A. The meaning of “working hours” under Article 42(1) of the Labor Standards Act and Article 3(1) of the Addenda of the Labor Standards Act (=actual working hours)

(b) Wage payment relationship in case where an employer engages in a workplace of more than 8 hours in excess of 6 hours ordinarily during a paid holiday in the week; and

(c) Whether there exists a remedy interest in a case where a final and conclusive judgment was rendered against the worker in a lawsuit seeking nullification of a separate suspension from office filed by the worker for the same reason during the procedure of remedy, upon receipt of a request for remedy under Article 27-3

A. Article 42(1) of the Labor Standards Act and Article 3(1) of the Addenda of the Labor Standards Act intend to restrict excessive working hours per day or per week. As such, working hours of the above provision refer to actual working hours.

B. In ordinary cases, when the employer works 46 hours a week in total by 8 hours a day and 6 hours a week a day, and only during the week a paid holiday exceeds 6 hours a day, the amount of wages corresponding thereto should be paid separately.

C. Under Article 27-3 of the Labor Standards Act, if an employer has filed an application for remedy on the ground that the employer has no justifiable reason, and the employee, in the process of remedy, filed a lawsuit seeking confirmation of invalidity of the suspension from office for the same reason against the employer separately, and a final and conclusive judgment rendered by dismissal was rendered on the ground that the claim is groundless, the remedy benefits should no longer be deemed to have been extinguished, as it has already become final and conclusive that the suspension from office

(a)Article 42(1) of the Labor Standards Act, Article 3(1)(c) of the Addenda, Article 27-3 of the Trade Union Act, Article 40 of the Trade Union Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 91Da14406 delivered on October 9, 1992 (Gong1992, 3105). Supreme Court Decision 92Nu6099 delivered on July 28, 1992 (Gong192, 2679)

Plaintiff

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

Seoul High Court Decision 90Gu6349 delivered on October 31, 1990

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, since the previous work hours of non-party 1 company were 48 hours a week from 8th day to 1st day, Sundays was a weekly holiday, Article 42(1) of the Labor Standards Act was amended by Act No. 4099 on March 29, 1989, and the statutory work hours per week from 48 to 46 hours under the previous provision of Article 3(1) of the Addenda to the non-party company and the non-party company’s trade union were punished for collective bargaining on the daily work hours between the non-party 1 and the non-party company’s trade union, but without agreement, the non-party 1 company violated the above provision of the Rules of Employment for 8th day to 8th day, and the non-party 2 company's request for disciplinary action against the non-party 1 company's non-party 3 company's non-party 1 company's non-party 1 company's non-party 1 company's non-party 1 company's daily work hours.

2. Upon examining the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court did not err in its reasoning, but did not err by misapprehending that the Plaintiff’s act was a legitimate act of a trade union and the instant disciplinary action was taken as a retaliation against it. Therefore, we cannot accept the allegation that the lower court neglected the judgment as to the requirement of unfair labor practice.

3. Article 42(1) of the Labor Standards Act and Article 3(1) of the Addenda of the Labor Standards Act intend to restrict excessive working hours on a daily or daily basis. Thus, working hours referred to in the above provision of the Act refer to actual working hours. On the contrary, the lower court erred in determining that working hours referred to in the above provision of the Act include working hours for paid holidays which are not actual working hours.

However, in ordinary cases, if an employer works 46 hours a week in total by 8 hours a day and 6 hours a week a week, and only during the week a paid holiday is held in excess of 6 hours a day, the amount of wages corresponding thereto should be separately paid, and otherwise, it would result in the infringement of the right to a paid holiday. Therefore, the lower court should also examine this issue.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the incomplete hearing or by misapprehending the legal principles of Article 42 (1) of the Labor Standards Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

4. In addition, in a case where the employer’s suspension order against the employee under Article 27-3 of the Labor Standards Act was applied for remedy on the ground that there is no justifiable ground, and the worker separately filed a lawsuit seeking confirmation of invalidity of suspension order for the same reason against the employer, and a final and conclusive judgment of dismissal rendered on the ground that the claim was groundless, the remedy interest should no longer be deemed to have been extinguished since it was determined that it was not a disposition of suspension from office without justifiable grounds (see Supreme Court Decision 92Nu6099 delivered on July 28, 1992).

Therefore, the court shall reject the application for remedy on the ground of extinguishment of the remedy interest when the judgment against the plaintiff was proved in the civil litigation as to the above unfair suspension order issued by the National Labor Relations Commission based on Article 27-3 of the above Labor Standards Act, and the records show reference materials to support the fact that the plaintiff's judgment against the plaintiff was affirmed in the civil litigation as to the above unfair suspension order issued by the National Labor Relations Commission and the review decision made by the National Labor Relations Commission, and the court shall urge the parties to prove the existence of the remedy interest and deliberate and decide on it.

5. Therefore, we reverse and remand the judgment below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.