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(영문) 대법원 1995. 8. 22. 선고 94다43078 판결
[보험금][공1995.10.1.(1001),3236]
Main Issues

A. The scope of binding force of the Supreme Court's judgment of remand

(b) Where the first and second judgments of remand conflict with each other, the court of original judgment to which the case is remanded shall be bound;

Summary of Judgment

A. Legal decisions made by the court of final appeal as the grounds for reversal are binding not only on the appellate court but also on the appellate court. As such, the court of final appeal cannot take any other opinion with regard to the relevant case. In this case, even if the case was remanded to the Supreme Court which is inconsistent with the previous Supreme Court precedents, even if the case was remanded to the court of final appeal rather than the Supreme Court en banc Decision, the

B. Even in cases where the first and second remand judgments of the Supreme Court conflict with each other, the lower court, which was remanded by the second and second remand judgments, is bound by the legal judgment of the second and second remand judgments pursuant to Article 406(2) of the Civil Procedure Act.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 406 of the Civil Procedure Act

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court en banc Decision 80Da2029 delivered on February 24, 1981 (Gong1981, 13735) 84Da391 delivered on November 27, 1983 (Gong1985, 71) 83Nu620 delivered on February 9, 198 (Gong1988, 518) B. Supreme Court Decision 80Da2904 delivered on September 8, 1981 (Gong1981, 14324) 90Nu760 delivered on August 23, 191 (Gong191, 2442)

Plaintiff-Appellant

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant-Appellee

[Defendant-Appellant] Korea Automobile Insurance Co., Ltd., Counsel for defendant-appellant

Judgment of remand

Supreme Court Decision 93Da11807 delivered on April 12, 1994

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 94Na13925 delivered on July 6, 1994

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate brief filed after the expiration of the time limit for filing the grounds of appeal) are examined.

The court of final appeal may not take any other opinion with regard to the relevant case since the court of final appeal is bound not only to the appellate court but also to the appellate court. In this case, even if the judgment of reversal and return in accordance with the previous Supreme Court precedents was conducted in the appellate court, not to the Supreme Court en banc Decision, the legal judgment based on the grounds for reversal is bound by both lower courts and the court of final appeal (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 80Da2029, Feb. 24, 1981; Supreme Court Decision 84Da391, Nov. 27, 1983; Supreme Court Decision 83Nu620, Feb. 9, 1988).

The court below held that a person who suffered damages due to a public official's tort can claim damages against the State or a public organization, and that he cannot claim direct damages against a public official. The above legal judgment of the court below is contrary to the judgment of 69Da701 delivered on October 10, 1972, but it is in accordance with the legal judgment of the party member's second remand judgment, which is based on the legal judgment of the party member's second remand judgment as the reason for reversal, and the court below which is bound by the legal judgment of the court below was a legitimate measure. The party member is bound by the above legal judgment of the court below which is based on the reason for reversal and cannot take any other opinion in the above case. Thus, there is no ground for appeal that the above remand judgment was erroneous

In addition, the issue is that the second remand judgment of party members conflict with the first remand judgment, but the first remand judgment only ruled that the plaintiff is not a person who operates an automobile for himself under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, and that the plaintiff is liable for tort under the Civil Act. Thus, the second remand judgment cannot be deemed to conflict with the first remand judgment, and even if the second remand judgment conflicts with the Supreme Court's first remand judgment and the second remand judgment, the court below which was remanded by the second remand judgment is bound by the law of the second remand judgment pursuant to Article 406 (2) of the Civil Procedure Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 80Da2904, Sept. 8, 198; 90Nu760, Aug. 23, 191); and the second remand judgment is just and there is no reason to reverse the judgment of the court below in accordance with the purport of the second remand judgment.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1993.1.26.선고 92나17480
-서울고등법원 1994.7.6.선고 94나13925
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