(a) Whether Article 75-2 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act applies to the land for business purposes of a corporation (negative);

(b) Time to file an incidental appeal;

A. Article 75-2 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 12028 of Dec. 31, 1986) (amended by Presidential Decree No. 12028 of Dec. 31, 1986), regardless of the contents of Article 75-2 of the former Enforcement Rule of the Local Tax Act (amended by Ordinance No. 452 of Dec. 31, 1986), the land for business of a corporation is used directly for its own purpose and is excluded from the land for non-business use of the corporation, so there is no room for the application of the above Rule

(b)It is reasonable to see that the time when Appellee may file an appeal is at the expiration of the period for submitting the appellate brief corresponding to the time of closing argument in the appellate court.

Article 188 (1) 13 of the former Local Tax Act (amended by Act No. 3878 of Dec. 31, 1986), Article 142 (1) 1 and 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 12028 of Dec. 31, 1986), Article 75-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act (amended by Ordinance No. 452 of Dec. 31, 1986), Articles 395 and 372 of the Civil Procedure Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 85Nu553 delivered on August 18, 1987; Supreme Court Decision 80Da2442, 2443 Delivered on September 8, 1981; Supreme Court Decision 85Nu29 Delivered on February 10, 1987

Jung Bank Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellee

Head of Busan Metropolitan City/Dong

Daegu High Court Decision 87Gu177 delivered on February 22, 1989

The defendant's appeal shall be dismissed, and the plaintiff's appeal shall be dismissed.

The costs of appeal and incidental appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff and the defendant respectively.

1. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant Litigation Performers

Article 188 (1) 1 (3) of the former Local Tax Act (amended by Act No. 3878 of Dec. 31, 1986) which was enforced as of the date of commencing the payment of property tax of this case (the above provision on Sep. 16, 1986) and Article 142 (1) 1 (7) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 12028 of Dec. 31, 1986), the land acquired by the Plaintiff shall be deemed to fall under the land used directly for the proper purpose of non-business (see Supreme Court Decision 88Nu634 delivered on Apr. 11, 1989). The court below held that the Plaintiff’s direct use of the above land for non-business purpose cannot be deemed to have been for non-business purpose under Article 185(1)5 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act (the above provision on non-business purpose of Article 166(1)5 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Local Tax Act).

The court below erred in finding that the part of the land of this case, which the plaintiff used directly for its own proper purpose, is not directly used for its own proper purpose, on the contrary of the other hand, and for the same reasons as seen earlier, it should be determined that only a part of the land of this case was excluded from non-business land (the part against the defendant is not specified as much as possible according to the court below's judgment. However, as seen earlier, the part of the land of this case against the defendant (the part of the defendant's appeal) constitutes the plaintiff's land for business purpose,

The issue is groundless.

2. As to the plaintiff's incidental appeal

Unless otherwise provided in the Administrative Litigation Act in the administrative litigation, Article 372 of the Civil Procedure Act applies mutatis mutandis to the court of final appeal pursuant to Article 395 of the same Act (Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act). Thus, the plaintiff who is the Appellee in this case may file an appeal even after the right to appeal is extinguished. However, in light of the difference in the structure of the appeals procedure between the appellate court and the court of final appeal and the court of final appeal would allow the plaintiff to receive a written notice of the receipt of the notice of receipt of the appeal, it is reasonable to view that the time when the appeal can be filed as at the expiration of the submission period of the appellate brief corresponding to the time of the closing of argument in the appellate court (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 80Da2442, 2443, Sept. 8, 191; Supreme Court Decision 85Nu29, Feb. 10, 1987). It is evident that the plaintiff has received a notice of receipt of the appeal on March 28, 19, 198.

Therefore, the defendant's appeal is without merit. The plaintiff's incidental appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges on the charge of litigation costs.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)