(a) Nature of decision of the deliberative committee on property devolving upon the State and method of relief against illegality in such decision;

(b) Determination of the petition council, which is subject to an illegal petition for review on the determination of a petition for review of the property devolving upon the State, and the validity of a local government-funded agency disposition under that determination;

C. Scope of binding force on lower courts in legal judgment of remand case

A. The binding force of the lower court’s judgment on the remand judgment arises only from the passive point of view that the lower court’s judgment is not justifiable, and thus, it may bring about the same conclusion as the judgment prior to remanding, in so far as there is another possible point of view by avoiding any error on the ground of reversal.

(b) The determination of the Council on Petitions for Reversion cannot be cancelled or changed by the Council unless there is a review or other special reason, and its disposition cannot be corrected or changed without the cancellation or change of the adjudication as indicated by the Director-General.

C. The decision of the Appeal Council, which is a petition decision-making authority for a petition case on the property devolving upon the State, cannot be an independent administrative litigation for which the revocation or alteration thereof is sought, and only the disposition of the Director-General of Local Government (the Director-General of Local Tax Office after the amendment of the Act) who revoked or changed as a result of this decision is subject to administrative litigation. Thus, the illegality of the decision of the Appeal Council can only be asserted in administrative litigation on the disposition

Article 39 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to Jurisdiction, Article 8(2) of the Regulations on Petitions on Property Belonging to Jurisdiction, Article 406(2) of the Civil Procedure Act

Sung Chang Enterprise Corporation

Busan Head of Busan District Tax Office

China Industries Corporation

Daegu High Court Decision 63Gu41 delivered on November 19, 1963

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the supplementary intervenor, and the remainder shall be borne by the defendant.

As to each of the grounds of appeal by Defendant Litigation Performers and Defendant Intervenor’s Intervenor’s Intervenor’s Intervenor’s Attorney Kim Jong-sik and Han-do

According to Article 39 (2) of the Regulations for the Deliberation Committee on Property Belongingd to Jurisdiction under Article 39 (2) of the Regulations for the Deliberation Committee on Property Recovery to Jurisdiction. The decision of the Deliberation Committee on Property Appeal is binding on the decision of the Deliberation Committee, but the decision of the Decision Committee on Appeal on Property Belongingd to the State is recognized as binding on the decision of the Deliberation Committee, but the decision of the Decision Committee on Appeal cannot be the independent administrative litigation for which the cancellation or change of the decision is sought, and only the disposition of the Director-General of Local Government Office (the Director-General of Local Tax Office) whose decision has been changed in accordance with the cancellation of the decision can be the subject of administrative litigation. In this case, the decision of the Deliberation Committee on Appeal cannot be contested as an administrative litigation independently, but if there is an administrative litigation on the disposition of the Local Government Office (Local Tax Office) which is bound by the decision, it is reasonable to interpret that the decision

It is natural in light of the purport of the previous precedents that the petition review committee's decision on the disposal of the property devolving upon the local government-invested administrative agency's original administrative disposition, but if it is viewed in substance from a substantive point of view, the decision of the appeal ruling agency with such nature can not be cancelled or changed by the petition review committee, which is a ruling agency, unless there is a review or any other special provision unlike general administrative disposition, and that the disposition of the local government-invested administrative agency bound by the ruling cannot be cancelled or changed by the administrative litigation without a legitimate cancellation or change of the above ruling, even if there is a cancellation or change by administrative litigation, the appeal on the disposal of the property devolving upon the local government-invested administrative agency's own has the nature of dispute and can not be independently subject to administrative litigation even if the ruling has binding force.

In this case, it is difficult to conclude that the appeal filed by the plaintiff by 16 May 16, 1960 No. 2230 is a request for re-examination of the ruling 1958.7.9, and that the ruling is cancelled or modified without any legal ground to re-examine it, even if it is an unlawful act which can be cancelled or modified again, it shall not be readily concluded that the illegality is significant and obvious, and that the disposition of the defendant's local government administrative agency on January 8, 1961 and 2.9 shall not be considered as a disposition of ipso facto invalidation until it is cancelled, and it shall not be considered as a legitimate disposition of 20.20 after re-examination of the ruling 20.3rd of the ruling as mentioned above, the cancellation of the ruling cannot be seen as a legitimate cancellation of the ruling 20.20 after re-examination of the ruling 20.3rd of the ruling 29.20 after its re-examination of the ruling 20.29.

The binding force of a false judgment on the lower court's erroneous judgment of remand arises only from a passive point of view that the judgment of the lower court is not justifiable on the ground of reversal, and the lower court cannot be deemed to have committed an unlawful act that did not have been bound by the judgment of remand on the ground that it brought about the same conclusion as the judgment of the lower court prior to remand by another possible point of view, and as such, it cannot be concluded that the lower court did not cancel the disposition on December 22, 1961, on the ground that the lower court's judgment did not revoke the disposition on the ground that the grounds for reversal of the judgment of remand did not change the grounds for disqualification under the applicable laws and regulations of the Defendant, which is the grounds for reversal of the judgment of remand, and therefore, it is difficult to accept the reasoning on whether the judgment of remand was illegal or not, and it is difficult to accept the reasoning on the fairness of administrative disposition of the judgment of the lower court and the principle of prohibition, which is the subject of the Defendant's disposition on December 22, 1961.

The issue is either groundless or groundless.

Therefore, according to Article 14 of the Administrative Litigation Act, Articles 400, 395, and 384 of the Civil Procedure Act, all participating judges are decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

The Supreme Court Judge Yang-Gyeong-Gyeong (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court Decision 2011Hun-Ga, Kim Jong-sung, Kim Jong-sung, Kim Jong-sung, Kim Jong-sung, Kim Jong-sung, Kim Jong-chul, Lee Ma