The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. On August 9, 2015, the summary of the grounds for appeal: (a) the Defendant arranged commercial sex acts on the condition that the said female employees receive KRW 200,000,00 among the male customers, I and J, at the F amusement shop located in Jindo-gun E, Nam-gun, which was operated by the Defendant on August 9, 2015; (b) however, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the facts charged, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

2. Determination

A. The summary of the facts charged in the instant case is a person who operates the F amusement main store in Jindo-gun E (hereinafter “the instant amusement main store”).

On August 9, 2015, the Defendant arranged commercial sex acts on the condition that the said female employees receive KRW 20,000,000 among G (V, 31 years old), H (V, 28 years old), male customers who found the above entertainment establishments, and I (V, 52 years old), and J (V, 56 years old).

B. The lower court rendered a judgment that acquitted the Defendant on the following grounds, based on the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

1) According to the court’s legitimate examination of evidence, the following facts are as follows: ① K, J, and I paid KRW 200,000 to G and H, who are the female employees of the instant entertainment shop; ② L, to go into the place of commercial sex acts; ② L, to go into the place of commercial sex acts; ③ the Defendant was prevented from having engaged in commercial sex acts; ③ the Defendant was made not to have engaged in commercial sex acts; ② the fact that there was a correction between I and the Defendant; and the above facts showed the types of operation of the instant entertainment shop and the cost of commercial sex acts set by the employees of the said entertainment shop; and K, J, and I consistently agreed to engage in commercial sex acts with the employees of the said entertainment shop.

In addition to the circumstances such as the statement, there is also a doubt that the defendant, the main owner of the entertainment center of this case, has arranged sexual traffic between G, H, J and I as stated in the facts charged of this case.

(ii)..