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(영문) 대법원 1966. 6. 9. 선고 66다615 전원합의체 판결
[토지대금]
Main Issues

The starting point of counting the statute of limitations for tort by illegal occupation and the right to claim damages

Summary of Judgment

If the ownership of the victim's land was not lost due to the illegal act by the illegal occupation, the tortfeasor's illegal act shall continue to be committed, and the damage shall continue to occur, resulting from a new illegal act, and therefore, the extinctive prescription shall run separately from the date on which the new damage occurred in the application of Article 766 of the Civil Code.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 766 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff-Appellant

Plaintiff (Attorney Oil-il, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant-Appellee

Bosung Land Improvement Cooperatives (Attorney Cho Jong-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

original judgment

Gwangju High Court Decision 65Na408 delivered on March 2, 1966

Text

The original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court.

Reasons

The plaintiff's attorney examines the grounds of appeal.

According to the reasoning of the judgment in the judgment of the court below, the plaintiff alleged that the non-party Bosung-gun's Hasung-gun's Haak-gun's Haak-gun's Haak-gun's Haak-gun's Haak was created as a maintenance (maintenance) around April 1945 without the plaintiff's consent and transferred the land to the Haak-gun, and that the defendant's association continued to be used for the maintenance since the above repair association was integrated and maintained in January 1, 1962, and thus the defendant is liable to compensate for damages caused by tort since it would have infringed the plaintiff's ownership. However, although the plaintiff's right to compensate for damages was more than three years, counting from May 1, 1947, which can be viewed as the time when the plaintiff, who is the victim, became aware of the damage and

However, according to the records, the plaintiff's assertion is unreasonable when the ownership of the land in this case belongs to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's claim for the monetary amount equivalent to the market price price of the land with compensatory compensation is a legal assertion. However, the court below's opinion does not need to be distorted. Furthermore, it is clear that the plaintiff's assertion clearly argues that the ownership of the land in this case is still against himself/herself, and there is a doubt that the plaintiff's claim for damages due to the illegal occupation of the defendant association with respect to the land in this case. Thus, the court below should have clarified the purport of his/her assertion by ordering the plaintiff as to this point.

In addition, if the ownership of the plaintiff's land is lost due to the plaintiff's tort and it is impossible to deliver it to the plaintiff, the defendant's harmful act is terminated and the damage will continue thereafter. Thus, the extinctive prescription of the plaintiff's right to claim compensation for damages shall commence from the time when the plaintiff became aware of the first damage and the perpetrator, and if the plaintiff's ownership on the land was not lost, the defendant's tort shall continue to occur and the damage shall continue to occur, and if the plaintiff's ownership on the land is not lost, the damage shall be caused by the new tort. Accordingly, in applying Article 766 of the Civil Code, the extinctive prescription shall commence separately from the day when the new damage occurred. The court below did not deliberate and decide on whether the ownership on the land of the plaintiff was lost due to the maintenance and creation of the original case, and on the above ground, the decision that the prescription period of the plaintiff's claim for compensation for damages has expired due to the error of incomplete deliberation or lack of reason due to the failure to exercise of the duty to clarify, which affected the judgment.

It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Kimchi-bak (Presiding Judge) Dog-do and Mag-dong and Mag-do and so-called Mag-do Mag-do, Hansung Pap-do, the Mag-man L

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심급 사건
-광주고등법원 1966.3.2.선고 65나408
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