All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The joint principal offender prescribed in Article 30 of the Criminal Act is liable for the entire crime in cases where he/she realized the elements of the crime by sharing the crime jointly among accomplices according to his/her intent to jointly commit the crime.

In order for such a joint principal offender to be established, it is necessary to implement a crime through a functional control by a joint doctor as a subjective requirement, and the intent of joint process is to be integrated for the purpose of committing a specific criminal act with a common intent and to shift one’s own intent by using another’s act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Do2461, Jan. 26, 1996; 2013Do12592, Apr. 26, 2017). On the other hand, the essence of joint principal offender is that the actors share the role of joint principal offender with a functional control by sharing it as a common intention, and that there is no such control (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 8Do1247, Apr. 11, 1989). Furthermore, the lower court found the Defendants guilty of the violation of the Act on the Appointment of Criminal Evidence and the Act on the Appointment of Criminal Procedure (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Do387, Apr. 111, 2019).

A. After June 2014, Defendant B was in office as a regular manager of W Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “W”) and held an investment presentation meeting at X-type business office or head of office.