Sale and purchase of farmland subject to the condition precedent;

If a party to the purchase and sale of farmland sells the land under the condition of suspension for the purpose of siteization and the work of siteization, which is a condition, is conducted within a short period after the sale, it shall be deemed to be a site and it shall be a valid sale even if there is no proof of the purchase and sale of farmland.

Article 19 of the Farmland Reform Act

66Da1690 decided Oct. 18, 1966 (Supreme Court Decision 4351 decided Jun. 29, 1965; Supreme Court Decision 65Da339 decided Jun. 29, 196 (Supreme Court Decision 171Da168 decided Oct. 168)

Plaintiff

Intervenor joining the Plaintiff

Defendant

Seoul Central District Court (63 Ga9060) in the first instance trial

The original judgment shall be revoked.

The defendant will implement the registration procedure for ownership transfer on the ground of the gift made from December 30, 1960 with respect to the supplementary participant of the plaintiff 782 square meters (489 square meters, 2 Hobbebs, 8 square meters) prior to the Government-si (detailed address omitted).

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant in the first and second instances.

The plaintiff sought a judgment to the same effect as the disposition.

The fact that the defendant completed the repayment on December 30, 1960 and the fact that the ownership transfer registration was made on August 11, 1961 is no dispute between the parties.

On April 10, 1959, prior to the completion of the repayment by the Defendant, the Defendant: (a) donated the land of this case to the Intervenor’s Intervenor on the condition of suspending reimbursement; (b) again purchased the land of this case from the Intervenor’s Intervenor at KRW 273,800 on May 29, 1959; (c) the Defendant completed the redemption of the land of this case on December 30, 1960 and completed the registration of ownership transfer on August 11, 1961; (d) on behalf of the Intervenor on behalf of the Defendant, the Plaintiff sought ownership transfer registration procedure as stated in the order against the land of this case. Accordingly, even if the Defendant had not donated the land of this case to the Intervenor’s Intervenor, it was an act invalid under Article 16(1) of the Farmland Reform Act, and even if the Defendant made a donation to the Plaintiff’s Intervenor, the Plaintiff’s claim for purchase and sale of the land of this case was null and void as well as the Plaintiff’s claim for compensation under the Farmland Reform Act.

First of all, the plaintiff's claim is unlawful as it conflicts with res judicata, and when Eul evidence 3-1,2, and 3-3 is examined as to the defendant's defense that it is unlawful, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff's assistant intervenor in this case (However, the plaintiff's assistant intervenor is not the defendant's assistant intervenor but the defendant's assistant intervenor) of the same purport as at the time of the lawsuit in this case (the plaintiff's assistant intervenor in this case's statement is called the defendant's assistant intervenor) against the defendant in this case, which is mistakenly known to the organization belonging to the plaintiff's government in 1962 as an organization belonging to the plaintiff's city, and the plaintiff's assistant intervenor in the second instance against the defendant in this case against the defendant in this case. However, the plaintiff's assistant intervenor in the second instance was not an organization belonging to the plaintiff's government, but an independent organization. Thus, in the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff's assistant intervenor in this case's claim is dismissed as the plaintiff's defense of res judicata effect.

Therefore, as the defendant's seal portion of this case is presumed to be genuine, if the contents of No. 3, No. 6-1, and No. 2, which are presumed to be genuine by the testimony of Non-Party 1, the witness of the court below, and the testimony of Non-Party 1 and 2 of the court below, are consistent with all the purport of the parties' arguments, the defendant donated and delivered the land to the plaintiff's supplementary intervenor on April 10, 1959. The plaintiff's supplementary intervenor sold the land of this case to the plaintiff's supplementary intervenor for the purpose of seeking a site other than the government office building site, because the land of this case is located in the public sale of this case because it is improper in location and attached to the public sale of this case's land to the plaintiff's main building site, but it is inevitable to sell it to the plaintiff under a private contract on May 29, 1959 without being aware that the land was delivered to the plaintiff's supplementary intervenor at the time of delivery of this case's land to the plaintiff's supplementary intervenor at the same time as above.

Therefore, on the premise of the above facts, the Defendant’s acquisition of the land of this case by the Intervenor is necessarily required to prove the transfer of the land in its original farmland under the Farmland Reform Act, and the disposal of the farmland before its repayment is restricted under the principle of no farmland ownership transfer. The purpose of this provision is to prevent the appearance of so-called non-farmerism by limiting only farmers and preventing non-farmer from purchasing the land. However, this provision is to only apply to the transfer of the land, i.e., the acquisition of the land by the Intervenor’s transfer of the land, and it is not clear that the purpose of the acquisition of the land was to acquire the land by the Intervenor’s transfer of the land without the above-mentioned condition that it would be used for any other purpose than for agriculture. This provision is not applicable to the Plaintiff’s transfer of the land by the Intervenor’s transfer of the land without the above condition that it would not be subject to the Plaintiff’s transfer of the land by the Intervenor’s transfer of the land. This is because there is no room to acknowledge that the Plaintiff’s transfer of the land would not be subject to the Plaintiff’s transfer of the land.

Thus, the defendant is obligated to register the transfer of land in this case on December 30, 196, when the condition of repayment is fulfilled, to the plaintiff's assistant intervenor for the transfer of ownership based on donation, and the plaintiff's assistant intervenor is obligated to register the transfer of ownership based on sale and purchase of the land in this case as of the day the above condition is fulfilled. Thus, the plaintiff's assistant intervenor's creditor, who is the plaintiff's creditor, has the right to claim against the plaintiff's assistant intervenor for the transfer of ownership based on donation as above, and the plaintiff's claim should be accepted. Since this conclusion differs, the judgment is to revoke this conclusion, and the litigation cost is to be borne by the defendant who is the losing party in both the first and second instances.

Judges Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)