A. Violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act in a case where the cost of appointment is paid upon a request for the appointment of an attorney (negative)

(b) In cases where the nominal owner is affixed to a false trust deed with the seal affixed thereon, the sex of the crime of forging and forging private documents (affirmative);

A. An act in receipt of a request for the appointment of a lawyer shall not be deemed to constitute an act in receipt of money and valuables under the pretext of solicitation or solicitation for cases or affairs handled by a public official under Article 54 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act.

B. In a case where one copy of another’s trust deed, which is a private document pertaining to rights and duties, was prepared, and the completion was presented and sealed as if it were other documents, and then submitted it to the court as evidence, the crime of forging and uttering of the private document is established.

A. Article 54 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 3594 of Dec. 31, 1982), Article 78 subparagraph 1 B of the Attorney-at-Law Act, Article 231 and Article 234 of the Criminal Act

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee Young-su, Kim Tae-tae

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 82No6140 decided March 18, 1983

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Criminal Court.

1. We examine the Defendant’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 1.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below recognized the fact that the defendant received 500,000 won from the victim to the police officer in charge of the defendant's fraudulent act of the person who is under detention in the Mosong Police Station in favor of the victim, and maintained the judgment of the court of first instance applying Article 54 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act to the above act.

However, even if the court of first instance examined the evidence of the above fact-finding, there is no evidence to prove that the above money was received under the pretext of giving the defendant's solicitation to the police officer in charge and release (the victim stated in the court of first instance as if the defendant requested the main interrogation of the prosecutor to the police officer in charge, and then changed the statement that he requested the money to be given by the attorney during the cross-examination of the defense counsel after he made a statement as if he requested the defendant to release the main interrogation by requesting the police officer in charge). Rather, according to the statement of the judicial police officer in the process of handling affairs by the victim and the statement of the first instance trial witness in the court of first instance, it is recognized that the defendant received the above money with the expenses of appointing the attorney. Accordingly, the act of receiving the expenses of the appointment at the request of the attorney-at-law constitutes an act of offering money or goods under the pretext of soliciting or arranging the case or affairs conducted by a public official provided in Article 54 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 3594).

Ultimately, the court below maintained the judgment of the court of first instance which recognized facts in violation of the rules of evidence without any evidence, and therefore, it is reasonable to discuss this point.

2. We also examine the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 6.

According to the evidence adopted by the court of first instance by the court below, it is sufficiently recognized that the defendant prepared one copy of the trust certificate in the name of the victim, which is a private document concerning rights and obligations, and presented and sealed it to the victim as if it were a document with other contents, as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, and that he forged one copy of the trust certificate in the name of the same person and submitted it to the court as evidence and used it as evidence, and there is no error of violation of the rules of evidence, lack of reason, or misapprehension of the legal principles as to the crime of forging and uttering of private documents in the first instance court's findings of fact

3. Ultimately, the part of the judgment of the court below regarding the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act cannot be maintained illegally. Since the court of first instance imposed the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act and the crime of fabrication and uttering of private documents as concurrent crimes, the entire judgment of the court below is reversed and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Criminal Court, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Lee Sung-soo (Presiding Justice)