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1. The defendant's 21,10,90 won and 31,67,300 won and 31,67,300 won respectively to the plaintiff (appointed party), the appointed party C, and D.
Reasons
1. Facts of recognition;
A. On July 4, 1998, the Defendant borrowed KRW 95 million from the deceased (hereinafter “the deceased”) (hereinafter “the instant loan”). By March 30, 1999, the Defendant: (a) paid in kind the borrowed loan, which is scheduled to be constructed; and (b) made a certificate of borrowing that the borrowed loan will be returned in cash if it is impossible to do so.
B. The Deceased died on March 28, 2005, and the Appointor E is the wife of the Deceased, the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the remainder of the Appointor are the deceased’s children.
C. On April 30, 2006, the Defendant re-established a loan certificate with the content that the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the appointed party would repay the instant loan by October 30, 2006.
[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2 (including branch numbers, if any), the purport of the whole pleadings
2. Determination
A. According to the above facts finding as to the facts of the cause of the claim, the defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay calculated at the rate of 31,67,300 won per annum under the Civil Act from April 1, 1999 to June 29, 2016, and 15% per annum under the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, which is stipulated in the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, to E, according to the ratio of the loan of this case to the plaintiff (appointed party) and the remaining designated parties, respectively, and to the plaintiff (appointed party) and the remaining designated parties after the due date.
B. The defendant's assertion and defense 1) although the defendant asserted that he paid part of the loan of this case, there is no evidence to acknowledge this, this part of the defendant's assertion is rejected. 2) The defendant defense that the extinctive prescription of the loan of this case has expired, but the starting point of the extinctive prescription of the loan of this case is from the day after the due date. The final decision of the loan of this