1. The plaintiff's incidental appeal and the defendant's appeal are all dismissed.

2. The costs of incidental appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of this court cited in the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows: “The sum of the rent of KRW 13,500,00,00 for the lease deposit of this case from October 2017 to June 2018 - KRW 1,784,720 for the same period, including public charges, charges causing road traffic, charges for supplying electricity, etc. - KRW 240,00 for the reported portion on July 25, 201,” and the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited in the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, other than adding the judgment of the defendant on the defendant’s assertion as stated in the following paragraph 2, it is identical to the ground of the judgment of the court of first instance.

2. Judgment on the defendant's assertion

A. The Defendant asserted that the Plaintiff was notified of the termination of the instant lease agreement from the first instance court to September 2017, and that the first instance court did not assert that the termination of the instant lease agreement was notified at the beginning of December 2017. However, recognizing that the first instance court was notified of the termination of the instant lease agreement around the beginning of December 2017 violates the principle of pleading.

B. The phrase “the fact that refers to the fact that it is referred to in the principle of pleading” does not include any indirect fact that leads to the determination of the legal effect of the extinguishment of a right, which directly requires the determination of the existence of the right and that leads to the verification of the existence of the right.

(See Supreme Court Decision 94Da37868 Decided November 4, 1994, etc.). The period of notification of termination of a lease is merely an indirect fact that makes an indirect and means room to determine the termination of the lease, which is the fact of the right to claim the return of the deposit, and thus, it cannot be said that the first instance court acknowledged that there was a notification of termination of the lease of this case on or after September 2017, 2017, which was alleged by the Plaintiff, around the first instance court.

Therefore, the defendant's above assertion is difficult to accept.

3. As such, the plaintiff's claim of this case is accepted within the scope of the above recognition and the remaining claims are dismissed as there is no ground, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion.