1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

Judgment of the first instance.

1. The reasons why this court should explain this part of the facts of recognition are as follows: “Defendant Cho Jae-in” is as follows: “Codefendant of the first instance trial”; “Codefendant D, a trustee in bankruptcy of the bankrupt B corporation” or “Defendant trustee in bankruptcy”, respectively; and “the instant transfer contract” in Part 13 of the third decision of the first instance is as “the instant transfer contract”, except for the case where “the instant transfer contract” is deemed as “the instant transfer contract”, and thus, it is identical to the part “1. Recognition” in the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, and thus, it is cited in accordance with Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. According to the above findings of the determination as to the cause of the claim, barring any special circumstance, the claim for payment of the deposit of this case shall be deemed to have been filed with the Plaintiff.

3. Judgment on the defendant's assertion of intentional denial

A. The gist of the parties’ assertion 1) The instant security agreement was concluded in the situation where B is economically distressed, and thus constitutes a biased act that obstructs equal distribution among bankruptcy creditors. Accordingly, the Defendant is subject to the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter “Rehabilitation Act”).

(2) In accordance with Article 391 subparag. 1, the right to set aside a contract for the instant transfer is invalid, and the sales claim, which was the object of the said contract, is returned to B, and the right to claim payment of deposit money for each of the instant deposits, is the Defendant, the bankruptcy trustee, B. The Plaintiff B entered into a loan agreement for the instant transfer and the instant transfer for security for the purpose of maintaining a new loan for the purpose of maintaining a business. Therefore, the instant transfer for security does not constitute an act detrimental to a bankruptcy creditor.

Even if the instant transfer contract constitutes an act detrimental to bankruptcy creditors, the Plaintiff only lent money to B after sufficiently examining the ability to repay through objective data at the time of the contract, such as a loan agreement with the lender on June 2012 and a letter of recommendation of investment with the lender.