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(영문) 대법원 1981. 10. 13. 선고 81누117 판결
[도로사용료부과처분취소][집29(3)특58;공1981.12.15.(670), 14502]
Main Issues

(a) An example of recognizing that a written objection sent to the head of the relevant Si/Gun/Gu after sending it to the head of the relevant Si/Gun/Gu is a written objection;

B. The case where the head of the Gu recognized the objection objection raised with the official seal of the market as an act of the market.

C. Whether Article 130 of the Local Autonomy Act applies to an objection to the imposition of charges for occupying and using roads by the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor (negative)

Summary of Judgment

A. As the head of Jongno-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government issued a notice of payment along with this notice of imposition by the head of Jongno-gu, upon receipt of the disposition imposing road occupation and use fees by the head of Jongno-gu, Seoul Metropolitan Government, the Plaintiff sent the notice to the Plaintiff, stating the “Seoul Metropolitan Government Head Return” in the text of the written objection and stating the “Ying the head of Jongno-gu, Seoul” on the envelope sent, the Plaintiff shall be interpreted

B. If the head of the above-ro group directly handles the plaintiff's objection and requests the head of the citizen department who accepts the official seal of the market for the relation under the name of the head of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City, and notifies the plaintiff with the official seal of the market for the objection, the above objection shall be deemed to have reached the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor (the defendant) when the above head of the Gu requests the head of the above citizen department to affix the official seal of the market for the objection, and the objection shall be deemed to have reached the defendant's act to reflect the defendant's objection as long as the defendant's official seal is duly sealed on

C. A person who is dissatisfied with the disposition of imposition of road occupation fees under Article 80-2 of the Road Act in Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor may raise an objection within 30 days from the date he/she receives a notice of payment of occupation fees under Article 16 of the Enforcement Rule of the Ordinance on the Collection of Road Occupancy Charges, and Article 130 of the Local Autonomy Act as a general juristic person

[Reference Provisions]

(a)Article 80bis, Article 43, Article 35(2)(a)(b) of the Road Act; Article 16(c) of the Enforcement Rule of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Ordinance on the Collection of Road Occupancy Charges; Article 130 of the Local Autonomy Act

Plaintiff-Appellant

Attorney Jeon Jong-gu, Lee Jong-ho, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant-Appellee

Attorney Kim Jong-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 79Gu545 delivered on February 17, 1981

Text

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The judgment of the court below rejected the lawsuit on the ground that the plaintiff did not take a legitimate pre-trial procedure under Article 130 of the Local Autonomy Act prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

2. However, according to the record, it is evident that the defendant's objection against the defendant against July 30 of the same year was submitted to the head of the subordinate district under his/her jurisdiction as to the disposition of this case rendered on July 18, 1979, and it is evident that there was an objection against the defendant's name as the same 8.3 person.

3. The reasoning of the judgment of the court below is as follows. The plaintiff filed an objection with the head of Jongno-gu Office other than the defendant on July 30, 1979, and the head of Jongno-gu directly rejected the plaintiff's above objection without any justifiable reason. The head of Jongno-gu Office rendered a disposition to return it to the head of Jongno-gu Office on August 30 of the same year, and the disposition to impose the road occupation and use fees of this case was made in the name of the defendant. Thus, the defendant's request with the official seal affixed to the head of the Seoul Metropolitan Government Office with the official seal affixed to the defendant, affixed the defendant's official seal affixed to the above reply, and returned it to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was notified of the return of the objection of the above disposition of this case against the defendant, and the plaintiff can be acknowledged that the plaintiff filed the lawsuit of this case against the defendant on August 30 of 1979 without any objection to the disposition of this case, and the lawsuit of this case is concluded to be unlawful without legitimate objection procedure.

4. First, we should examine whether the Plaintiff’s objection against the Defendant or against the head of Jongno-gu Office under the Defendant’s control.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below Nos. 8-2 and 8-2, the document of the court below stated that the document of objection must return to the head of Jongno-gu Office (see the head of civil engineering division). However, in the envelope sent by him, the envelope sent by him is merely called the head of Jongno-gu Office (see the head of civil engineering division). According to the records, the head of Jongno-gu Office, who is subject to the disposition of this case, sent the notice of payment along with the written notice of the notice of imposition, and when combined with the above documentary evidence, it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff's objection against the defendant and submitted it to the effect that it was submitted through the head of the above Gu

Then, according to the statement of No. 3 of this case, it is clear that the objection (the meaning of the statement of objection) is the disposition of the defendant or the disposition of the head of Jongno-gu Office, and the official seal of the head of Jongno-gu Office is affixed to the defendant, barring any other circumstances, the rejection disposition should be interpreted as the defendant, unless the head of the Gu directly handles it, and the head of the Gu directly requests the head of the Gu to the head of the citizen division who holds the defendant's official seal in the name of the defendant, and the return of it is not a disposition made by the head of Jongno-gu Office, but a disposition made by the head of the Gu as it is not a defendant's disposition, but a disposition made by the head of Jongno-gu. However, in this case, even if the above objection is not deemed forged by the head of Jongno-gu Office, even if the head of the Dong-gu Office participated in the decision making process of rejecting the defendant's objection, the above objection will reach the defendant, and as long as the defendant's official seal was affixed to the defendant's name.

5. In addition, Article 43(1) of the Road Act provides that the road management agency may collect occupation and use fees from the person who occupies and uses a road under the provisions of Article 40(1) of the Road Act. (2) Article 35(2) of the same Act provides that matters necessary for tolls and collection shall be determined by the Ordinance of the local government to which the road management agency concerned belongs, in the case of national highways, and in the case of other roads, it shall be determined by the Ordinance of the local government to which the road management agency concerned belongs. Article 80-2 of the same Act provides that the collection method of occupation and use fees shall be made in the same manner as the collection of occupation and use fees of the road is made, and Article 16 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that the person who has an objection to the imposition of occupation and use fees of the Seoul Special Metropolitan City may raise an objection within 30 days from the date on which he receives a notice of payment, and it shall be interpreted and applied not to Article 30(2) of the Road Act.

Therefore, the court below's decision that it did not go through legitimate pre-trial procedure is erroneous or erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to pre-trial procedure, and it is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating Justices who reviewed the reversal and return of the judgment of the court below on the ground of the reasons for the argument.

Justices Jeon Soo-hee (Presiding Justice)

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