The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The identity of the party to the contract is a matter of interpretation of the intent of the party involved;

The interpretation of a declaration of intent is to clearly confirm the objective meaning that the parties have given to the act of indicating, and where the content of a contract is written in writing between the parties to the contract, it shall not be cited in the phrase used in writing, but it shall reasonably interpret the objective meaning that the parties have given to the act of indicating, in accordance with the content of the document, regardless of the parties’ internal intent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da5122, Jun. 30, 1995; 2000Da27923, Oct. 6, 2000). In this case, if the objective meaning of the text is clear, the existence and content of the declaration of intention shall be recognized as stipulated in the text, unless there are any special circumstances.

(2) The court below’s determination of whether a factual assertion is true in accordance with logical and empirical rules on the basis of the ideology of social justice and equity based on free evaluation of evidence (Article 202 of the Civil Procedure Act), and the fact duly confirmed by the court below that the court below did not go beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence is binding on the court of final appeal, by taking into account the entire purport of pleadings and the result of examination of evidence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 200Da72572, May 24, 2002; 201Da44471, Nov. 29, 2012)

(Article 432 of the same Act)

2. The lower court determined as follows on the grounds stated in its reasoning.

Unless there are special circumstances, the instant goods contract is a stock company B (hereinafter “B”), and thus, it is difficult to deem the Defendant as the contractual party to the instant goods supply contract or the instant repayment agreement as the contractual party.

B. The Defendant had B, contrary to the purport of Article 7-2 of the former Act on the Establishment of Organizations, Including Persons of Distinguished Service to the State (amended by Act No. 13195, Feb. 3, 2015).