1. The plaintiff's appeal shall be dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by C.

Purport of claim and appeal

The judgment of the first instance.

1. The judgment of the court of first instance on the legitimacy of the appeal of this case rendered a declaration of the termination of the lawsuit following the withdrawal of the lawsuit by the plaintiff (the chief known D), but it is evident that C filed the appeal of this case by asserting that it is not the plaintiff's representative but the plaintiff's representative is not the plaintiff's representative

Therefore, I examine whether C has the authority to file an appeal on behalf of the plaintiff.

A. The summary of C’s assertion 1) The Plaintiff was a traditional temple built in 1656, and the Korean Traditional Temples Preservation and Support Act on June 10, 198 (hereinafter “Korean Traditional Temples Act”).

(2) The Plaintiff was registered as a traditional temple under the Korean Traditional Temples Act, and the Plaintiff’s believers was organized in March 1949 and continued to exist until now. C was appointed as the Plaintiff’s chief minister on the recommendation of the Plaintiff’s New Buddhist Temples Association. (2) The Defendant was registered on November 18, 191, and the Plaintiff was arbitrarily incorporated into his own jurisdiction without due process under the Korean Traditional Temples Act.

Therefore, D, appointed according to the defendant's constitution, is not a legitimate representative of the plaintiff.

3) Even if D is a legitimate representative of the Plaintiff, it is also possible for D to appoint multiple inspectors. As such, C, recommended by the Plaintiff’s New Dos Association, is a legitimate representative, who is the Plaintiff’s well-known. 4) Accordingly, the instant appeal filed by C as a representative of the Plaintiff is lawful.

B. 1) Determination 1) If a temple belongs to it by establishing a legal relation with a specific religious group, it shall be deemed as a constituent member of the relevant association. Since the specific constitution and method of the relevant religious group, which is an autonomous law of an association with regard to such constituent members, is applied to the inspection to which it belongs, the right to appoint and dismiss the chief chief inspector of the relevant religious group is lost, and the right to appoint and dismiss the chief inspector of the inspection belongs to the relevant religious group (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da6045, Jul. 14, 1995). In light of the following circumstances recognized by comprehensively considering the records of this case and the overall purport of the arguments, C shall be deemed as a legitimate representative of the Plaintiff.