The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. According to the summary of the grounds of appeal by I and H’s statement, the fact that the Defendant knowingly knew that he/she was not permitted to cut timber is sufficiently recognized as ordering H, etc. to cut timber.

However, the judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant.

2. The lower court, based on the evidence duly adopted and investigated, received instructions from I (G manager) who works in the Office of the Military, i.e., (G manager) from I (G manager) who was employed before and after the work on the day of the instant case, to remove forest fire risk factors in the area designated by the Defendant, and cut trees.”

The fact that G members, including H, made a statement that they cut standing timber without obtaining a separate confirmation from the management entity, solely on the ground that they made a statement that they would be inconsistent with the I’s instructions from the Defendant at the site ( even if H, etc. believed that the Defendant was a mountain owner).

In order to cut standing timber, the head of the Gun, etc. must obtain permission to cut standing timber, and the I notified the H of the absence of permission to cut standing timber in the area.

(2) However, if G members prepared electric saws, saws, and saws, etc. in advance, as stated in the facts charged, when H et al. had engaged in an operation that did not believe the Defendant’s horse as stated in the facts charged, it was natural to report such circumstances to the management entity I at least after the completion of the operation, and H merely reported that H was within the scope that the trees cut on the day of the instant case in the court below’s trial without permission.

In light of the fact that I did not clarify the direction that I would cut trees to H on the day of the instant case, or even if he did so, H et al. performed the removal of risk factors on the day of the instant case.