Determination of cancellation of reversion and presumption of possession in good faith

The decision to dismiss an application for cancellation of reversion pursuant to Act No. 120 is merely to bring about the effect of returning the object to the property to which it belongs, and it is not to decide whether or not there is a right of annual appeal, so long as the right to the object is established by the decision to cancel the attribution of the central administrative agency and the possession in good faith is continued, it is reasonable to authorize the right of annual appeal on the real estate

Act No. 120, Articles 1, 120, 2, 120, 3, 120, 4, 120, 5, 120, 6, 120, 7, 8, 120, 9, 120, Article 15 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belongings

Plaintiff

Director Lee Jae-ju, Attorney Lee Jae-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 55Do121 delivered on September 27, 1955

The main body is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The ground of appeal by the defendant Han Sung-ro, a person who is not erroneous in the facts-finding, is not reversed as a matter of course, since it is not erroneous in the judgment below. (1) The court of first instance recognized the plaintiff's right of annual appeal, taking pride in the fact that the plaintiff asserted the ownership of the property in question to the Minister of Justice and rejected it. According to the above dismissal, even though the plaintiff did not purchase the property in question, it can be sufficiently recognized that the plaintiff purchased the property in question from his river on July 21, 1945, before August 15, 1945. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret that the plaintiff is not entitled to lease the property in question under Articles 9 (5) and 26 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to the plaintiff. (2) In addition, the plaintiff is not entitled to lease the property in question as a lessee under the law as of August 19, 1954, and it is clear that the plaintiff did not have the right of annual appeal to lease the property in his name, but did not belong to the plaintiff's property in his name.

(1) The decision to dismiss an application for cancellation of ownership pursuant to Article 120 of the Information Communication Act is merely to bring about the effect of returning the object to the property to which it belongs, and it is not to decide whether or not the right has been established, so long as the right to the object is believed to have been established by the decision to cancel the property to which it belongs and the possession in good faith has been continued, it is reasonable to determine whether the right to the pertinent real estate is authorized to authorize the annual right to the pertinent real estate cannot be employed. (2) The plaintiff becomes aware of the facts that the plaintiff is disqualified for re-lease, and the plaintiff made an application for lease within 20 days after the decision to dismiss the application pursuant to Article 120 of the Act on August 19, 1954 (the lease application which was rejected on September 9, 1954). Accordingly, according to the records and the facts at the time of the original judgment, it is clear that the defendant's appeal to dismiss the plaintiff's application for new occupancy after the establishment of Article 120 of the Civil Procedure Act cannot be asserted as the ground for appeal.

Justices Kim Byung-o (Presiding Justice)