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(영문) 대법원 1993. 8. 13. 선고 93도1118 판결
[교통사고처리특례법위반][집41(2)형,747;공1993.10.1.(953),2484]
Main Issues

The meaning of "when a pedestrian passes a crosswalk" under subparagraph 3 of Article 48 of the Road Traffic Act;

Summary of Judgment

A pedestrian under Article 48 subparagraph 3 of the Road Traffic Act who is passing a crosswalk shall not mean all the cases in which the person passes the crosswalk, but it shall be limited to the case where the person passes the crosswalk with the intention to cross the road, so if the victim was up to the crosswalk at the time of the accident, it is obvious that it cannot be said that the victim was passing the crosswalk, and in relation to such victim, it shall not be deemed that the pedestrian is obliged to protect the pedestrian in the crosswalk.

[Reference Provisions]

Subparagraph 3 of Article 48 of the Road Traffic Act, the proviso to Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Prosecutor

Judgment of the lower court

Incheon District Court Decision 93No33 delivered on March 18, 1993

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

The First Ground for Appeal

According to the records, the fact-finding by the court below is acceptable, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence such as theory of lawsuit. There is no reason to argue.

The Second Ground of Appeal

Article 3 (2) (proviso) 6 of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents provides that "in the case of operating a vehicle in violation of the duty to protect pedestrians at a crosswalk under Article 48 (3) of the Road Traffic Act" shall not apply to cases where the main sentence of Article 48 (2) of the same Act concerning the crime of failing to take measures. Article 48 (3) of the Road Traffic Act provides that "if a pedestrian passes a crosswalk, the driver of any motor vehicle shall temporarily stop or slowly stop and stop so as not to obstruct the passage of the crosswalk." Thus, the purpose of the Road Traffic Act is to ensure the safe and smooth traffic by preventing and removing all dangers and obstacles to the traffic (Article 1 of the same Act) and it is reasonable to interpret that "in the case where a pedestrian under Article 48 (3) of the same Act passes along the crosswalk, it does not mean all cases where the person is on the crosswalk, but it shall be limited to cases where the driver passes the crosswalk with his intention to cross the crosswalk.

However, according to the facts established by the court below, it is evident that at the time of the accident, the victim was placed on the crosswalk, so it cannot be said that he had passed the crosswalk. Thus, the defendant, who is the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, is not obliged to protect the pedestrian in relation to the victim.

Therefore, the court below's revocation of the judgment of the court of first instance which found the defendant guilty of the facts charged of this case on the ground that the above accident vehicle does not fall under the proviso of Article 3 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents and is admitted to the Financial Cooperative under Article 4 (2) of the same Act, and dismissal of the prosecution of this case under Article 327 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act is justifiable, and there is no error of law such as misapprehension

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jong-dong (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-인천지방법원 1993.3.18.선고 93노33