2013Da62285 Registration of transfer of ownership

2013Da62292 (Consolidation) Transfer of Ownership

The person who received the lawsuit from the deceased A

1. B

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

7. H;

Korea

Guro-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government

Seoul High Court Decision 2012Na 105, 2012Na122 decided July 17, 2013 (Joint)

Judgment

November 29, 2017

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant (Defendant 1) on the existence of the grounds of retrial, the lower court acknowledged facts as indicated in its reasoning after compiling the adopted evidence, and it is reasonable to view that the evidence used as the grounds of rejection of the request by the deceased A in the judgment of retrial was lost due to the pronouncement and confirmation of innocence by the parties concerned. Thus, the judgment of retrial in this case determined that there was a ground for retrial of “when a criminal judgment, which served as the basis of the judgment under Article 451 subparag. 8 of the Civil Procedure Act, was changed according to another judgment.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal by the defendant (hereinafter "defendant") in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to grounds for retrial or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment

2. As to the ground of appeal on the part of the claim for ownership transfer registration

A. After compiling the adopted evidence, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its reasoning. The court below rejected the plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff") who were the heir of the network A until December 31, 1998 when three years have passed since the former Farmland Act ( enacted by Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994 and enforced January 1, 1996; hereinafter referred to as "former Farmland Act") did not complete the repayment and registration of the farmland price for the distributed farmland of this case, so it is impossible to acquire ownership under the provisions of the Farmland Reform Act and the Special Assistance Act because it is not possible to acquire ownership under the provisions of the Act. In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the judgment of the court below is justifiable, and there is no violation of Article 2 and Article 3 of the Addenda of the former Farmland Act and Article 208 of the former Farmland Act or there is no need to modify the legal principles as to the interpretation of Article 209 of the former Farmland Act.

B. The plaintiffs asserted that since they failed to complete the repayment of farmland price within the period stipulated in Article 3 of the Addenda of the former Farmland Act due to the defendant's illegal act, they may be deemed to be qualified under Article 150 of the Civil Act. However, this cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal as a new argument that is imposed upon the court of final appeal. In addition, the repayment of farmland price falls under the so-called statutory condition stipulated in the Farmland Reform Act as the requirements for acquisition of ownership, and therefore, Article 150 of the Civil Act cannot be applied or applied by analogy. Thus, the above plaintiffs

C. On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the Plaintiffs could not be deemed to have obtained benefits without any legal ground, on the grounds that the Plaintiffs became unable to acquire ownership of each piece of land listed in the [Attachment 1 and 2] real estate list of the lower judgment due to the repayment of farmland price due to the failure to complete the repayment of farmland within the period stipulated in Article 3 of the Addenda of the former Farmland Act.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the plaintiffs' grounds of appeal, there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to unjust enrichment,

3. As to the Plaintiffs and Defendant’s grounds of appeal on the claim for damages

A. As to the occurrence of liability for damages and the extinctive prescription, the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning after comprehensively taking account of the adopted evidence, and determined that the Defendant was liable to compensate the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs, who were the deceased A or his heir, due to a series of illegal acts from May 1, 1953 to October 11, 1979, even if the deceased A was legally distributed the farmland of this case.

Furthermore, the court below, after compiling the adopted evidence, accepted the plaintiffs' re-claim that the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription cannot be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith, and rejected the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription. In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just. In so doing, contrary to the defendant's grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the intention or negligence of a public official as to liability for State, occurrence of damages, causation between illegal act and damages

B. As to the scope of liability for damages, etc., the lower court acknowledged the facts as indicated in its reasoning by comprehensively taking account of the adopted evidence, and determined that if there was no Defendant’s series of illegal acts, the deceased A or the Plaintiffs acquired the instant distributed farmland in return for the payment of farmland, which was not acquired due to the Defendant’s illegal act, and that the damage therefrom was realized due to the impossibility of the Plaintiffs’ acquisition of ownership after the lapse of December 31, 1998, the farmland payment under Article 3 of the Addenda of the former Farmland Act was due to the payment of the farmland payment. Furthermore, the lower court deemed that the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs were the market value calculated based on the “before the current status at the time of distributing each land listed in the [Attachment 1, 2, and 3] of the lower judgment at the time of December 31, 1998, and calculated the amount of damages in accordance with its judgment on the basis of the market price appraisal result at the lower court.

In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal by the plaintiffs and the defendant, there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of damages, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. In addition, it cannot be said that the court below did not deduct the amount converted into the amount of grain received at the time of December 31, 1998 in the farmland distribution year

2) Meanwhile, in light of the relevant legal principles and records, we affirm that the lower court did not offset the negligence, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles on offsetting the negligence, contrary to what is alleged in the Defendant’s grounds of appeal.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jung-hwa

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Jeju High Court Decision 201Na1548

Justices Park Sang-ok