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(영문) 대법원 1982. 2. 9. 선고 81도3040 판결
[간첩ㆍ간첩방조ㆍ반공법위반ㆍ국가보안법위반][집30(1)형,21;공1982.4.1.(677),319]
Main Issues

(a) Other party to the divulgence in the crime of divulging national secrets;

B. The meaning of national secrets in the crime of divulging national secrets

(c) Method of proving whether it is subject to confiscation;

(d)the concept of "weapons" in the crime of movement, such as weapons;

Summary of Judgment

A. As a matter of course, in the crime of divulging state secrets under Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the former National Security Act (amended by Act No. 3318 of Dec. 31, 1980), the other party to the disclosure is expected to be a member of an anti-government organization or a person who was ordered to do so. Thus, it cannot be said that the disclosure of state secrets between a member of an anti-government organization or a person who was ordered to do so is not established even if it is disclosed.

B. The “state secrets” under Article 3 subparag. 1 of the former National Security Act cannot be limited to the military secrets, and also includes the national secrets of each aspect of politics, economy, culture, and society, and even if it belongs to the common sense in the Republic of Korea, it belongs to an anti-government organization if it becomes favorable material to anti-government organization.

C. Whether the subject of confiscation is subject to confiscation is not related to the constituent facts of crime, and there is no need for strict proof, and there is sufficient evidence that can be accepted only.

D. The concept of “weapons” in the crime of movement, such as weapons under Article 3 subparag. 3 of the former National Security Act includes not limited to weapons used or possessed by the State or a public organization, but also weapons owned or occupied by the general public. However, it does not include weapons that a member of a anti-state organization or a person under its order has come into being from the time of locked to an anti-state organization, or weapons that a member of an anti-state organization or a person under its order transferred to a domestic

[Reference Provisions]

A. B. Article 3 of the National Security Act (amended by Act No. 3318, Dec. 31, 1980); Article 48 of the Criminal Act; Article 307 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and two others

Defense Counsel

Attorney Lee Im-soo (1), (2), (3), or more of the Act (1)

upper and high-ranking persons

Prosecutor (Defendant 1)

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 81No1229 delivered on October 7, 1981

Text

All appeals by the Defendant, etc. and by the Prosecutor against Defendant 1 are dismissed.

Defendant 2 and 3 shall be included in the imprisonment of 40 days each of the days of detention pending trial after appeal.

Reasons

1. Defendant 1’s defense counsel’s ground of appeal No. 1 is examined.

The crime of divulgence of national secrets under Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the former National Security Act (amended by Act No. 331, Dec. 31, 1980) is established when a member of an anti-government organization or a person who is subject to its order discloses national secrets to carry out his purpose. Thus, the other party to the divulgence is naturally expected to be a member of an anti-government organization or a person who is subject to its order, and even if a member of an anti-government organization or a person who is subject to its order, it cannot be accepted as an independent opinion that the crime of divulgence of national secrets is not established.

In addition, if a person who discovered and collected the detection of the State secrets as prescribed by the above Act discloses the secrets collected by the detection, it shall be deemed that one crime was committed by universal title (see Supreme Court Decision 74Do147, Jul. 26, 1974). However, according to the records of this case, only the act of divulging the State secrets was indicted, and the court below found the defendant guilty, it shall not be deemed that there was a violation of the theory of lawsuit.

2. The grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 1 as well as the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2 as to the changed number of defense counsel are examined.

Examining the records of the judgment of the court below and the court of first instance cited by it, the measures of the court below which recognized each of the facts charged against the defendant, etc. are just, and it is not acknowledged that each of the statements made by the defendant et al. at the prosecutor's office was not made in a reliable state due to strong pressure, etc., or that each of the suspect interrogation records made by the defendant et al. was not admissible by such strong method, but it cannot be concluded that the testimony about seizure is inadmissible or false because the witness of the court below did not limit the so-called state secrets under Article 3 subparagraph 1 of the former National Security Act only to military secrets, and contains state secrets about politics, economy, culture, and society. Even if the facts belong to the Republic of Korea, it is interpreted that the materials favorable to the anti-state organization are classified as state secrets, and thus, it is justified in the judgment of the court below to acknowledge so-called crime of leakage of state secrets, and in the same purport, the decision of the court below is justified.

3. The defendant's defense counsel's three grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the records, the goods confiscated by the court below are recognized to have been lawfully confiscated as stated in its reasoning (the confiscation is not limited to the goods seized), and there is sufficient evidence to prove that there is no strict evidence since it is not related to the constituent facts of the crime. According to the records, among the seized goods of this case, the goods of subparagraphs 1 through 19 are deemed to be the goods of subparagraphs 1 and 20, and the goods of subparagraphs 1 through 19 are those of which the defendant 2 provided or intended to provide for the criminal act of this case, and the issue of whether the goods are provided for the crime of this case is a kind of fact-finding, and the fact-finding of the court below, which is the intention to recognize that the seized goods of this case were provided for the criminal act of this case, is erroneous, and the argument of mistake of facts cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal. It is without merit.

4. Each of the grounds of appeal No. 2 by the Defendants, No. 3 by the defense counsel, and the grounds of appeal by the defense counsel are examined together.

In light of various circumstances related to sentencing and circumstances cited in the arguments, etc. based on the records, the lower court’s determination of punishment against Defendant 1 and 2 is not deemed to be extremely unfair, and since Defendant 3 was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years at the lower court, it cannot be deemed a legitimate ground for appeal on the ground of unfair sentencing. Thus, there is no ground for appeal on this point.

5. The prosecutor's grounds of appeal as to Defendant 1 are examined.

The concept of "weapons" in Article 3 subparagraph 3 of the former National Security Act provides that "transfer" and "taking" shall be in the parallel form of arms, etc., and the above "taking" means the deprivation of possession. In the case of the crime of deprivation of arms, it cannot be thought that it includes the act of taking arms owned or possessed by a member of an anti-government organization or a person who is ordered to do so, and in comparison with the object of destruction, robbery, etc. of the same Article, it is reasonable to interpret that it does not include a weapon that a member of an anti-government organization or a person who is ordered to take possession of arms from an anti-government organization or a person who is ordered to take possession of arms from a domestic secret to a domestic secret.

Therefore, the part of the court below's explanation that "weapons" in the above crime of movement of arms are limited to the arms used or possessed by the State or a public organization, is erroneous, but the conclusion of the court below's decision that the defendant 1 moved to the concealment area is justified, on the ground that the non-indicted 1, a member of an anti-government organization, had possession in the Republic of Korea and transferred to the same defendant as the non-indicted 1, a member of an anti-government organization, for the same reason that the "weapons" in the above crime of movement of arms is not included in the "weapons"

We cannot accept the argument of attacking the judgment of the court below from the opposite view.

6. Therefore, the Defendants’ final appeal and the Prosecutor’s final appeal against Defendant 1 are without merit, and all of them are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges by applying Article 57 of the Criminal Act and Article 24 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings to Defendant 2 and 3.

Justices Shin Jong-young (Presiding Justice)

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