2014 Doz. 19086 Compensation, etc.

A Stock Company

Law Firm Roba and well-being, Counsel for defendant

Attorney Kim Ji-hee, and Song-young

Law Firm Taeyang, Attorney Kim Jong-il

Attorney Kim Jong-chul

1. B

2. C

3. Stock companies D.

[Judgment of the court below]

May 24, 2017

June 28, 2017

1. The Defendants jointly pay to the Plaintiff 90,000,000 won with 5% interest per annum from March 7, 2015 to June 28, 2017, and 15% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. The plaintiff's remaining claims against the defendants are dismissed.

3. 1/10 of the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff, and the remainder by the Defendants, respectively.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The defendants pay to each plaintiff 101,00,000 won with 20% interest per annum from the day after the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. The plaintiff is a company with the purpose of manufacturing and selling chemical products, including a wast-type 1 for automobiles, and the defendant B entered the plaintiff around January 17, 200 and was engaged in crating development and research work until September 30, 2008. The defendant C was employed in the plaintiff on December 1, 2003 and was employed in the plaintiff's research team and was employed in the business of developing and researching crating products. The defendant C was employed in the plaintiff on September 30, 2008 and was employed in the plaintiff's research team. The defendant D corporation (hereinafter "the defendant corporation") was established with an investment from the defendant B and C around October 10, 2012 and supplied the plaintiff's cing-type sweet-type sweet-type sweet-type sweet-type swel-type swel-type swel-type swel-type swel-type swel-type.

B. On September 30, 2008, Defendant B and C set back the Plaintiff, and carried out, without permission, the research files containing the manufacturing method of the products, such as co-rating agents, including the Plaintiff’s lucispe (Recispe2).

C. Article 66 (Duty after Retirement) of the Plaintiff’s History provides that “any person retired or dismissed shall not divulge secrets of the company that he/she acquired while in office to another person.” The Plaintiff’s guidelines for research and development duties revised around September 10, 2008 provide that “All data (documents, files, records, etc.) related to research and development shall be classified and managed as external expenses (4.1.2)” and that “any data (documents, files, records, etc.) related to research and development shall belong to the company’s assets at the time of withdrawal of the number of persons participating in research and development.”

D. On August 16, 2004, Defendant B and C prepared and delivered to the Plaintiff a written oath as indicated below.

I swear that, as an employee of the plaintiff, he/she shall maintain and observe the following matters in handling or using "information" and "research results". 1. he/she recognizes that all information assets, such as technical information (inventions, patents, development, production, etc.), and all trade secrets or other data (hereinafter "management information") he/she has acquired with him/herself or with other persons during his/her term of office, are exclusively owned by the plaintiff and has the right to use and dispose of the plaintiff. 2. 3. he/she does not have a relationship of employment or other cooperation (working, adviser, counsel, etc.) with the same competitor by making use of the management information acquired by the plaintiff or the same competitor(s) for one year after his/her retirement. When he/she is fully aware that he/she has become aware of the above contents and has failed to implement the above matters in good faith, he/she assumes all civil or criminal responsibilities pursuant to the plaintiff's rules, and promptly compensate for damages inflicted on the plaintiff.

E. Defendant B and C should not leak out the research materials, which are the Plaintiff’s major business assets, during his/her service in accordance with the Plaintiff’s bylaws, research and development work guidelines, and a written oath, and there was an occupational duty to discard research materials, which are business assets, to the Plaintiff at the time of retirement, so that they do not return them to the Plaintiff or divulge them to the outside.

Nevertheless, Defendant B, in violation of the above occupational duties, removed the Plaintiff’s four research notes from the Plaintiff’s research institute for personal use of the same kind of enterprise in the future, obtained property benefits by without permission, and thereby, inflicted damages equivalent to the same amount on the Plaintiff. Defendant C, around September 30, 2008, left the Plaintiff in violation of the above occupational duties and left the Plaintiff for personal use of the same kind of enterprise as a result of the research files, including the production method of the products developed by the Plaintiff, such as nivers and crating agents, without permission, take out the said files from the Plaintiff’s research institute for personal use of the products, such as nivers and crating agents, and without permission. The Plaintiff obtained property benefits by taking out the Plaintiff’s files of the documents containing the method of manufacturing nivers and results of research, etc. developed by the Plaintiff’s research institute, without permission, and caused considerable damage to the Plaintiff.

Defendant B was sentenced to a suspended sentence of two years on November 6, 2014 in Ulsan District Court Decision 2014Kadan951 in the above crime of breach of trust, and Defendant C was sentenced to a suspended sentence of two years on the same day, and the same day was sentenced to a suspended sentence of two years in the same case. Defendant B, C, and the Prosecutor did not file an appeal on the above case, and the said judgment became final and conclusive on November 14, 2014.

F. The Plaintiff filed a complaint with Defendant B and C on September 30, 2008 with the purport that “The Plaintiff violated the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act (hereinafter “Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade Secret Protection Act”) by means of acquiring files, etc. containing the manufacturing method of the Plaintiff’s vehicle strawing product while withdrawing from the Plaintiff on September 30, 2008, after acquiring files, etc. containing the manufacturing method of the Plaintiff’s vehicle strawing product, and selling the vehicle strawing product by developing and selling the vehicle strawing product.”

The Ulsan District Prosecutors' Office investigated the plaintiff's complaint against the defendant B and C on April 23, 2014 as a result of the investigation into the plaintiff's above complaint, and judged that "the defendant B and C developed a de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto manufacturing process of the plaintiff's automobile waer and sold it to F, but it shall not be deemed as trade secrets because the plaintiff's efforts make it difficult to see that the plaintiff maintained and managed the relevant materials as confidential by considerable effort and thus, it shall not be deemed as trade secrets." (Article 3493, No. 43092 of Ulsan District Prosecutors' Office 2013, No. 43092 of the case).

G. On May 30, 2016, the court requested the G institution’s H appraiser to conduct an appraisal in order to verify whether the Plaintiff’s automobile strawing agents and the automobile strawing agents manufactured by the Defendant Company are identical, but H appraiser attempted to verify the identity of the said two strawing agents through various testing methods and equipment analysis, etc. on September 30, 2016, however, the court requested the instant court to withdraw the appraiser’s designation on the ground that it was impossible to measure the two strawing agents by means of equipment analysis, and that it was no longer possible to conduct an appraisal.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4, Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 5 (including branch numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings.

2. The parties' assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) Although Defendant B and C, even if retired from the Plaintiff, has a job duty to divulge any trade secret and other material that they came to know while on duty to the Plaintiff or to not use for their own interest or for a third party’s interest, in violation of this duty, they carried out without permission the Plaintiff’s automobile strawing technology, which is a trade secret under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, while leaving the Plaintiff, and thereby establishing the Defendant Company and manufacturing automobile strawing agents by utilizing it. The Defendants supplied the strawing agents manufactured as above to F, which are the Plaintiff’s transaction partners, so the Plaintiff cannot supply the strawing agents to the Plaintiff’s existing transaction partners, and the Plaintiff is liable for damages to the Plaintiff as a joint damages, since the Plaintiff was partly liable for damages to the Defendants.

2) Even if the Plaintiff’s automobile string technology does not constitute a trade secret under the Unfair Competition Prevention Act, so long as the above technology was not disclosed to many unspecified persons and the user’s major assets derived from using considerable time, effort and expenses, Defendant B and C’s act of carrying it out without permission constitutes tort. Therefore, the Defendants jointly liable to compensate the Plaintiff as part of the above damages, for damages, for KRW 101,00,000,000, which is part of the damages.

B. The defendants' assertion

1) The Plaintiff is a market-dominating business entity in the field of manufacturing technology of the machinery machinery for automobiles, and filed the instant lawsuit with a view to hindering the Defendant’s access to the detypeing market of the machinery machinery for automobiles. Thus, the instant lawsuit constitutes abuse of rights.

2) Defendant B and C’s technology of manufacturing the Plaintiff’s automobile strawing machinery taken out at the time of retirement does not constitute trade secrets.

3) The Defendants did not use the Plaintiff’s wafering manufacture technology by stealing the Plaintiff’s wafering manufacture technology, and did not produce the same product as the Plaintiff’s wafering mechanism. Accordingly, the Defendant is not liable to compensate the Plaintiff for damages.

3. Determination on the defense prior to the merits

The exercise of the right to trial is also regulated by the principle of trust and good faith in order to protect the other party and secure judicial functions. Thus, the filing of a lawsuit, which solely leads to the bullying of the other party and the unnecessary consumption of judicial human resources, is not permissible as an abuse of the right to trial in violation of the principle of trust and good faith, barring special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da275, May 28, 1999). However, given that the right to trial of a court belongs to the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, in determining that the filing of a lawsuit to realize the right under substantive law is an abuse of the right against the principle of trust and good faith,

However, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit in this case with a market-dominating business operator in the field of machinery manufacturing technology for automobile strawing manufacturing technology constitutes abuse of rights. However, inasmuch as the defendant B and C were found to have withdrawn from the plaintiff's automobile straw straw, etc. of the plaintiff's automobile straw strawing product without permission, the plaintiff must have a doubt as to whether the plaintiff's use of it does not infringe the plaintiff's business interest and thereby infringe the plaintiff's business interest, in light of the fact that the plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit in this case against the defendants is a market-dominating business operator in the field of machinery manufacturing technology for automobile strawing manufacturing technology, and there is no evidence to acknowledge it differently. Accordingly, the plaintiff's defense to the effect that the plaintiff's filing of the lawsuit in this case constitutes abuse of rights is without merit.

4. Judgment on the merits

A. Determination on whether to claim damages

1) Whether the Plaintiff’s wafer manufacturing technology constitutes a trade secret

The term "trade secret" under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act means a production method, sale method, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities, which is not known to the public, and has an independent economic value. The term "trade secret" means a method of production, sale method, and other technical or managerial information useful for business activities, which is maintained in secret by considerable effort. The term "not known to the public" means that the information is not known to many and unspecified persons because it is not known to the general public, such as publication, etc., and (ii) it means that the holder of the information has an independent economic value (economic usefulness), and (iii) it means that the holder of the information can obtain competition benefits through the use of the information, or that considerable expenses or effort is needed for the acquisition or development of the information, and (iv) it means that the information is expressed or notified that it is confidential, and that the information is objectively maintained and managed by the person subject to access to the information or the person who has access to the information, etc., and that the information is imposed on him/her (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Do297.

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the above facts and evidence, i.e., ① the Plaintiff’s vehicle wafer manufacturing technology is not disclosed to the public, and ② the Plaintiff’s vehicle wafer manufacturing technology seems to have been made in the Plaintiff’s considerable time, effort, and expenses. ③ If a competitor acquires the Plaintiff’s vehicle wafer manufacturing technology, it seems that the Plaintiff’s vehicle wafer manufacturing technology would have been capable of gaining competitive benefits, such as reducing the costs of manufacturing the vehicle wafering and cutting the products. ④ In full view of the fact that the domestic company holding the vehicle wafer manufacturing technology appears to have difficulty in developing the technology to the extent that it would be difficult for the Plaintiff, including the Plaintiff, to reach three parts, the Plaintiff’s vehicle wafer manufacturing technology is deemed to have the economic usefulness and utility.

However, in full view of the aforementioned facts and arguments, the following circumstances are as follows. ① The Plaintiff, including Defendant B and C, had researchers keep data on the Plaintiff’s automobile strawing manufacturer’s own computers, and did not take security measures to protect the Plaintiff’s personal computers, and neglected to allow anyone to access and copy data on the Plaintiff’s automobile strawing manufacturer’s computer, ② The Plaintiff did not designate a security officer or a manager in charge of the Plaintiff’s automobile strawing manufacturer’s technical data file stored in the Plaintiff’s personal computer; ③ the Plaintiff did not separately conduct security education against his employees; ④ the Plaintiff’s research files or research notes do not have a separate sign that can be perceived as confidential data; and ④ the Plaintiff’s need for security information did not have been classified as confidential data, and thus, the Plaintiff’s secret manufacturing technology data did not meet the Plaintiff’s secret manufacturing technology requirements.

2) Whether the Defendants manufactured products identical to the Plaintiff’s wafering agents by stealing the Plaintiff’s wafering manufacture technology

As seen earlier, in order to verify whether H appraisers designated by this Court had the same technology as the Plaintiff’s lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lussor lussor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lussor lusssor lusor lusor lussor lusor lusor lusor lusssor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor lusor.

3) Whether the Defendants are liable for tort

If an employee disclosed a trade secret to a competitor or ships it out without permission for the purpose of using it for his/her own interest, the act of taking it out constitutes a tort under the Civil Act at the same time (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 201Da6700, Jun. 28, 2012; 201Da6717, Jun. 28, 201).

In light of the above legal principles, in full view of the following facts and circumstances acknowledged by the Defendants’ aforementioned facts and the purport of the arguments, Defendant B and C shall not leak out research materials, which are the Plaintiff’s main business assets, during his/her service pursuant to the Plaintiff’s regulations and research and development work guidelines, and a pledge. Even if there were occupational duties to return or discard research materials, which are business assets, to the Plaintiff at the time of retirement, to the Plaintiff, or not leak out of the outside, the Defendants’ technical materials, including the Plaintiff’s construction machinery strawpe, were removed without permission for personal use at the time of the Plaintiff’s withdrawal of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Defendants’ act of manufacturing and using the Plaintiff’s construction machinery strawle, which was removed without permission, constitutes an act of removing the Plaintiff’s business secrets from the Plaintiff’s business assets without permission, and thus, the Defendants’ act of removing them from the Plaintiff’s construction machinery strawle to the Plaintiff’s construction machinery strawle to improve the problems of the Plaintiff’s construction machinery straw.

① The Defendant C stated to the effect that, upon undergoing the police investigation, it is impossible for the Defendant C to produce and sell trade secret files related to the manufacture, such as the Plaintiff’s vehicle wale wale wale wale and wale wale wale wale, which were used in the production of the same kind of product by referring to the Plaintiff’s vehicle wale wale wale wale, which can be produced and sold for a short period of up to 2 to 4 months, and that if it was not possible for the Plaintiff to obtain trade secret files related to the manufacture, such as the Plaintiff’s vehicle wale wale wale wale.

According to the above statements by Defendant C, the Defendants seems to have been able to make a short-term manufacturing of le-type le-type le-type le-type le-type le-type le-type le-type le-type le-type le-raying agents using the Plaintiff’s le-

② Defendant B, under the investigation by the police and the prosecution, made the Defendant Company’s co-rating agents on the basis of the Plaintiff’s co-rating agents, and stated that when manufacturing samples, Defendant B made it the same as Plaintiff Lescam in terms of making samples, and subsequently, Defendant B made efforts to see Plaintiff Lescam and to reduce the defective quality by comparing Plaintiff Lescam with other parts of defective products when manufacturing samples.

According to the above statements by Defendant B, the Defendants made sampling using the Plaintiff’s lusium lusium, without permission, using the Plaintiff’s lusium lusium, and analyzed the above lusium and developed the manufacturing technology of lusium lusium lusium in a way that improves the problems of the lusium lusium.

③ In the Republic of Korea, only three companies including the Plaintiff are required for the development of automobile machinery machinery and tools to the extent of holding the manufacturing technology of strawing manufacturer. Nevertheless, it seems that the Defendant Company, which only had three researchers, was able to manufacture the strawing agents for automobiles in the process of developing the strawing manufacturer technology after the establishment of the Defendant Company, which only had three researchers, could have manufactured the strawing agents for automobiles. After the Defendant Company’s production of samples using the strawing agents for automobiles carried out from the Plaintiff Company without permission as stated in the investigation agency by the Defendant Company B, as stated in the investigation agency, after analyzing the strawing agents for the Plaintiff’s automobile, and improving the problems discovered by analyzing the strawing agents for the Plaintiff’s automobile, it seems that the Plaintiff Company could avoid many mistakes in the process of developing the strawing manufacturer manufacturing technology.

B. Determination on the scope of liability for damages

In a lawsuit seeking compensation for damages caused by a tort, where it is deemed that the occurrence of property damage is recognized, but it is difficult to prove the specific amount of damage in light of the nature of the case, the court may determine the amount of damage in proximate causal relation by comprehensively taking into account all the relevant indirect facts, including the relationship between the parties, which is revealed by the result of examination of evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings, the background leading up to the occurrence of a tort and property damage caused thereby, the nature of the damage, and all the circumstances after the occurrence of the damage (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Da6700,

살피건대, 위 인정사실과 앞서 든 증거들 및 변론 전체의 취지를 종합하여 인정되는 다음과 같은 사정들 즉, ① 피고 회사와 같은 원고의 경쟁사가 원고의 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 레시피 등 기술자료를 무단으로 취득하여 사용할 경우 기술개발에 소요되는 비용 절감 등 경쟁상의 이익을 얻을 수 있을 것으로 보이나, 위와 같은 기술자료는 별도로 거래되지 않아 그 가격을 산출하기가 성질상 곤란한 점, ② 앞서 본 바와 같이 피고 회사가 생산한 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제가 원고가 생산한 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제와 동일한지 알기 어렵고, 그 유사한 정도를 추단할 수 있는 자료 역시 부족한 점, ③ 피고 회사는 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 관련 특허를 등록하는 등 원고가 보유하지 못한 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 관련 기술 중 일부를 확보한 것으로 보이는바, 이러한 피고 회사의 기술력이 피고 회사가 생산한 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제에 얼마나 반영되었는지 구체적으로 알 수 있는 자료가 없는 점 등을 두루 감안하면, 이 사건에서 원고의 손해액을 증명하는 것은 성질상 매우 곤란하다고 할 것이다. 다만, 위 인정사실과 앞서 든 증거들 및 이 법원의 F에 대한 2017. 4. 18.자 사실조회 회신결과, 이 법원의 금정세무서장에 대한 2017. 4. 27.자 사실조회 회신결과에 변론 전체의 취지를 종합하여 인정되는 다음과 같은 사정들 즉, ① 피고들이 무단 반출한 원고의 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 레시피 등 기술자료는 원고가 상당한 시간, 노력 및 비용을 투입하여 작성한 것으로 보이는 점, ② 피고 회사가 원고의 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 레시피 등 기술자료를 활용하여 시행착오를 피함으로써 원고 등 정상적인 개발과정을 거쳐 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제를 제작한 업체들보다 가격 경쟁력을 갖출 수 있었을 것으로 보이는 점, ③ 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제를 제작하는 업체가 국내에는 원고를 포함하여 3개뿐이었던 점을 감안하면, 피고 회사가 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제를 원고보다 저럼한 가격에 F에 납품하지 아니하였다면, F는 원고로부터 지금까지 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제를 계속하여 납품 받았을 것으로 보이는 점, ④ 원고의 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 레시피 등 기술자료의 유용성이 인정되는 기간이 얼마인지 정확히 알 수는 없으나, 원고의 위 기술자료의 내용과 경제적 유용성, 원고가 입은 손해의 성격, 피고들의 불법행위의 태양, 원고와 피고들의 관계, 피고 B, C의 원고에서의 직책 및 그 배임행위의 비난 가능성 정도, 원고와 피고 회사의 사업 규모 등 이 사건 변론에 나타난 제반 사정을 고려할 때, 원고가 입은 손해는 피고들이 원고의 위 기술자료를 이용하여 개발한 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 제품 (품목명 : I)을 F에 납품함으로써 원고와 F간의 거래가 중단된 2013. 2. 28.경부터 2017. 1. 24.경까지 4년 정도의 기간 동안 입은 손해로 제한하는 것이 타당한 점, ⑤ 피고 B은 수사기관에서 '피고 회사가 (자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제를) kg당 9,800원에 납품을 하더라도 제조 경비를 빼고 10~15% 정도의 이윤이 발생했기 때문에 위 가격에 납품하였다'는 취지로 진술하였는바, 피고 B의 이 부분 진술에 의하면, 피고 회사는 F에 납품하고 받은 물품대금 중 최소한 10% 정도의 순수익을 취득하였을 것으로 보이는 점, ⑥ 피고 회사가 2013. 2. 28.부터 2017. 1, 24.까지 4년 정도의 기간 동안 F에 납품한 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 제품(품목명 : I)의 물품대금 합계가 4,512,920,750원[= 459,016,850원(2013년 납품가액) + 896,486,930원(2014년 납품가액) + 1,174,442,800원(2015년 납품가액) + 1,724,563,790원(2016년 납품가액) + 258,410,380원(2017년 납품가액)]인 점, ⑦ 피고 회사가 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제 관련 기술에 관한 특허를 등록하였고, F가 이 법원의 사실조회에 '피고 회사의 코팅제 제품이 가장 우수하기에 양산 적용하였다'는 취지로 회신하였는바, 이에 비추어 피고 회사가 원고의 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제의 레시피를 활용하기는 하였으나, 원고의 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제보다 성능을 개선하였을 것으로 보이므로, 피고 회사가 F에 자동차용 웨더 스트립 코팅제를 납품하여 올린 수익 전부가 원고의 자동차용 웨더스트립 코팅제의 레시피를 무단 반출 및 사용한 이 사건 불법행위와 상당인과관계 있는 손해라고 보기는 곤란한 점 등의 사정들을 종합해 보면, 원고가 피고들의 공동불법행위로 입은 손해액은 위 물품대금의 2% 상당액인 90,000,000원으로 정함이 상당하다.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the Defendants are jointly liable to jointly pay the Plaintiff damages amounting to KRW 90,00,00 and the damages for delay calculated at the rate of 15% per annum from March 7, 2015, which is the day following the date when the copy of the complaint of this case was served on the Defendants as the last day of the tort, to the extent of existence or scope of the performance obligation of this case from March 7, 2015 to June 28, 2017, which is the date when the judgment was rendered by the Defendants. The Defendants are liable to pay damages for delay calculated at the rate of 20% per annum from the date following the date when the copy of the complaint of this case was served on the Defendants. However, since the damages for delay exceeds the rate of 15% per annum from the date when the copy of the complaint of this case was served to the date when the payment was made, the damages for delay exceeds the rate of 15% per annum from the date following the date when the complaint of this case was delivered to the Defendants.

5. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim against the defendants is justified within the scope of each of the above recognition, and each of the remaining claims is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges in the future;

Judge Lee Jong-soo

Judge Lee Jong-chul

1) Motor vehicle wafering agents are rubber materials that maintain the nature of rubber attached to the motor vehicle’s even part for a long time and contain in rubber to prevent noise and water leakage.

2) Leicpe is a document that serves as the design drawings in the production of a chemical product, containing the name of the product, the names of raw materials entered into the product, input quantities, working methods, physical properties, etc., as a work instruction prepared to manufacture a specific product.

3) The Plaintiff calculated the total value of the goods supplied by the Defendant Company to F for automobile strawing agents at KRW 4,547,420,075, and calculated the amount of damages based on this. However, according to the result of the Defendant Company’s response to the fact-finding conducted on April 4, 2017 by the Head of the Gold District Tax Office, the total value of the goods supplied by the Defendant Company to F is calculated as KRW 4,512,920,750, and it appears that there was an error in calculation in calculating the supply value of the Defendant Company.