The case holding that the rejection of an application for permission for extension of the period submitted three months after the expiration of the period of permission for displaying outdoor advertisements is not a deviation from discretion.

In order to obtain permission for extension of the period of displaying an outdoor advertisement previously permitted for three years, it should have been submitted along with a written consent to use by the building owner, etc. in order to obtain the permission for extension of the period of time, but the administrative agency did not submit it even at the time when three months have elapsed since the original permission period was expired, despite the request for supplement of the written consent to use, even though the administrative agency had extended the period of time three times, and requested the supplement of the written consent to use the defective period of time, the previous permission is naturally null and void without any separate act due to the expiration of the period unless there are special circumstances. Thus, even if it was possible to submit a written consent to use by the building owner after the return of the application for permission for extension of the period of outdoor advertisement display, it cannot be deemed that the rejection disposition deviates from discretion on the ground of such circumstances, regardless of whether a new application for permission can be filed separately from the previous permission.

Article 1 [General Administrative Disposition], Article 27, Article 3 of the Outdoor Advertisements, etc. Control Act, Article 4(1)4, Article 7(1), and Article 9(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Outdoor Advertisements, etc. Control Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 et al. (Law Firm Doz., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Other (Attorney Kim Full-soo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The head of Seocho-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government (Law Firm Dong-dong Law Office, Attorney Ansan-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 95Gu19647 delivered on May 8, 1996

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The defendant's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff, on November 18, 1991, installed the advertisement of this case with the permission for installation of advertisements indicated in the attached Form of the judgment below, which is a disguised advertisement on the rooftop of the Seocho-gu Seocho-dong 6-1, Seocho-gu, Seoul, with the permission from the defendant on November 18, 1991. The above permission for installation expired as of November 18, 1994. The defendant notified the plaintiff of the expiration of the permission period for installation of the advertisement, and notified the plaintiff that he should submit an application with the legitimate approval from the Minister of National Defense and a new building owner's consent for use of the building. However, the plaintiff did not supplement it until the designated date despite the three demands for extension. The defendant rejected the extension of the permission period for installation of the above advertisement against the plaintiff as of February 20, 1995, and it did not obtain the new consent from the owner of the building of this case as one of the grounds for rejection of the building, but did not obtain the new consent to the plaintiff's consent within six months.

2. In full view of each provision of Article 3(1) and (2) of the Outdoor Advertisements, etc. Control Act, Article 4(1)3, Article 7(1), and Article 9(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, a person who intends to install the same advertisement in this case shall obtain permission from the Mayor/Do governor, etc. under the conditions as prescribed by the Presidential Decree. If a person who has obtained permission intends to extend the display period, he/she shall obtain permission from the Mayor/Do governor, etc. 10 days prior to the expiration of the display period. In cases where he/she intends to display advertisements, etc. on the land or goods, etc. owned or managed by another person, he/she shall submit a new permission, and if he/she intends to extend the display period for more than one year, he/she shall submit an advertisement, etc. with documents proving that he/she has obtained permission from the owner or manager. Thus, if an application for permission for extension was filed without satisfying the requirements as above under the Act, the administrative agency’s rejection of the application is justifiable and there is no violation of law.

According to the facts and records confirmed by the court below, the plaintiff should have submitted a written consent to use of the building owner, etc. in order for the plaintiff to obtain the permission to extend the period of the advertisement of this case which was previously permitted three years. However, although the defendant had been urged to supplement and submit the defective written consent to use for three times, although the defendant had been urged to extend the period of submission for three times, the plaintiff did not submit it even at the time of the disposition of this case for which about three months have passed after the original permission period expired. Accordingly, the defendant's rejection disposition of this case cannot be viewed as justifiable.

In addition, in a case where a legitimate extension of period is not permitted as above, the previous permission becomes null and void as a matter of course due to arrival of the time limit, barring special circumstances (see Supreme Court Decision 94Nu11866, Nov. 10, 1995). Thus, even if the plaintiff can submit a written consent to the use of the building owner after the rejection of this case, it shall not be deemed that the return of this case is beyond the discretion, regardless of whether the plaintiff can make a new application for permission separate from the previous permission.

In conclusion, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the requirements for permission to extend the outdoor advertisement display period or discretionary power, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, it is reasonable to discuss this purport.

3. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)