Where a traffic accident occurs due to a failure in a traffic signal apparatus installed by the head of the competent local police agency and delegated with the management authority, whether the local government as well as the local government is liable to compensate for the damage (affirmative)

Article 3 (1) of the Road Traffic Act provides that the Special Metropolitan City Mayor, a Metropolitan City Mayor, or the head of a Si/Gun (excluding the head of a Gun in a Metropolitan City) shall install and manage signal apparatus and safety signs when it is deemed necessary to prevent danger on the roads and to ensure safe and smooth flow of traffic. Article 71-2 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Traffic Act provides that the Special Metropolitan City Mayor, a Metropolitan City Mayor, and a Metropolitan City Mayor shall delegate the authority to install and manage signal apparatus and safety signs under the above Act to the Commissioner of a Local Police Agency. In such a case where an administrative authority is delegated to the agency, the delegated agency shall not be deemed to change the person to whom the authority is delegated. Accordingly, if a public official of the delegated agency causes damage to another person due to a defect in the facilities installed and managed by a public official of the delegated agency or a public official of the entrusted agency, the local government or a local government under Article 2 or 5 of the State Compensation Act shall bear liability for damages caused by a traffic signal apparatus of a public official under the State Compensation Act or a local government under its jurisdiction.

Articles 2, 5, and 6 (1) of the State Compensation Act, Article 3 (1) of the Road Traffic Act, Article 71-2 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Traffic Act

Supreme Court Decision 92Da2684 delivered on January 26, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 848) Supreme Court Decision 92Da29528 delivered on January 11, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 671) Supreme Court Decision 94Da38137 delivered on December 9, 1994 (Gong195Sang, 107) Supreme Court Decision 94Da57671 delivered on February 24, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 140)

Plaintiff

Korea

Seoul District Court Decision 98Na9655 delivered on January 13, 1999

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as cited by the judgment of the court below, and the records, Daejeon Metropolitan City Mayor recognized that the above signal apparatus was installed at crosswalks and signal apparatus on the six-lane road in front of the Yonhapsan, Daejeon Metropolitan City (location omitted), the management authority of the above signal apparatus was delegated to the Commissioner of the Provincial Police Agency pursuant to Article 71-2 (1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Traffic Act, and the public officials belonging to the Chungcheongnamnam Provincial Police Agency and public officials belonging to the Chungcheongnamnam Provincial Police Agency are in charge of the management thereof at the traffic integrated control center for joint work. On October 2, 1996, the above signal apparatus was broken out due to a lightning, and at the same time on October 12: 13, 196, and around 15:56, and around 15:196, the court below determined that the above signal apparatus was not inspected by the defendant, and that the above signal apparatus was found to have been broken on 16.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Article 3(1) of the Road Traffic Act provides that when a Special Metropolitan City Mayor, a Metropolitan City Mayor, or the head of a Si/Gun (excluding the head of a Gun in a Metropolitan City) deems it necessary to prevent danger on roads and ensure safe and smooth flow of traffic, he shall install and manage signal apparatus and safety signs, and Article 71-2(1)1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Road Traffic Act provides that the Special Metropolitan City Mayor, a Metropolitan City Mayor, and a Metropolitan City Mayor shall delegate the authority to install and manage signal apparatus and safety signs under the above Act to the commissioner of a local police agency. In such a case where an administrative authority is delegated to an agency, the delegated agency shall not be deemed to change the subject of the delegation. Accordingly, where a public official belonging to the delegated agency causes damage to another person due to a defect in the public structure established and managed by the delegated agency, the delegated agency shall be liable for damages under Article 2 or 5 of the State Compensation Act, and the local government or the State to which the delegated agency belongs shall be liable under Article 2 or 5 of the State Compensation Act.

However, Article 6 (1) of the State Compensation Act provides that where the State or a local government is liable to compensate for damages pursuant to Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the same Act, if the person who is in charge of the appointment and supervision of a public official or the construction and management of a public institution is not the same person as the person who is in charge of the construction and management of a public institution, the person who bears the expenses shall compensate for damages. Thus, the defendant who bears the salary for police officers under the control of the signal apparatus of this case shall also be liable for damages under Article 6 (1) of the State Compensation Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da57671, Feb. 24, 1995; 92Da29528, Jan. 11, 1994).

In this regard, the decision of the court below that recognized the liability for damages against the defendant under Article 6 of the State Compensation Act is just and it is not erroneous as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. There is no ground for appeal

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

In light of the above facts, although there is a high risk of an accident with a green light at the same time on a pedestrian and a vehicle signal, it is sufficient for police officers who manage it to recognize it as negligence in the performance of their official duties, because it is sufficient to recognize it as negligence, without taking safety measures such as immediately suspending the operation of the signal apparatus or assigning traffic signals, and the judgment of the court below to the same purport is reasonable. The argument that the above signal apparatus failure was caused by a natural disaster, which is a natural disaster, and the repair of the signal apparatus was delayed, and it was not neglected arbitrarily, and therefore there is no negligence is no reason to accept the argument that there is no reason.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-hee (Presiding Justice)