Evidence of the suspect interrogation protocol of the defendant prepared by the prosecutor

An interrogation protocol of the accused prepared by the public prosecutor who recognized the authenticity in the court by the accused who was a suspect, shall be admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the statement of the accused recorded in the protocol is not voluntarily made or in particular made under a particularly reliable state.

Article 312 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 84Do378 Decided May 29, 1984

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Lee Young-ho

Busan District Court Decision 86No406 delivered on April 17, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The sixty days, from among those pending trial after the appeal, shall be included in the principal sentence.

The grounds of appeal by the defendant and his defense counsel are also examined.

In light of the records, the defendant's statement at the prosecutor's office, which was a suspect, is admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the defendant's statement recorded in the protocol was not made arbitrarily or it was made under particularly reliable circumstances. (See Supreme Court Decision 84Do378 delivered on May 29, 1984) In this case, the defendant's statement at the prosecutor's office is recognized as the authenticity of the prosecutor's protocol of interrogation of the defendant in the court. In addition, considering all circumstances, such as the signature, unmanned contents and the defendant's educational background, experience, intelligence level, etc., the defendant's statement at the prosecutor's office cannot be deemed as being a false statement forced due to illegal confinement and adviser, violence, etc., or in a situation in which it is impossible to guarantee its credibility, it is just to adopt the above protocol as evidence, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding legal principles as to incomplete deliberation or admissibility of evidence, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the judgment of the court of first instance.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges who are to include part of the number of days pending trial after the appeal in the principal sentence in accordance with Article 57 of the Criminal Act.

Justices Park Jong-dong (Presiding Justice)