1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. During the disposition, the following facts are: short-term sojourn status visit (C-3) on November 4, 2014, the date of entry into the Republic of Korea of the Republic of Korea of the Plaintiff-U.S. (hereinafter “instant disposition”) (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on November 19, 2014, the date of application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “the date of application for refugee status”): The fact that there is no dispute over the grounds for recognition of the decision to dismiss the decision of October 27, 2016 on February 24, 2016; the fact that there is no ground for recognition of the decision to dismiss the decision of the decision of October 27, 2016; the entries in Gap, Eul’s evidence Nos. 1 and 2; Eul’s evidence No. 1 through 4; the purport of the entire

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion is a national of the Republic of Camera (hereinafter referred to as "Kamera").

On May 2005, the plaintiff was living in the North Northern region of Kamera, and around 2005, the village of the plaintiff living in the Republic of Korea was attacked by Bomeri, a Islamic armed organization, and went back to Thailand after getting damaged in 2006, and entered the Republic of Korea around November 2014.

As such, the Plaintiff should be recognized as a refugee because it is likely to cause harm to the life and body of the Plaintiff, if he/she returns to Kamera.

B. Determination 1) Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act defines refugee status as “any foreigner who is unable to be protected or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, status as a member of a specific social group, or political opinion, or is a stateless foreigner who is unable to return to or does not want to return to the country in which he/she had resided before entering the Republic of Korea due to such fear.” 2) In full view of the following circumstances revealed by the evidence as seen earlier, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have “a well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion,” and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.