefore, it is evident that a person drives a motor vehicle, other than a motor vehicle, and thus, it is not possible to apply penal provisions accordingly.

Thus, it is clear that the defendant who driven the instant horse cannot be punished as a provision of the above Act explicitly stated by the prosecutor. Accordingly, the above facts charged constitute a case that does not constitute a crime and thus, a verdict of not guilty pursuant to the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure

2. Next, the summary of the facts charged is that the defendant's health care violation of the Act on the Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents is against the driver's license, the alcohol concentration of 1.2 migs, and around 16:50 on April 27, 1984, the defendant operated a large 81-year light flag owned by the defendant at the waste transshipment station in Eunpyeong-gu Seoul, Eunpyeong-gu and 45-2 of Eunpyeong-gu, Seoul, and moved back to 5 km high speed. In such a case, the person engaged in driving service has a duty of care to prevent accidents from occurring, and in light of the provisions of the Road Traffic Act, the latter part of the vehicle's 9-year light of the victim's right-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side-hand side of the victim's vehicle.

However, since the above vehicle driving of the defendant did not violate the provisions of Article 38 (b) or Article 39 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, it is evident that the defendant could not institute a prosecution against the victim's explicit intent. Accordingly, according to the statement of the prosecutor's statement on Nonindicted 2 and the written agreement on the preparation of Nonindicted 3, it can be known that Nonindicted 1, the victim of this case, expressed clearly his intention not to punish the defendant on May 13, 1984, which is the date of the prosecution of this case. Accordingly, the institution of the prosecution of this case constitutes the time when the procedure becomes null and void in violation of the provisions of law, and thus, the prosecution of this case is dismissed pursuant to Article 327 subparagraph 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

It is so decided as per Disposition for the above reasons.

Judges Lee Dong-soo

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