(a) Whether the driver of an automobile who first entered the intersection has a duty to take measures to avoid driving in preparation for the vehicle from which he/she drives in violation of the passing method of the intersection;

(b) The case holding that it is consistent with the empirical rules to regard that even if the repair is made in light of the damaged part of the automobile and the amount of expenses required for the repair, the exchange value is likely to be reduced and that the exchange value would be reduced if there is any damage to that degree can be known.

A. According to Article 22(3) of the Road Traffic Act, all vehicles intending to enter the intersection in which traffic is not controlled shall not obstruct the passage of another vehicle if there is another vehicle already entering the intersection from another road. Thus, in the case of a vehicle having entered the intersection, other drivers should not interfere with the passage of the vehicle, and barring special circumstances, the first driver of the vehicle having entered the intersection should not interfere with the passage of the vehicle. Thus, barring any special circumstance, the driver of the vehicle having entered the intersection is not obliged to take measures to avoid such act in preparation for the vehicle having the first driver entering the intersection by violating the traffic method under the Road Traffic

(b) The case holding that it is consistent with the empirical rules to view that the exchange value is reduced in the event of repair of a damaged part of a motor vehicle in light of the damaged part of the motor vehicle and the amount of expenses required for its repair (gold 4,289,800 won), and that the exchange value is reduced in the event of damage of a motor vehicle due to an accident to that degree, it is reasonable to view that the exchange value is reduced.

(a) Article 763 of the Civil Act (Article 396), Article 22(3) of the Road Traffic Act (Article 763 of the Civil Act);

Plaintiff’s Attorney Noh Jae-il

Defendant 1 and one other

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 91Na12812 delivered on October 16, 1991

The part of the judgment of the court below against the plaintiff shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Civil Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that Defendant 2, who is a driver of an accelerator-car owned by Defendant 1 (vehicle registration No. 1 omitted) had driven the above vehicle at around 14:40 on Nov. 29, 1989 and proceeded at the speed of 50km per hour at the speed of 50km. In such a case, the above defendant, the driving company, should safely pass through the intersection while driving the vehicle in the same way as he had to do so, while driving the vehicle in this case (vehicle No. 2 omitted) with the (vehicle No. 2 omitted), had the vehicle in this way to the right side of the above way, had the vehicle enter the above intersection, had the vehicle first discovered and operated the vehicle in this way to the above intersection, had the vehicle in this case been damaged by the plaintiff's shock and caused damage to the vehicle in this case without the plaintiff's fault due to frequent reasons before and after the accident. Furthermore, it was found that the above defendant's error was found that the vehicle in this case was done without the plaintiff's fault.

2. According to the evidence Nos. 3 (A) and evidence Nos. 9-1 and No. 1 (A) as cited by the court below, the plaintiff, as the second-line road of the second-way road along the road along which the plaintiff is running, was driving on the crosswalk at a speed of about 15 km for a speed of speed after the first-way stop on the crosswalk, and the plaintiff was driving on the intersection at a speed of about 15 km, and there is a conflict between the pent portion of the plaintiff's vehicle. Thus, according to Article 22 (3) of the Road Traffic Act, all vehicles entering the intersection where the traffic control is not performed shall not interfere with the passage of the vehicle if there is a vehicle already entering the intersection from other roads to which the traffic control is not performed. Thus, in this case, the plaintiff's failure to obstruct the progress of the plaintiff's vehicle entering the intersection should not interfere with the traffic order of the plaintiff, and it cannot be said that the plaintiff's negligence did not interfere with the traffic order of the defendant 2.

However, it is difficult for the court below to find that there are special circumstances to deem that the plaintiff was negligent, even by evidence (a evidence Nos. 3-3, 4, 5, 9-1, 2, and the inquiry report to the chief of Ansan Police Station) based on the above fact-finding data.

3. The court below found the plaintiff's mistake that the plaintiff proceeded without disregarding the plaintiff's driving of the motor vehicle on the part of the defendant and suffered the accident of this case. In such a case, the plaintiff can prevent the accident and make it possible for the plaintiff to do so. However, it cannot be said that the plaintiff, who first entered the intersection, first of all, has a duty to take measures to avoid the accident in preparation for the plaintiff's driving a motor vehicle in violation of the intersection traffic method, and in such a case, it is difficult to understand the reasons why the plaintiff can safely pass in any way other than the plaintiff's driving.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles of offsetting negligence, or in the incomplete hearing or in the incomplete hearing, and the arguments are justified within the scope of this.

On the second ground for appeal

1. Furthermore, the court below recognized that the first repair dog cost calculated for the repair of the Plaintiff’s automobile due to the instant accident requires a repair expense of KRW 5,467,00 or KRW 4,289,80,00, and rejected the part of the Plaintiff’s automobile damaged by the instant accident for the reason that there was a decrease in the exchange value, as to the part of the Defendant’s claim for compensation for damages caused by tort, the repair cost would be the amount of damage if the repair was possible, and the exchange value would be the amount of the damage if the repair was impossible. As in the instant accident, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the vehicle destroyed by the collision but the repair cost would have been reduced in exchange as alleged by the Plaintiff, as in the instant case of the instant accident, but the repair cost would have been destroyed by the collision but could have been known or could have been known by the Defendants. However, the court below rejected it on the ground that there was a lack of evidence to find it otherwise.

2. However, in light of the content of parts or accessories requiring repair of the Plaintiff’s automobile as indicated in the evidence No. 7 (Written Estimate) and the damaged parts of the Plaintiff’s automobile as indicated in the evidence No. 9-1, No. 2 ( photographs) and the amount of the cost required for the repair of the Plaintiff’s automobile, it would be assumed that even if accepting the damaged parts of the Plaintiff’s automobile, it would be likely that the exchange value would be reduced, and that if the Plaintiff’s automobile is damaged due to an accident similar to the instant case, the exchange value would be reduced rather than that of the empirical rules.

3. Thus, the court below did not confirm whether there was a decrease in the exchange value of the Plaintiff’s automobile, and rejected the Plaintiff’s claim on this part by recognizing that the Defendants could not have known this fact. The reasons for this review are as follows.

Therefore, the part of the judgment below against the plaintiff is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Jae-chul (Presiding Justice)