In a case where the former representative director of a corporation actually exercises the authority of the representative director and uses a promissory note with the name of the former representative director of the said corporation, which was used in his name from a provisional date with the approval of the latter representative director, as the representative director of the said corporation, whether it constitutes the crime of preparation of qualification-based securities and its exercise (affirmative)

If the defendant, who had been employed as the representative director of a corporation, still issued and used a promissory note with the name of the above representative director of the corporation, which had been used before, despite the fact that the representative director had been changed to another person, was indicated as the representative director of the above corporation, and still used the promissory note with the name of the above company as its representative director, even if he obtained the approval of the former representative director in preparing and exercising the promissory note, or the defendant who actually exercised his authority as the representative director of the above company temporarily used his name as the former representative director due to the change of the current contract with the bank, it cannot be deemed as the exercise of authority as a legitimate representative director, and thus constitutes

Articles 215 and 217 of the Criminal Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Han, Attorneys Park Dong-young and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellant-appellee)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Jeon Jong-gu

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 89No5851 delivered on February 9, 1990

The appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. As to occupational embezzlement:

According to the evidence admitted by the court of first instance as cited by the court below, it can be sufficiently recognized that the crime of occupational embezzlement in the judgment against the defendant is committed, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence such as the theory of lawsuit or misunderstanding the legal principles on the crime of embezzlement. Therefore, the argument is groundless.

2. As to the preparation and exercise of a promissory note in the name of the representative director of the non-indicted company 1, who has been employed as the representative director of the non-indicted company 1 (hereinafter referred to as the "non-indicted 1") from around November 26, 1985, and the defendant still exercised the issuance of a promissory note with the name of the above representative director of the above company, indicating the defendant as the representative director of the non-indicted 1's company, although the representative director of the non-indicted 1 was changed to the non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's name, the defendant's act of preparing and exercising a promissory note in the name of the representative director of the above company, which has no right to perform his duties as the representative director due to the change of the representative director of the non-indicted 1's company, or the defendant's exercise of authority as the representative director's actual representative director of the bank's company's title.

3. Therefore, the defendant's appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-ju (Presiding Justice)