(a) Voluntary confessions made by advisers to investigation agencies prior to the public prosecutor, and before the public prosecutor;

(b) Calculation of the import price for green use and the domestic wholesale price;

A. In a case where the Defendant made an involuntary statement as an adviser during the investigation process by an investigative agency prior to the public prosecutor, and thereafter made a statement of the same contents even at the investigation stage after the public prosecutor’s investigation, even though there was no forced confession such as adviser at the time of investigation before the public prosecutor’s investigation, the confession before the public prosecutor’s investigation does not eventually lead to an involuntary confession. If the Defendant denies the confession of the same contents as before the public prosecutor’s prosecutor by asserting that the Defendant made an involuntary confession with the investigative agency prior to the public prosecutor’s investigation agency prior to the public prosecutor’s investigation, it should be deemed to be the purport of denying the ar

B. Green use is illegal to assess the market price without distinguishing the import price from the domestic wholesale price according to the classification of each region, even though there is a substantial difference between the import price and the domestic wholesale price.

Articles 312, 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Articles 9 and 198 of the Customs Act

A and six others

B (for Defendant A, for Defendant C), D (for Defendant E), F (for Defendant G, H, E, and I)

Seoul High Court Decision 81No803 delivered on June 17, 1981

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

1. We examine the grounds of appeal No. 1 by Defendant A, C, H, E, and I, Defendant A, and Defendant C’s counsel’s grounds of appeal No. 1, Defendant G, H, E, and I’s defense counsel’s attorney-at-law No. 1, as well as the grounds of appeal No. 1 by Defendant E.

(1) According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below held that each protocol of examination of the suspect as to the defendant A, C, G, H, H, J, and I adopted as guilty evidence among the summary of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below is admissible as evidence since the defendants admitted the authenticity of their authenticity and statement in the court of first instance.

In light of the record, the evidence list stating the contents of the first instance court's examination of evidence contains that the above defendants recognized the voluntariness of the interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor. Thus, the above judgment of the court below is interpreted as a basis for this.

However, it is evident in the record that the remaining Defendants except Defendant G among the above Defendants asserted that the protocol prepared by the investigative agency through the first and second trials contain false statements made in the state of no voluntariness by adviser, etc., and if the Defendants made a false statement through adviser, etc. in the investigation agency prior to the prosecutor’s investigation process and continued to make the same statement even after the prosecutor’s investigation stage, even though they did not have been forced to make a confession by adviser, etc. at the time of the investigation before the prosecutor’s investigation, the confession before the prosecutor’s investigation does not need to be a non-voluntary statement. If the Defendants denied the confession of the same contents before the prosecutor’s investigation agency by asserting that the Defendants made a confession without voluntariness as an adviser at the time of investigation before the prosecutor’s investigation, it should be viewed as denying the voluntariness of the protocol prepared by the prosecutor.

Therefore, even though the court below should determine whether the confession of the above Defendants was made voluntarily by the prosecutor, the court below should have determined the admissibility of evidence (in the absence of any special restriction on the method of the investigation, it is sufficient to recognize the Voluntaryness considering the circumstances indicated in the records, such as the statement of the relevant Defendant in the court or the confession of the accused). Without taking such measures, it cannot be said that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the Voluntaryness of the Defendants to recognize the admissibility of evidence.

(2) In addition, the court below determined that Defendant E denies the admissibility of the interrogation protocol prepared by the public prosecutor, but it cannot be seen that there is no reason to suspect that the confession in the prosecutor's office was not made arbitrarily on the record. However, according to the records, the above Defendant asserted that the confession was made at the time of the investigation by the investigative agency, and that he suffered from the left-hand astronomical chronic heavy infection as a result of the adviser's response, and submitted a written diagnosis (record 293). Even if the adviser of the above Defendant's assertion was made during the investigation process before the public prosecutor, the confession made before the public prosecutor cannot be recognized if the state of non-voluntary examination continues at the investigation stage. Thus, the court below's determination that the defendant's confession could not be found because there was no reason to suspect the voluntariness merely because it should be examined whether the defendant's assertion was genuine or not, is erroneous in the judgment on the admissibility of evidence in the above protocol.

(3) Meanwhile, the lower court, citing the reasoning of the first instance judgment, against Defendant A, C, G, and H:

① From August 22, 1978, he/she was aware that he/she evaded customs duties of KRW 7,33,464 by loading a gold ingot at the Simian port in the Republic of Korea on the 24th day of that month and by importing a gold ingot at the port in the Republic of Korea on September 13, 1978, and ② starting a port in the Republic of Korea on September 20, 1979, he/she paid the price of goods in advance to the Manopoto in the Republic of Korea from the port in the Republic of Korea on September 20, 1979, he/she acquired approximately 40,000,000 from the 25th day of that month to the Manopoto port in the Republic of Korea on the 24th day of that month after taking over 12,929,849 won (the Defendant among this case, 8,052,565 won) by bringing a part of the 25th day to the Manoton port in the Republic of Korea.

However, according to the contents of a reply made between August 22, 1979 and September 25 of that year by the court below, the above K entered into the Sinono-to-Korean consul on September 9, 1979 and departing from the Sino-Mano-Ba on September 14:00, 1979 and entered the Sino-Mano-Ba on September 14:00, 1979. Although the contents of the reply do not coincide with the entry and departure of the above facts, it is difficult to escape from an incomplete hearing as to the evidence.

2. We examine Defendant E’s counsel’s ground of appeal No. 2

In light of the reasoning of the judgment below and the records of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, the court of first instance and the court of first instance recognized the price at 3,750,000 won per official according to the certificate of appraisal prepared by the Seoul Customs Office M and N among the fact-finding facts 3 and 4 of the above defendant's provisional facts, and calculated the duty evasion amount and the additional collection amount on the basis of this. According to the witness M of the court of first instance, the above appraisal was presumed to be based on the lower quality price under the tax standard price list prepared by the Korea Customs Service because there was no melting material, and the above price list does not have any difference for each region.

However, according to Article 9(1) of the Customs Act, which was in force at the time of the instant offense, the duty base of imported goods shall be based on the price or volume of imported goods. In addition, Article 198(1) of the same Act provides that the amount of customs duties as at the time when a criminal cannot be confiscated pursuant to Article 198(1) of the same Act shall be equivalent to the domestic wholesale price as at the time of the instant offense. According to the second replys made by the president of the Korea Pharmaceutical Association on the fact inquiry by the lower court, the import price of green used around September 1979 and January 1, 1980, shall be KRW 1,800,000, and New Zealand Green used as at the time of the instant offense, it is clear that there is a considerable difference between the domestic wholesale price and the domestic wholesale price for each region.

Therefore, although it is difficult to see that the appraisal evaluated without distinguishing the classification of the mountainous district with respect to the green use of this case is an expression of a reasonable tax base amount or additional collection amount of customs duties, the court below's decision that calculated the amount of evasion of customs duties and the amount of additional collection against the above defendant by adopting only the above appraisal result without examining the contents of the column of the taxation base based on the above appraisal shall not be deemed to have committed an unlawful act.

3. Of the facts set forth in the first instance judgment against Defendant A, C, G, H, and J, the calculation of the duty evasion amount and the additional collection amount for melting melting melting Y ex officio, and the calculation of the respective duty evasion amount and the additional collection amount as stated in the ground of appeal as to Defendant E in the above paragraph (2).

4. Ultimately, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below against the Defendants is reversed, and remanded to the Seoul High Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Lee Sung-soo (Presiding Justice)