[1] Whether the case where a witness refuses to testify by legitimately exercising the right to refuse to testify as prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Act constitutes “when a statement is unable to be made because there is any other similar cause” under Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act (negative)

[2] In a case where Gap corporation and its employees were indicted for violating the former Framework Act on the Construction Industry on the ground that they offered funds to the executives of a management entity specialized in improvement projects at the time of solicitation to select them as housing redevelopment projects, and the defendants did not consent to the "legal opinion" prepared by an attorney-at-law and transmitted to Gap corporation as evidence, and the attorney-at-law refused to testify, the case affirming the admissibility of the above written opinion and affirming the judgment below finding innocence

[1] [Majority Opinion] Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that “In cases falling under Article 312 or 313, where a person who needs to make a statement at a preparatory hearing or on a trial date is unable to make a statement due to death, illness, foreign residence, unknown whereabouts, or any other similar cause, such protocol and other documents may be admitted as evidence: Provided, That this shall apply only where it is proved that such statement or preparation was made under particularly reliable circumstances” provides that “when a witness cannot make a statement due to death, illness, foreign residence, unknown whereabouts, or any other similar cause” (Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act provides for exceptions to the above admissibility of evidence; Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act provides that “when a witness is unable to make a statement due to his/her testimony due to death, illness, or any other cause”; Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act provides that “when a witness is unable to make a statement due to death or any other cause” and Article 84 of the former Criminal Procedure Act provides that he/she may refuse to testify due to be admitted to a foreign public trial due to be held.”

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee] Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that even a document which has not been proven by the testimony made by an originator or the person making the original statement may be admitted as evidence in certain cases. The purpose and purpose of the provision are to prevent the discovery of substantive truth, which is the guiding ideology of criminal procedure, by excessively strictly limiting the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Therefore, “where a person who needs to make a statement is unable to make a statement due to death, disease, foreign residence, unknown whereabouts, or any other similar cause” under the above provision includes not only cases where the person who made the document or the person making the original statement is unable to attend at a preparatory hearing or on the court date, but also cases where the person who made the statement is unable to hear the statement on the formation of the document even if he/she attends the court, such as death, disease, foreign residence, unknown whereabouts, etc., and when a witness present at the court exercises the right to refuse to testify, and there is no difference in the scope of exception of the hearsay rule for the discovery of substantive truth.

[2] In a case where Gap corporation and its employees were prosecuted against the violation of the former Framework Act on the Construction Industry (amended by Act No. 10719, May 24, 201) on the ground that they offered funds to the executives of a management entity specialized in improvement projects at the time of soliciting that they would be selected as a housing redevelopment project, and the attorney did not consent to the "legal opinion" prepared in the legal advice process and transmitted to Gap company's side, and the attorney asked the defendant to testify after proving that the contents of testimony were related to others' secrets known to Gap's knowledge of business entrusted by the company Gap, the case affirming the court below's determination that the above legal opinion constitutes "documents produced by the person other than the defendant or their statements" as stipulated in Article 313 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act in substance, and its conclusion cannot be admitted as admissibility on the grounds that the attorney's testimony or testimony was not established by the attorney's oral hearing or the date of trial, and it cannot be admitted as evidence admissibility on the ground that it did not constitute evidence admissibility on the remaining evidence of the attorney's testimony.

[1] Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 5054 of Dec. 29, 1995); Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 8496 of Jun. 1, 2007); Articles 148, 149, 310-2, 313 (1), and 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 12 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Article 38-2 (see current Article 38-2 (1) of the former Framework Act on the Construction Industry (amended by Act No. 10719 of May 24, 201); Articles 34, 112, 149, 219, 310-2, and 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 38-2 (2) of the former Framework Act on the Construction Industry (amended by Act No. 10719 of May 24)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 92Do1211 delivered on August 14, 1992 (Gong1992, 2711) Supreme Court Decision 92Do1244 delivered on August 18, 1992 (Gong1992, 2799) Supreme Court Decision 2004Do3619 Delivered on May 25, 2006 (Gong2006Ha, 1202)

Defendant 1 and four others

Defendant 2 and one other and the prosecutor

Law Firm, Kim & Lee LLC et al.

Seoul High Court Decision 2008No2778 decided June 26, 2009

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the ground of appeal by the prosecutor on the violation of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry

A. Violation of the legal principles as to the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case

(1) Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides, “When a person who needs to make a statement at a preparatory hearing or on a trial date is unable to make a statement due to death, disease, foreign residence, unknown whereabouts, or any other similar cause, the relevant protocol and other documents may be admitted as evidence: Provided, That the foregoing shall apply only when it is proved that the statement or preparation was made in a particularly reliable state.” As for hearsay evidence for which the statement by the person making the original statement, etc. is not proven admissible as evidence, Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act provides, “when a statement is unable to be made due to death, disease, overseas residence, unknown whereabouts, or any other similar cause.” This provision restricts the scope of exceptions under Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act, which was amended by Act No. 5054, Dec. 29, 1995; Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act, which was amended by Act No. 8496, Jun. 1, 2007; Article 314 of the former Criminal Procedure Act, supra.

Meanwhile, the Criminal Procedure Act provides that any person, his or her relatives, etc. may refuse to testify when he or she is subject to criminal prosecution or public action or conviction (Article 148), and also guarantees the right to refuse to testify when a witness has a certain reason (Article 149). The Criminal Procedure Act also guarantees the right to refuse to testify when he or she or a person who is in a religious position becomes aware of in the course of his or her duties as a lawyer, patent attorney, notary public, certified public accountant, certified public accountant, tax accountant, public scrivener, doctor, herb doctor, pharmacist, pharmacist, midwife, nurse, or religious position.

In light of the language and purport of Article 314 of the current Criminal Procedure Act, the purport of amendment, and the contents of the provisions on the right to refuse to testify, etc., the case where a witness who attends the court refuses to testify by legitimately exercising the right to refuse to testify as prescribed by Articles 148 and 149 of the Criminal Procedure Act does not constitute “when a statement is unable to be made because any other similar cause” under Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

(2) The court below maintained the judgment of the court of first instance in which Defendant 5 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant 5”) received legal advice from an attorney-at-law who is affiliated with the law firm as indicated in its judgment, while maintaining the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case, and held that, although there is no express provision under the current law, it is one of the rights to receive legal assistance from an attorney-at-law recognized under Article 12(4) of the Constitution, the client has the privilege that the client may refuse disclosure of the legal opinion of this case for the purpose of legal advice between the attorney-at-law and the client. Accordingly, the court below determined that the legal opinion of this case is inadmissible as long as the authenticity of its establishment is not recognized by the attorney-at-law who is the author in the court, and even if its establishment is recognized as authentic, it cannot be admitted as evidence to acknowledge criminal facts against Defendant 5, the client, and Defendant 1 and 2, regardless of

(3) The main text of Article 12(4) of the Constitution provides that “any person arrested or detained shall have the right to prompt assistance of counsel.” In this regard, Article 34 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits a defense counsel or a person who intends to be a defense counsel to have an interview with the accused or suspect detained by the defendant or suspect and to receive documents or articles without restriction. Meanwhile, the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the seizure of articles held or kept by an attorney-at-law, etc. on the part of others may be refused (main sentence of Article 112 and Article 219). The fact that an attorney-at-law, etc. came to know in the course of being entrusted with his/her duties and that another person’s confidential information is protected within a certain scope (main sentence of Article 149).

In light of the above contents and purport of the provisions of the Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Act concerning the right to assistance of counsel and the scope of confidentiality between a lawyer and a client, etc., it is not acceptable to accept the opinion that legal advice that a person who cannot be seen as a criminal suspect or the defendant has been consulted with a lawyer in his daily life by failing to commence criminal procedures, such as an investigation or a public trial, may also be derived from the client's privilege that may refuse to disclose the confidential information, as the content of the right to receive assistance of counsel, or that the relevant seized articles without the client's consent by the above privilege cannot be used as evidence in a criminal trial regardless of whether the seizure procedure is unlawful. The court below's explanation of the grounds for denying the admissibility of evidence of the legal opinion of this case cannot be said to be appropriate.

(4) However, the court below's conclusion that the court below denied the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case and did not adopt it as evidence is justifiable for the following reasons.

In a case where a document printed from a seized digital storage device is used as a statement evidence, the hearsay rule is applied to the authenticity of the contents of the document, so it can be used as evidence only when it is proved to be genuine by the person who prepared the document or made the statement (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Do2317, Sept. 3, 199; 2007Do7257, Dec. 13, 2007).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, the legal opinion of this case was prepared by an attorney-at-law belonging to the law firm, and then the prosecutor acquired the electronic document sent to Defendant 5 on the part of Defendant 5 by e-mail through the seizure of digital storage media such as computer, and then printed out it, and applied as evidence. Defendant 1, 2, and Defendant 5 did not agree to the admissibility of evidence. The above attorney-at-law appeared as a witness on the 6th trial day of the court below, but explained that the contents to be testified are related to another person's secret, which was known from Defendant 5 company's business entrusted by e-mail, and refused

Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the legal opinion of this case is a document printed out from a seized digital storage medium, and its substance constitutes “a statement prepared by any person other than the defendant or a document stating such statement” as stipulated in Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, since it was not proven by the aforementioned attorney’s statement, who was the maker or the person who made the statement at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial, the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case cannot be acknowledged pursuant to the above provisions. Furthermore, the attorney’s failure to make a statement as to the establishment of the legal opinion of this case at the public trial date of the court below constitutes a case where the right to refuse to testify is duly exercised as prescribed in Article 149 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and thus, the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case cannot be acknowledged in accordance

Therefore, although the court below erred as seen earlier at the time of establishing the reasoning, the court below’s conclusion that rejected the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case was justifiable, it cannot be said that this affected the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal in this part is not acceptable.

B. Violation of law as to the adoption of evidence and violation of the rules of evidence

(1) In order to use the documents printed from the seized digital storage medium as evidence, the identity of the documents stored in the digital storage medium and printed out should be recognized. To this end, the original of the digital storage medium should not be changed from the seizure to the printing out (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do7257, Dec. 13, 2007, etc.).

According to the records, the court below held that the documents printed out of the accounting materials and the list of copies, etc., as evidence by the prosecutor, constitute evidentiary documents, i.e., the contents of which are the evidentiary materials, and the contents of which are the evidentiary materials, and that they were not identical to the original contents stored in the digital storage medium, and that they were not admitted as evidence on the ground that they were not proven to be authentic by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.

In light of the above legal principles, the above measures by the court below are just, and there is no error in violation of the law regarding the adoption of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

(2) According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court upheld the first instance judgment that acquitted the Defendants and Defendant 5 on this part of the charges, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, on the ground that it is difficult to recognize that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone was involved in or conspired to commit a crime violating the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, such as the facts charged.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there is no violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

2. As to the grounds of appeal by the prosecutor on the offering of a bribe related to the redevelopment of the Class 1 district and the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bribery)

A. According to the records, with respect to documents printed out from digital storage media, such as the current status of securing new construction rights and the current status of enforcement products, which the prosecutor applied for as evidence in relation to this part of the facts charged, the court below did not adopt the evidence on the grounds that the above evidence as statement evidence is not identical to the original contents stored in the digital storage medium, but did not prove the authenticity of its establishment pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.

In light of the above legal principles, the above measures by the court below are just, and there is no error in violation of the law regarding the adoption of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance that acquitted the above Defendants on this part of the charges, on the ground that it is not sufficient to recognize that Defendant 1, 2, and 3 provided by the prosecutor alone with the evidence submitted by the prosecutor was given or received money under the pretext of solicitation for the selection of a contractor,

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there is no violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

3. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendants 2 and 4 as to the offering of a bribe related to the redevelopment of the front Three Zones and the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bribery) and the Prosecutor

A. Determination as to which public official’s profit constitutes a bribe should be made by taking into account all the circumstances such as the contents of the relevant public official’s duties, the relationship between a public official and a beneficiary of benefits, whether there exists a special relationship between both parties, the degree of profit and the situation and timing of giving and receiving benefits. The same applies to the executives and employees of a rearrangement project management contractor who are deemed public officials under the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents. In this case, the same applies to the cases of executives and employees of a rearrangement project management contractor who are deemed public officials under the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents. Although a rearrangement project management contractor must enter into a specific business entrustment agreement with a rearrangement cooperative or an association establishment promotion committee, and acquire profits in relation to a specific reconstruction or redevelopment project, it does not constitute a bribe as an unfair profit in which the executives and employees gain profit

Meanwhile, the crime of acceptance of bribe under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Act applies to a public official’s acceptance of a bribe in the course of performing his/her duties, and even in cases where a public official allows another person to deliver a bribe to a third person without receiving a bribe, if there is a relationship that can be evaluated by social norms as being directly received by a public official, such as a public official’s death or representative, etc., such other person’s acceptance of a bribe, the crime of acceptance of bribe under Article 129(1) of the Criminal Act is established. The same applies to cases where an executive officer or employee of a management entity specialized in improvement projects, who is deemed a public official, gives a bribe to a management entity specialized in improvement projects other than himself/herself, in connection with his/her duties (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Do95

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged, based on its adopted evidence, that Defendant 2 made a solicitation as to the selection of redevelopment contractor to Defendant 4, who is deemed a public official as the representative director of the non-indicted 1 corporation, as a management contractor of the improvement project, and provided funds of KRW 3,30,000,000 in return for such solicitation to the above company for one year. Accordingly, the court below found Defendant 2 and 4 guilty of the crime of offering of bribe and acceptance of bribe regarding the amount equivalent to the above financial gains, on the basis of the circumstances stated in its reasoning, the above provision of financial benefits to the above company can be evaluated as having been directly given to Defendant 4 by social norms.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged by Defendants 2 and 4, there were no errors by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, with respect to this part of the facts charged that Defendant 1, 2, and 4 offered and received the full amount of KRW 3.3 million as a bribe in consideration of the above solicitation, the court below maintained the measures that held Defendant 1 not guilty of the facts charged within the scope of exceeding the bribe amounting to the above financial gains on the ground that it is difficult for the court of first instance to recognize the facts charged on the grounds that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor with respect to Defendant 1 was insufficient to recognize the conspiracy or the participation of the above crime with respect to Defendant 2 and Defendant 4 only on the ground that it is difficult to recognize the above amount

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and contrary to the prosecutor's grounds of appeal, there is no violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except for a dissenting opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee as to the violation of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry.

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Dai-hee is as follows.

A. The majority opinion argues that the legal opinion of this case is hearsay evidence of Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act in substance, and its admissibility is not recognized by the above provision or Article 314 of the same Act, and that the court below's conclusion that did not recognize the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case is justifiable. However, as examined below, the court below's decision that rejected the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case is unlawful. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the majority opinion.

(1) First, it is reasonable to point out that the Majority Opinion’s rejection of the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case on the ground of the so-called attorney’s privilege is inappropriate. In principle, the issue of the scope and limitation of the use of evidence in the criminal procedure is belonging to the territory of legislative discretion or choice, and as a matter of principle, it is necessary to respect it. In addition, an attempt to restrict the use of evidence directly from the Constitution should not be made. In addition, according to Articles 112 and 219 of the Criminal Procedure Act, it is clear that the use of legal opinion, etc. prepared by a lawyer on legal advice with the client is not specifically restricted in cases where the client possesses or keeps it.

(2) However, the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that the legal opinion of this case is deemed hearsay evidence under Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and that the admissibility of the legal opinion is not recognized, cannot be consented for the following reasons.

(A) First, I do not agree with the Majority Opinion that the instant legal opinion constitutes hearsay evidence under Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.

The hearsay evidence is a document containing a statement in place of the statement made at a preparatory hearing or during a public trial, or a statement containing another person’s statement made outside a preparatory hearing or during a public trial (Article 310-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act), and means evidence constituting a fact requiring proof as to the existence or absence of the original statement itself. Therefore, “written statement prepared by a person other than the defendant” as hearsay evidence under Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act refers to a document stating the fact requiring proof by a person who has directly experienced the fact requiring proof, and a document stating his opinion only irrespective of the fact requiring proof experience cannot be deemed hearsay evidence under the above provision, and thus, the admissibility of evidence cannot be restricted by the rules of hearsay evidence.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the record, the legal opinion of this case is written with the legal opinion expressed by the attorney-at-law belonging to the law firm as stated in the judgment of the court below in accordance with the defendant 5's request for advice, and it can be seen that the above attorney-at-law is not a document that directly experience the facts requiring proof and contains the contents thereof. Therefore, deeming the legal opinion of this case as hearsay evidence, such as Article 313 (1) of the Criminal Procedure

(B) Even if the legal opinion of this case constitutes hearsay evidence under Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, unlike the interpretation theory of the majority opinion, the phrase “when a person who prepared the document or made the original statement is unable to make a statement because of any other similar cause” under Article 314 of the same Act includes cases where the person who prepared the document or made the original statement exercises the right to refuse to testify at court. Thus, the legal opinion of this case still remains admissible.

First, Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act permits documents which have not been proven by the testimony made by an originator or the person making the original statement to be admitted as evidence in certain cases. The purpose and purpose of the above provision are to prevent the discovery of substantial truth, which is the guiding ideology of criminal procedure, by excessively strict restriction on admissibility of hearsay evidence. Therefore, the above provision is to widely interpret that “when a person who needs to make a statement is unable to make a statement due to death, illness, foreign residence, unknown whereabouts, or any other similar cause” includes not only cases where the person who made the document or the person making the original statement is unable to appear at the preparatory hearing or the court on the court date, but also cases where it is impossible to hear the statement on the authenticity of the document even if the person who made the statement or the person making the original statement is present at the court. When a witness dies, is missing, ill, or is missing, and when a witness present at the court exercises the right to refuse to testify, it is impossible to prove the authenticity of the document without the prosecutor’s responsibility as evidence and there

In the meantime, the Supreme Court has consistently and consistently held that the case where a witness who attends the court by exercising the right to refuse to testify constitutes an exception under Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act (see Supreme Court Decisions 92Do1211, Aug. 14, 1992; 92Do1244, Aug. 18, 1992; 2004Do3619, May 25, 2006). This is entirely reasonable as an interpretation theory that reflects the purpose and purpose of the above provision. Unlike the language “when a witness is unable to make a statement due to any other reason” under the former Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 8496, Jun. 1, 2007), Article 314 of the current Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 8496, Jun. 1, 207) provides that “when a witness is unable to make a statement due to any other reason” and it is more strict to interpret the exception of the hearsay rule due to any change in the previous precedents.

Second, Article 149 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which provides for the right to refuse to testify of an attorney-at-law, provides for the duty of confidentiality of an attorney-at-law, etc., and even if a client’s confidential information is protected pursuant to the above provision, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that it is an indirect and incidental effect following the exercise of the right to refuse to testify by an attorney-at-law, etc. In this regard, it is true that there is no problem in the admissibility of evidence of a statement in a case where an attorney-at-law, etc. gives testimony without exercising the right to refuse to testify. Therefore, concluding that the admissibility of a document prepared by an attorney-at-law, etc. or stating the statement is denied by exercising the right to refuse to testify under Article 149

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, although an attorney-at-law, who is the maker of the legal opinion of this case, appeared as a witness on the court below date, he refused to testify as to the formation of such a petition. The court below should have deliberated and judged whether the preparation of the legal opinion of this case constitutes hearsay evidence under Article 313(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act and was made in a particularly reliable state under Article 314 of the same Act.

B. Therefore, the lower court should have determined whether to admit this part of the facts charged after having adopted the legal opinion of this case as evidence in cases where the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case is recognized by further examination of whether it can be admitted as evidence. Nevertheless, the lower court maintained the first instance court that acquitted the Defendant on the grounds that the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case is rejected and the remaining evidence alone is difficult to recognize this part of the facts charged without going through such examination and determination. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment, and the

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below on the violation of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry should be reversed without any further review of the prosecutor's remaining grounds for appeal, and the part on the offering of bribe to Defendant 4 as to Defendant 2 is related to the above defendant's violation of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry and Article 37 of the Criminal Act.

C. On the other hand, although it is not alleged in the grounds of appeal, I would like to express their opinions on the judgment of the court below as to the admissibility of each prosecutor’s protocol against Nonindicted 2 and 3 as follows.

The lower court determined that each of the above statements cannot be admitted as evidence in light of the purport that the investigative agency confirmed the contents of the instant legal statement and examined the details of the preparation and the contents thereof, and that it also cannot be admitted as evidence.

However, it is not reasonable to deny the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case as seen earlier, and even if the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case is restricted by the rules of hearsay evidence as stated in the majority opinion, it is not reasonable to view it as an illegally collected evidence since the investigative agency acquired its content in accordance with the lawful procedure through a search and seizure warrant issued by a judge. Nevertheless, the court below rejected the admissibility of the legal opinion of this case immediately on the ground that the above statement of this case contains the details of the preparation process of the legal opinion of this case. Such decision of the court below is a result of restricting the legitimate examination of the investigative agency for

Therefore, if the case is reversed and remanded, the court below should re-examine and judge the admissibility of each of the above written statements.

As above, we express our dissent against the Majority Opinion.

Justices Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice)