The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Violation of the Act on Promotion of Utilization of Information and Communications Network and Information Protection, Etc.;

A. Articles 74(1)3 and 44-7(1)3 of the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. (hereinafter “Information and Communications Network Act”) punish the acts of repeatedly allowing any person to reach other party the language, text, sound, image, or video of a code that arouses fear or apprehension through an information and communications network.

“The issue of whether an act constitutes an act of repeatedly reaching another person” refers to not only the case where the other party directly contacts the language causing fear or apprehension, but also where the other party objectively recognizable it by taking into account the following factors: (a) the content and method of expression that the Defendant sent to the other party; (b) the relationship between the Defendant and the other party; (c) the process and frequency of sending the text; (d) the situation before and after the sending of the text; and (e) the situation faced by the other party.

Therefore, if the Defendant sent a text message that may cause fear or apprehension to the mobile phone of the other party, thereby leading the other party to a situation where he/she can immediately receive the text message without any restriction, such act satisfies the requirement that the other party should reach the other party’s text that may cause fear or apprehension. It is irrelevant to whether the other party actually confirmed the text message.

B. The lower court determined that this part of the facts charged was guilty on the following grounds.

In other words, the text messages sent by the defendant to the cell phone of the victim constitute a phrase that may cause fear or apprehensions in consideration of the content, circumstances, period, frequency, etc. of the message.

. The damaged person.