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The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court.
Reasons
1. A request for auction to exercise a security right is also a ground for suspending extinctive prescription, but a claim that is not stated in the amount of the request for auction is not interrupted by the request for auction, and if part of the claim is not included in the amount of claim (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da17092, Dec. 10, 191). In an auction procedure to exercise a security right, where an applicant creditor applies for auction by stating only part of the secured claim as the amount of claim in the application for auction, barring any special circumstance, the amount to be distributed to the applicant creditor in the auction procedure shall be determined within the scope of the stated amount of claim, and thereafter, the amount of claim shall not be expanded by the method of submitting a claim account statement by the applicant creditor.
(See Supreme Court Decision 95Da22788 delivered on February 28, 1997, etc.). 2. Facts duly confirmed by the court below are as follows.
In 202, the Defendant set up a maximum debt amount of KRW 500 million and each collateral of KRW 600 million with respect to the instant real estate owned by the Defendant in order to secure the Plaintiff’s obligation owed to the Plaintiff by Company A (hereinafter “A”).
Since then, the defendant jointly and severally guaranteed part of the loans that A owes to the plaintiff.
(hereinafter) Of the Plaintiff’s claims against A, the part jointly and severally guaranteed by the Defendant is “the instant claim”).
Based on each of the above collateral security claims, the Plaintiff filed an application for the auction of the instant real estate with the Seoul Eastern District Court F (hereinafter “instant auction”). The application for auction contains the following: “The claimed amount of KRW 1,100,000,000 in total, KRW 3,720,01,879 in total, and KRW 3,720,01,879 in compensation for delay, and the remainder of the instant claim and the period during which the outstanding principal and damages for delay have been incurred and the rate thereof have been stated.”
C. On January 201, 201, the Plaintiff