The meaning of Article 545 (1) 3 of the Civil Act

Even if the contract is cancelled, the rights of a third party may not be infringed upon even if the contract is cancelled, but the third party who has acquired the right to the subject matter of the contract, shall meet the requisite to set up against the contracting party regarding

Article 545 of the Civil Act

Park Jong-ho et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

An administrator of an absentee's legal representative by e-mail

Seoul District Court of the first instance, the Seoul High Court of the second instance, and the Seoul High Court of the second instance 54 civil defense 492 delivered on March 30, 1955

The final appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff’s ground of appeal No. 1 contains an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to sharing and cancellation of the contract. In other words, as shown clearly in the records, the real estate for this purpose was originally owned by the Defendant, which was jointly purchased on December 20, 4282 by the first instance court with the right to display and create a short term of 50,000 won from the right to create a new market (which is the difference of 1th day of the same year with the right to display and create a new market) 520,00 won (the Plaintiff’s complaint and short term 40,000,0000,00000 won, were purchased on July 6, 4287 by the Defendant’s first instance court’s order to cancel the contract, and thus, the Plaintiff’s right to purchase and sell the real estate, which was clearly cancelled on March 18, 4283, the Plaintiff’s right to purchase and sell the real estate to Nonparty 1 and the Defendant’s first instance court’s order to cancel this legal principles.

However, according to the records and the original judgment in this case, the plaintiff could not complete the registration of the requisite against the plaintiff, even if he purchased the right to the object of the contract from the defendant Ehyp, the purchaser of the real estate in this case, and acquired the ownership thereof. Thus, the original judgment which did not accept the plaintiff's claim against the cancellation of the real estate sale contract between the defendant Ehyp and Embpon that can be recognized as representative, cannot be viewed as unlawful, since the original judgment which did not accept the plaintiff's claim against the plaintiff cannot be accepted merely because it is an independent opinion as to the cancellation of the contract.

The ground of appeal No. 2 is that the original judgment is erroneous in disregarding the principles of the lawsuit. In other words, as shown in the records, the case is that (1) the plaintiff is a joint hearing of the lawsuit that the plaintiff subrogated the plaintiff to the lawsuit that the plaintiff is the party against the defendant Lee Jong-soo (the form has a simple form of a collective action against the plaintiff, etc.), but (1) the lawsuit of the court of first instance against the plaintiff Lee Jong-soo et al. and the right to create the case is final and conclusive, and (2) the plaintiff is not charged against the defendant Lee Jae-sung on behalf of the defendant Lee Jong-sung on behalf of the defendant Lee Jong-sung on behalf of the defendant Lee Jong-sung on behalf of the defendant Lee Jong-sung on the same amount of the right to create the lawsuit, and therefore, the lawsuit against the plaintiff Lee Jong-sung on behalf of the defendant Lee-sung on behalf of the plaintiff Lee-sung on behalf of the defendant Lee Jae-sung on the same basis, and therefore, the court below did not have any direct jurisdiction against the plaintiff Lee Jong-sung on the ground of this judgment.

However, in the case of the co-litigation, even though the court of first instance did not institute a public prosecution after being ruled against the defendant's right to create a conflict of interest, the res judicata effect of the judgment against the person, etc. does not affect the defendant's objection. Therefore, there is no reason to

The above ground of appeal No. 3 is that the original judgment was erroneous in exercising the right of tin or in finding a tiny trial. In other words, if the original judgment did not have any narbly expressed as to whether the subject matter was real estate under the name of the defendant Lee Jong-chul, the original judgment was held that the defendant sold the real estate of 2 million won, including the main real estate owned by the defendant Lee Jong-tae, which was owned respectively, to the defendant Lee Jong-tae (see, e.g., 1 to 3, 2000 won in the original judgment). Thus, it was necessary to ex officio examine whether the real estate was donated to the defendant Lee Jong-tae, before the principal trial on whether it was a donation of the real estate under this Article. The court below recognized that the sales contract on December 21, 4282 between the defendant Lee Jong-chul and the plaintiff was an important fact that the plaintiff had no larbly agreed upon or had been cancelled in the form of 18 March 18, 4283 (see, 25).

As to the title of the ownership of the real estate in this case, the plaintiff did not assert that the principal lawsuit was filed on the premise that it was in the name of the defendant Lee Jong-dae, and thus, it is not necessary to seek an explanation ex officio. In addition, there is no room for doubt as to the conclusion that the original decision does not recognize the cancellation of the sales contract between the defendant Lee Woo et al. in the first instance trial and the plaintiff. Therefore, the appeal in this case is groundless and it is so decided as per Disposition by Article 401, Article 95, Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Justices Kim Jong-il (Presiding Justice) Acting Justice Kim Jae-ho on the present allocation of Kim Dong-dong