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1. The part against the plaintiff corresponding to the money ordered to be paid under the judgment of the court of first instance shall be revoked.
The defendant.
Reasons
1. The plaintiff transferred KRW 200 million to the defendant on April 18, 2003 without dispute between the parties, and the following circumstances acknowledged by the overall purport of Gap evidence Nos. 2-1 through 3, Gap evidence Nos. 5 and 7, i.e., the plaintiff reported the above KRW 200 million to the defendant as a loan to the defendant upon reporting the change in property in 2003 pursuant to the former Public Service Ethics Act (amended by Act No. 7189 of Mar. 12, 2004) on January 17, 2004; ② the defendant donated the above KRW 200 million from the plaintiff to the defendant on April 18, 200; ③ it is very exceptional to the plaintiff's first donation of KRW 200 million to the defendant on Feb. 20, 2013; and ③ the plaintiff did not lend the above KRW 200 million to the defendant on the premise that the loan was not repaid to the defendant without a peremptory notice from the defendant from February 28.
Therefore, barring special circumstances, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff KRW 200 million (hereinafter “instant loan”) and damages for delay.
2. Judgment on the defendant's defense for extinctive prescription
A. As the Defendant’s defense regarding the statute of limitations defense is a defense that the instant loan claim expired by the statute of limitations, the Defendant’s claim for the instant loan was extinguished by the statute of limitations, barring any special circumstance, since the fact that the Plaintiff applied for the instant payment order on October 1, 2013 when ten years elapsed from April 18, 2003 when the Plaintiff lent the instant loan was clearly recorded, barring any special circumstance.
B. As to the judgment on the ground of the interruption of extinctive prescription period (1), the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendant suspended extinctive prescription since the Defendant frequently approved the obligation from around 2005 to around 2011. However, the Plaintiff’s evidence No. 2-1 to 3, and Party A.