District Court-2013-Gu Partnership-16277 ( October 11, 2014)

It is difficult to regard the requesting corporation as a bona fide trading party, such as not confirming whether it is a actual business operator of the customer.

In full view of the fact that the representative of the key purchasing office is a person who has no business fund and ability to operate the scrap metal business, who is accused of the material materials, and that there is no fact that the applicant corporation is a real business operator through visiting the place of business before the transaction, etc., the applicant corporation has made an actual transaction with the key purchasing office and received issues tax invoices, or the applicant’s request that constitutes a bona fide transaction party is difficult to accept

Article 17 of the Value-Added Tax Act

2014Nu43389 Disposition of revocation of Disposition of Imposition of Value-Added Tax

AA Total Metal Co., Ltd.

○ Head of the District Tax Office

Suwon District Court Decision 2013Guhap16277 Decided February 11, 2014

October 30, 2014

November 20, 2014

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance court is revoked. The defendant revoked each disposition of the value-added tax OOOOO and the corporate tax OOOOOOOO for the first term of 2010 against the plaintiff on March 4, 2013 (the plaintiff corrected the date of the above disposition in the appellate court).

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

This Court's reasoning is as follows. This Court's reasoning is as follows: Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act cites the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, since it is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, in addition to the application of the following provisions:

2. Parts to be dried;

A. The second instance judgment " March 13, 2013." shall be written with " March 4, 2013." in the third instance judgment.

(b) Part No. 4 of the first instance judgment No. 2 of the second instance judgment shall be written with "No. 3, 5, and 8" "each description of No. 3, 5, and 8".

C. On March 11, 2014, the Seoul Central District Court rendered a judgment of conviction on the charge of violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (issuance of False Tax Invoice, etc.) (hereinafter referred to as "related criminal case"), and the above judgment was finalized around that time.”

(d)as between the fifth and tenth (10) decisions of the first instance court shall add the following:

In addition, in cases where there were circumstances under which a beneficiary could doubt whether a supplier is a actual supplier in light of the details of the issuance and issuance of a tax invoice, the price of the goods supplied, the specific route and process of the supply of the goods, and whether a nominal supplier of a tax invoice is a material, it is difficult to readily conclude that the beneficiary did not actually confirm the location of the supplier’s place of business, business facilities, etc. and the verification of the supplier’s business registration certificate, etc. is insufficient to conclude that the beneficiary was not negligent in not knowing the actual supplier’s name (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du959, Apr

(e) Part 5 of the first instance judgment " alone with each description of evidence A to 7 or 9" shall be stated as "only with each description of evidence A to 9 and testimony of witness B to the first instance court."

(f) No. 5 of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be written with the words "each description of No. 4 of the evidence No. 5 of the judgment of the court of first instance" as "each description of No. 3, 4, 7, and 8".

(g)in the sixth and sixth sentence of the first instance judgment, the following shall be added:

(D) Although the witness B testified to the effect that he had visited the Plaintiff’s workplace and actually supplied the closed Dong as described in the instant tax invoice, in the relevant criminal case, the witness stated that “AB did not play any particular role other than ordering the customer to the firstman of July 2010 after he registered the business as the representative of the instant purchasing agency on or around January 2010,” and that “B did not perform any other specific role than ordering the customer to the firstman of July 2010.” In addition, since B’s interest in the instant case and the Plaintiff was supplied with the closed Dong from the instant purchasing agency where there was no previous transaction, it cannot be concluded that the Plaintiff was not negligent for the mere reason of the testimony of the said OB.

(E) Meanwhile, the Plaintiff asserts to the effect that, unless the tax authority did not determine that the Plaintiff’s mother of the Plaintiff’s representative director purchased and received the closure dong from the instant purchasing agency as a false tax invoice, it is unfair to determine only the instant tax invoice against the Plaintiff, but the transaction between the Plaintiff and the instant purchasing agency is not identical to the Plaintiff when compared with the transaction between the Plaintiff and the instant purchasing agency. However, it seems that all circumstances were not identical to the Plaintiff when determining the good faith of theCC metal, including the size of the transaction and the period of the transaction (i.e., the Plaintiff’s assertion that the instant disposition was unlawful) and that there was no negligence on the part of the Plaintiff solely on the ground of the Plaintiff’s assertion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2013Du6527, Jul. 25, 2013; 2013Du6527, evidence No. 12-1, No. 212-2).

3. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit.