Criteria for determining whether farmland is prescribed in Article 2 of the Farmland Reform Act;

The term "farmland" in Article 2 of the Farmland Reform Act refers to not only to formal facts such as authorization or public notice that the land category of a temporary or actual cultivation or public record book or that the subdivision rearrangement work has been completed under the Urban Planning Act, but also to whether there is an objective situation that can be recognized as the objective situation that can contribute only to the agriculture and the agriculture or not, by taking into account various objective circumstances, such as the development of the land and the surrounding environment of the land.

Article 2 of the Farmland Reform Act

Seoul High Court Decision 4293Hun-Ga785 delivered on January 25, 1962 (Article 56(8) of the Civil Procedure Act) 62Da43 delivered on May 3, 1962 (Article 2(24) of the necessary Farmland Reform Act, Article 2(24) of the necessary Farmland Reform Act, Article 2(24) 1628, 6750 house 10 ② 290

Plaintiff

Defendant

Seoul District Court (62Na228)

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The case is remanded to the Seoul District Court public prosecution division.

The grounds of appeal by the plaintiff's agent are as stated in the appellate brief subsequently attached.

The judgment of the court below is examined ex officio as to the ground of appeal No. 1.

The court below argues that since farmland in the Farmland Reform Act refers to the land actually used for cultivation regardless of its legal category and its category was changed to the site, if the land category was actually cultivated at the time of the promulgation of the Farmland Reform Act, it is also deemed farmland. Thus, the land as a problem in this case that the plaintiff did not own own land at the same time as the promulgation of the same Act and that the plaintiff's claim for the principal lawsuit was actually dismissed without judging the remainder of the claim. In addition, according to the original adjudication and the record of the trial, the court below argues that the fact that the plaintiff used this land for the actual cultivation from before the promulgation of the Farmland Reform Act to the present date cannot be viewed as farmland under the same Act.

Of the grounds of appeal, the Plaintiff’s agent may not be deemed to have satisfied the purpose of the Supreme Court’s decision that the land was used by the Plaintiff’s agent to confirm ownership of real estate (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 50 and 51, Feb. 12, 1959: Supreme Court Decision 7No. 32, 1959: Supreme Court Decision 7No. 799Hun-Ga, supra) and that the land was already partitioned and arranged as a planning project for the land at the time when the construction was completed, and that the land was publicly announced by Seoul on October 24, 1946 pursuant to Article 24 of the Joseon Land Improvement Decree, which was not recognized as farmland by the Supreme Court’s precedents (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da1631, Feb. 12, 1955). However, this decision cannot be deemed to have been sufficient to support the above grounds of appeal. However, this decision is a case where the Plaintiff’s agent had already declareded the land ownership to be determined by the land substitution.

However, the original purpose of the Farmland Reform Act is to properly distribute farmland to farmers who cultivate farmland under the principle of light-to-land so that it is intended to achieve the self-reliance of farmers' economy and the improvement of farmers' lives due to the promotion of agricultural productivity, and the balance and development of the national economy. Therefore, the farmland under Article 2 of the Farmland Reform Act is not determined as only formal facts such as temporary cultivation or public record's land category or existence of authorization or public notice that the subdivision rearrangement work has been completed under the Urban Planning Act, but rather, it is not determined as a sound observation of the land as an average and sound observation of the objective situation such as the surrounding environment, etc. of the land. It has already been established as a precedent of the Supreme Court, and if it is possible to use the land which has been substituted as farmland for the purpose of continuously using the land which has been substituted as farmland for the purpose of land substitution due to the rearrangement of partition by urban planning.

Therefore, even though there is no dispute between the parties as to the fact that the defendant continues to use and benefit from the land at issue in this case for agriculture even after the land substitution becomes final and conclusive, it cannot be uniformly determined in light of the above legal principles as to whether this is the so-called farmland under the Farmland Reform Act, and even if it is determined after clarifying all the objective conditions, etc. of this land at the time of promulgation of the same Act, it cannot be seen that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the concept of farmland under the Farmland Reform Act and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. Accordingly, the court below's judgment cannot be viewed as an unlawful act of failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the concept of farmland under the Farmland Reform Act. If it is recognized that this land cannot be seen as farmland above, according to the above decision of this point and the judgment of this case, the disposition of distributing the land to the defendant is significant and obvious and thus it should be viewed as null and void, and therefore, the defect in the judgment of the court below is obviously affected by the judgment.

In order to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, it is decided as per Disposition in accordance with Article 406 of the Civil Procedure Act in order to have the court of original judgment re-examine the case.

Judges Han Sung-soo (Presiding Judge)