(a) The purport of the order of the court below that the head of the National Security Planning Department revokes a disposition not to allow an interview to the defense counsel;

B. Whether the lower court’s error that indicated the chief of the National Security Planning Department as a party, not a judicial police officer under Article 417 of the Criminal Procedure Act, on the quasi-appeal decision, constitutes grounds for reappeal under Article 415 of the Criminal Procedure Act

(c) The case holding that there was a legitimate application for interview by a defense counsel of a suspect under detention by the National Security Planning Board to submit an application for interview to the National Security Planning Department, stating that the defense counsel files an application for interview to the National Security Planning Board;

(d) The case holding that a disposition not to allow an interview is the same as a disposition not to allow an interview to be made to the suspect under detention of the defense counsel;

A. In light of Articles 2(1)3 and 15 of the National Security Planning Act and Article 8 of the Act on the Persons Performing the Duties of Judicial Police Officers and the Scope of their Duties, the purport of the order of the court below that revokes the refusal of a defense counsel meeting of the suspect by the head of the National Security Planning Department is that a person who performs the duties of a judicial police officer by the designation of the head of the National Security Planning Department as an employee of the National Security Planning Department is revoked the disposition prohibiting a defense counsel meeting.

B. The quasi-appeal procedure under Article 417 of the Criminal Procedure Act does not require the involvement of both parties that are in conflict with the litigation procedure based on the party principle. Thus, even if the court below erred by indicating the chief of the national security planning division, not the judicial police officer under Article 417, as the other party, it does not constitute an unlawful ground for reappeal under Article 415 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

C. In investigating a suspect, the National Security Planning Board entered the place of custody on the warrant of detention into the detention room of the secondary police station, and submitted an application for interview to the National Security Planning Department for the reason that the police box affiliated to the Seoul Branch of the National Security Planning Department, which stated that the defense counsel applied for an interview to the National Security Planning Department, was in a position adjacent to the Seoul Branch of the National Security Planning Department, and the purport of the application was notified to the National Security Planning Department through wire, if there are circumstances that the aforementioned notification was made to the National Security Planning Board, it cannot be readily concluded that

D. According to Articles 34, 89, 90, and 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which guarantee the right to interview and communicate with the defendant or suspect without any restriction on the part of Article 12(4) of the Constitution which provides the right to counsel, and Articles 89, 90, and 91 of the same Act which provide the right to interview and communicate with the defendant or suspect, the right to interview and communicate with the counsel is indispensable for guaranteeing the human rights of the defendant or suspect under physical restraint or for preparing for defense, and the right to interview and communicate with the counsel shall not be restricted not only by the disposition of the investigative agency, but also by the court's decision, unless there is any restriction on the law. In light of the purport of the above relevant law, the right to interview and communicate with the defendant or suspect after the lapse of the date of

(a)(d)Article 12(4) of the Constitution, Article 34 and Article 417(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 2(1)3 and Article 15 of the National Security Planning Act, Article 8(b) of the Act on the Persons Performing the Duties of Judicial Police Officials and the Scope of their Duties; Article 415(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 89, Article 90, and Article 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act;

D. Supreme Court Decision 89Mo37 delivered on February 13, 1990

Minister of National Security Planning

Attorney Park Ho-ho

Seoul Criminal Court Order 91 Assistant1 dated March 18, 1991

The reappeal is dismissed.

1. The grounds of reappeal are examined as first.

In investigating the crime of violation of the National Security Planning Act under Article 2 (1) 3 of the National Security Planning Act, the National Security Planning Department has the duties of judicial police officers under Article 15 of the above Act and Article 8 of the Act on the Persons Performing the duties of managing judicial police officers and the Scope of their duties. According to the records, the order of the court below that revokes the disposition of refusing to interview with the defense counsel against the suspect 1 and 2 by the head of the National Security Planning Department in this case, the purport of the order of the court below that the disposition of refusing to interview with the defense counsel against the suspect 1 and 2 by the head of the National Security Planning Department is ultimately the purport of revoking the disposition of prohibiting the interview with the defense counsel by the person who performs the duties of judicial police officer by the designation of the head of the National Security Planning Department. In addition, the quasi-appeal procedure under Article 417 of the Criminal Procedure Act is not required unlike the litigation procedure based on the party principle. Thus, the court below's argument is groundless.

2. The second ground for reappeal is examined.

According to the records, the non-applicant suspect 1 was detained in the National Security Planning Department on March 12, 191 on the charge of violating the National Security Act on March 12, 1991, and each detention warrant against the above suspects was stated in the National Security Planning Department and the Seoul Central Police Station detention room, respectively. The attorney-at-law No. 1, the applicant, appointed the above suspects as counsel from the mother of the above suspects and wanting to meet them. On March 14, 1991, the defendant No. 1 was appointed to the main police box affiliated to the Seoul Central Police Station of the National Security Planning Department and filed an application for interview with the National Security Planning Board, which is a defense counsel of the above suspects.

In the case of this case, the National Security Planning Board entered the place of custody on each warrant of detention of the above suspects as the detention room of the Central Police Station, and submitted the application for interview to the above main police station on the ground that the above senior police station affiliated with the Seoul Branch of the National Security Planning Department was located adjacent to the Seoul Branch of the National Security Planning Department. However, the above application stipulates that the applicant shall apply for interview to the National Security Planning Department. The chief of the National Security Planning Board has the authority to coordinate the duties of each intelligence and investigative agency, including the police agency, under Article 2 (2) of the National Security Planning Board Act and Article 3 of the Regulations on the Regulation on the Regulation of National Security Coordination of Information and Security Affairs, and when the attorney applies for interview under Article 34 of the Criminal Procedure Act, it does not necessarily have a certain form. According to the records, the applicant submitted the above application for interview to the above main police station, but it cannot be concluded that there was no legitimate application for interview as in the opinion of the court below.

3. The ground of re-appeal No. 3 is examined.

Article 12(4) of the Constitution provides that "any person who is arrested or detained shall have the right to have the assistance of counsel immediately when he is arrested or detained," and Article 34 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for the right to interview and communicate with the accused or suspect by the counsel in order to guarantee the above substantial right, and does not provide any restriction on the procedure or time. Meanwhile, Articles 89, 90, and 91 of the same Act also guarantee the right to interview and communicate with the accused or suspect under detention. The right to interview and communicate by the counsel is an essential right to guarantee the human rights of the accused or suspect under physical restraint and to prepare for defense. Thus, the right to interview and communicate by the counsel is not only a disposition by the investigative agency, but also a decision by the court, unless there is any restriction on the law.

Therefore, in light of the purport of the relevant laws and regulations, the fact that no meeting is held after the lapse of the date of application is the same as the disposition of denial of meeting. Therefore, the judgment below to the same purport is just, and it cannot be viewed that there is an illegal ground to be a ground for reappeal. There is no ground for appeal.

4. The reappeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)