Restrictions on free discretion subject to judicial review

The discretionary authority granted to administrative agencies is limited to themselves in the case of binding discretion as well as in the case of free discretion, and its limits should be determined by the customary law or general cooking as well as the provisions of the law. In a case where it is deemed extremely unfair in light of these various standards, the exercise of the discretionary authority is an illegal act that is subject to judicial review rather than unfair.

Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act

Attorney Choi Ho-ho, Counsel for the plaintiff

Attorney Lee Jae-hoon, Counsel Lee Jae-hoon, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Daegu High Court Decision 84Gu17 delivered on July 24, 1984

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

The discretionary authority granted to administrative agencies shall be limited to their own discretion, even if there is a wide and narrow difference not only in the case of the binding discretion but also in the case of the free discretion, and its limit should be determined by the customary law or the general doctrine as well as the provisions of the law. Therefore, if it is deemed that such a large number of standards are extremely unfair, the exercise of the discretionary authority is an illegal act subject to judicial review rather than unfair.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the defendant's disciplinary action in this case is unlawful because it exceeds the scope of disciplinary discretion in light of the above finalized facts. The court below's decision is justified in light of the limit of discretionary action and the facts determined by the court below, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to disciplinary action or disciplinary action, such as incomplete deliberation or disciplinary decision.

The purpose of this paper is to criticize the decision of the court below on July 14, 1981 by citing the rules on disciplinary action, etc. of public officials No. 251 of the Prime Minister, or the above rules have left room for discretion even if they are based on their own, and these rules are not necessarily bound by the rules on disciplinary action of public officials, but are not bound by the rules on disciplinary action of public officials. Therefore, we cannot accept the issue.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed without merit, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the losing party and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)