Cases where the measurement of autonomous possession is reversed;

Even if a person who is liable to implement the procedure for cancellation by completing a registration of ownership transfer through a null and void farmland distribution procedure has occupied the above land from the previous landowner, insofar as the land at issue was distributed by filing an application for distribution of farmland on the ground that it is small farmland in the above farmland distribution procedure and paid the redemption, it shall not be deemed that he/she occupied the above land with his/her intention.

Article 200 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and two others

Seoul District Court of First Instance (68Ga9192)

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendants.

Defendant 2: (a) On March 6, 1965, the Seodaemun-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government Seodaemun-gu 109-1 forest land of 97, Defendant 2 performed the procedure for cancelling the registration of transfer of ownership on July 15, 1967 and June 2, 19949 of the same year with respect to the ownership transfer on January 25, 1965 and/or 1/2 co-ownership on February 23, 1960 with respect to the same 1/2 co-ownership of forest land of 109, the same registry office as the Seoul Metropolitan Government Seodaemun-gu 109-2 forest land of 109-2 forest land of Seodaemun-gu, Seoul Metropolitan Government, and Defendant 1 and 3 performed the procedure for cancelling the registration of transfer of ownership on November 15, 1965 as the receipt of No. 36983, Nov. 15, 1965.

The original judgment shall be revoked.

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

(1) The forest land of 109-2 forest land of 109-2 forest land of 107 square meters and 109-2 forest land of Seodaemun-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government was originally the same at least 109 to 7198, but the land category was changed on September 2, 1960 to the forest land, which was partitioned into two lots on the same day, and all of the land was registered as Nonparty 1, and the ownership transfer registration was completed on September 3, 1958 on August 9, 1958; on 109-1 forest and field of 109-2 forest and field of 109-2 forest and field of 109-2 forest and field of 109-2 forest land; on March 6, 1965, the ownership transfer registration was received on the land of 209-1 forest and field of 197-2 forest and the remaining co-ownership share was received by Defendant 1, 23444.196.

(2) However, due to the distribution and repayment under the Farmland Reform Act as above, the registration of ownership transfer was made on the part of the non-party 2, who was the defendant in the original trial. However, considering the witness non-party 3's testimony, non-party 4's testimony, part of the testimony and the result of field inspection in the original trial and the court of the trial on the part of the non-party 6, 12, where there is no dispute in its establishment, this land is a forest where an average of 35 Does as of now, and most of which are covered by the natural pine trees, trees, brus, and miscellaneous trees, etc. are covered by the first instance court's 20 years or more, but the fruit trees, etc. are planted on the part of the ground, and there is an industrial accident witness with which the time of development cannot be known as the directors of the fruit trees, but it is contrary to the present status of the non-party 4's testimony under the Farmland Reform Act and its contents cannot be acknowledged as being part of the present evidence.

Therefore, in light of the objective form of the entire land recognized above, it shall be deemed that the land was farmland of the nature that it would have to be distributed to the farmer at the time of the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act, and therefore, it shall not be deemed that the land was farmland of the nature that it would have to be distributed to the farmer under the distribution procedure of the general farmland. Accordingly, according to the distribution procedure of the general farmland, the disposition distributed to the plaintiff 2, who was the defendant in the court below, and the transfer registration of ownership made on the ground of it shall be deemed null and void a year, and each registration of transfer of ownership made on the ground of the defendant 1, 3, and 2 shall be deemed null and void a cause registration. Considering the whole purport of the parties' argument in Gap evidence No. 4 without dispute, the plaintiff is the second child of the mother who died on July 30, 1957, and the defendants shall be obligated to register the cancellation registration of each of the above causes to the plaintiff.

(3) The Defendants’ legal representative asserted that (A) the instant land was owned by Nonparty 2’s father Nonparty 7, who was the Defendant at the lower court; (b) the Plaintiff’s father and Nonparty 8 had a monetary lending relationship; (c) the ownership transfer registration was made without any cause in Nonparty 9, a major child of Nonparty 8, the Plaintiff’s father and Nonparty 8, without cause; (d) the deceased Nonparty 7 filed a lawsuit claiming confirmation of ownership and cancellation of ownership transfer registration in 1932 (No. 2487 of the Hosung District Court Decision 1932), and the winning was confirmed; (e) Nonparty 7 occupied the instant land openlyly and openly with the intention of ownership from March 1932, 193, and thereafter, Nonparty 2 succeeded to and occupied the Plaintiff’s father and Nonparty 10 again, and thus, the ownership transfer registration was completed for a period of 195 years and more due to the completion of the ownership transfer registration.

However, it is sufficient to recognize that the deceased non-party 7 occupied and cultivated the land in this case from the time when the Defendants asserted, except for part of the contents of Eul evidence Nos. 6 which the plaintiff agreed not to believe, and in view of the whole purport of the parties' arguments in the contents of Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 1 and 2, the plaintiff's mother's transfer registration of ownership in the future was made on September 29, 193. The non-party 2 was bound to apply for the distribution of farmland on the ground that the land was small farmland when the Farmland Reform Act was promulgated, and was distributed as farmland on the ground that the land was distributed as farmland on the ground that it was small farmland, and it is sufficient to recognize the fact that the non-party 2 was paid in advance between Jun. 16, 1955 and Aug. 9, 1958, at least that the non-party 2 did not possess the land in this case and it cannot be accepted as evidence that the non-party 2 did not have acquired the land in this case as his intention (the non-party 2).

(B) Non-party 2 received the land as farmland and continued to occupy it in a peaceful manner with the intention to hold the ownership transfer on September 3, 1958 and completed the registration of ownership transfer on September 3, 1958. The Defendants, after completing the registration of ownership transfer on the grounds of each term sale or successful bid, succeeded to the possession and continued to hold it at present. Thus, it is obvious in the records that the prescriptive acquisition period of 10 years was completed on September 2, 1969, but it was received on September 2, 1969, so the above assertion also is unnecessary to make a decision above.

(C) In addition, since Defendant 1 and Defendant 3 completed the registration of ownership transfer on the land in question by a final and conclusive judgment against Nonparty 2 of the lower court, they asserted that the Plaintiff’s claim for cancellation of this case by subrogation of Nonparty 2’s right (right of cancellation) conflict with the res judicata of the final and conclusive judgment, but the Plaintiff’s claim for cancellation of this case’s claim for cancellation of this case is a claim based on his ownership (it refers to the assertion that the Plaintiff’s claim for cancellation of ownership is not a registration of inheritance, which is erroneous in the misunderstanding of Articles 186 and 187 of the Civil Act) and the above assertion is groundless

(4) Thus, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified and accepted. Since the original judgment is the same with the original judgment, the defendant's appeal is dismissed pursuant to Article 384 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Noh Jeong-ho (Presiding Judge)