The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Even if the name of the person who acquired the ownership of the real estate immediately before the piracy on August 15, 1945 is Japanese-type, it is right to presume that the nominal owner is not a Japanese person, but rather a Korean person who made a creative name as a Korean person, in light of the situation of the creative name after the piracy and the restoration thereof.

However, if there are special circumstances to regard the nominal owner as a Japanese person, such as the use of the Japanese style name before the new name was implemented, such presumption shall be broken if such special circumstances are recognized.

(See Supreme Court Decision 71Da226 delivered on March 9, 1971, and Supreme Court Decision 79Da728 delivered on November 27, 1979). 2. A.

The lower court determined that the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone was insufficient to recognize that the Defendant acquired the part of the dispute, even though it was not a property devolving upon the property owned by the Plaintiff, on the premise that B, registered on May 8, 1942, as the owner of the part of the dispute of this case, was a Republic of Korea in which the name of the owner of

In light of the above legal principles, the ownership of the dispute portion of this case was presumed to be the Republic of Korea, so in order to determine B as the property devolving upon the dispute portion of this case as Japan, the respondent should reverse this presumption by citing the circumstances to see B as a Japanese person, as a counter-proof.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the burden of proof that the court below judged the portion of the dispute in this case as the vested property on the premise that the plaintiff must prove that it is Korea.

B. Meanwhile, the lower court, based on the circumstances indicated in its reasoning, held that the instant dispute portion does not constitute property devolving upon the Plaintiff’s father, and, based on the circumstances indicated in its reasoning, held possession through the deceased F or the Plaintiff on Jan. 1, 2004, which entered into a loan agreement with the Plaintiff’s father after completing the registration of ownership transfer on the dispute portion, and held possession without negligence.