The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. According to the statement made by the investigation agency E of the grounds for appeal (public prosecutor E), the Defendant administered the Mesacin as stated in the facts charged.

In light of the fact that even according to the E’s legal statement, the defendant did not directly have observed the administration of the Mesphere, but there was a statement that the defendant would have been administered because he had never taken the administration of the Mesphere in the toilet because he had never taken the administration of the Mesphere in the toilet, the record also enhances the credibility of E’s statement about the facts of the crime, and the response to the training of the Mesphere in conspiracy has occurred, there is only a fact that he administered the Mesphere in around 2010, and it is difficult to believe the defendant’s vindication that the Mesphere is difficult.

However, the judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant is erroneous in the misapprehension of facts and affected the judgment.

2. Determination

A. In a criminal trial of relevant legal principles, the finding of guilt ought to be based on evidence with probative value, which makes it possible for a judge to have a reasonable doubt that the facts charged are true, to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt, and if there is no such proof, the conviction cannot be determined even if there is a suspicion of guilt against the defendant.

In addition, in light of the fact that the criminal appellate court has the character as a post-examination even after the fact, and the spirit of substantial direct trial as provided in the Criminal Procedure Act, there is a lack of evidence to exclude a reasonable doubt after the first instance court has gone through the examination of evidence such as the examination of witness.

In a case where the facts charged were acquitted, the probability or doubt about some dissenting facts may be raised as a result of the appellate trial’s examination, but it does not reach the extent to which the reasonable doubt causing the first instance trial can be sufficiently resolved.