The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. Article 249(2) of the former Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Act No. 8730 of Dec. 21, 2007) provides that “The statute of limitations for an offense against which a public prosecution was instituted shall be deemed to have expired at the expiration of 15 years after the public prosecution was instituted without final and conclusive judgment.” However, on December 21, 2007, the statute of limitations was amended by Act No. 8730 of Dec. 21, 2007 (hereinafter “amended Criminal Procedure Act”) and extended the statute of limitations to “25 years.”

On the other hand, Article 3 of the Addenda of the amended Criminal Procedure Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 2007. Dec. 21, 2007) (hereinafter "the Addenda provision of this case") provides that "the previous provision shall apply to crimes committed before the enforcement of this Act" under the title "the transitional measures with respect to the statute of limitations". However, the statute of limitations provided for in Article 249 (2) above is distinguishable from the so-called "judicial prescription" and "the statute of limitations" provided for in paragraph (1) of the same Article, and even according to the wording, the supplementary provision of this case applies only to "the statute of limitations" and does not apply

Therefore, the revised Criminal Procedure Act should be deemed to have no transitional provision regarding the judgment, so the period of the 25-year trial under Article 249(2) of the amended Criminal Procedure Act shall be applied in accordance with the principle of non-competence. Accordingly, the period of the 25-year trial under Article 249(2) of the amended Criminal Procedure Act has not yet expired after the public prosecution was instituted on February 23, 2004.

Nevertheless, there is an error of misapprehension of legal principles with regard to the judgment of the court below which rendered acquittal on the premise that Article 249(2) of the former Criminal Procedure Act, which is the previous provision, is applied to the facts charged of this case, has been 15 years since the date of institution of the prosecution.

2. Determination

A. The prosecutor of the lower court also asserted the same purport as the grounds for appeal, and the lower court rejected the prosecutor’s assertion on the following grounds.

(i) the Gu.