2015Gohap639 Attempted attempts, special obstruction of performance of official duties, injury resulting from special obstruction of performance of official duties, and specific crime aggravation.

Violation of the Punishment, etc. Act (Death or Injury caused by Dangerous Driving), the Road Traffic Act

Violation (driving) and Violation of the Road Traffic Act (Unlicensed Driving)

A

Seo Sung-sung (prosecution), Hun-Hun, and materials exchange (public trial)

Law Firm B, Attorney C

April 8, 2016

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for three years.

Facts of crime

On June 27, 2014, the Defendant was sentenced to two years of imprisonment with prison labor for fraud, etc. at the Busan District Court on September 4, 2014, which became final and conclusive on September 4, 2014, and is currently under the suspension of execution, and was sentenced to a fine of three million won at the Busan District Court on August 6, 2014 as a crime of violation of the Road Traffic Act.

1. Violation of the Road Traffic Act and the Road Traffic Act;

On July 25, 2015, from around 07:00 to around 07:50 on the same day, the Defendant driven a D rocketing car (hereinafter “the instant car”) under the influence of alcohol concentration of 0.140% while under the influence of alcohol level 0.140%.

2. Murder, attempted crimes, injury resulting from obstruction of performance of official duties, and violation of the Aggravated Punishment Act;

On July 25, 2015, around 07:50, the Defendant: (a) driven the instant car on the two-lanes around the third parallel road located in the Bridge-dong, Busan, the Bridge-dong; (b) was driving the instant car at the front of the traffic signal in front of the intersection from the head of the Dong-dong, and was driving the instant car to the head of Si/Gun/Gu-dong; (c) notified the victim F (the age of 47) who is the region belonging to the Busan, the Busan, Bridge-gu Police Station E zone, which caused the Defendant’s locking of the Defendant by receiving the report, of the name and resident registration number of the Defendant; and (d) responded to the measurement of the drinking reduction level by means of hiding it during the drinking reduction period.

The Defendant was under the suspension of the execution, and the driver’s license was revoked. The Defendant was under the influence of alcohol during the suspension period, and the driver’s license was under the influence of alcohol, and the driver’s license was under the influence of drinking, and was under the influence of drinking F, and was boarding the instant car on the driver’s seat. The F opened a driver’s seat and opened the upper body in the instant car and deducted the key of the instant vehicle. However, the F was under the influence of driving the instant vehicle, and the left left f, coming to the open seat of the instant vehicle. The left f, on the road, the right bridge was set up on the road, while driving the vehicle at a speed of about 37.7 km at a speed of about 51 meters in speed of 51 meters, and driving the vehicle to the f, driving the vehicle to the f, driving the vehicle to the f, driving the vehicle to the f, and driving the vehicle to the f, and driving the vehicle to the left f, with the front direction of the victim 1 to the instant vehicle.

Despite the first shock, the Defendant: (a) sufficiently predicted that F would be able to die far from the instant car at a speed of 92.1km; (b) operated a section of about 179 meters per hour at a speed of 92.1km; (c) re-driving over the median line to the left side of the instant car; and (d) continued to drive at a speed of 92.1km per hour at a speed of 92.1km; (c) continued to drive a vehicle with the front right side of the instant car (hereinafter referred to as “the front side of the instant car”); (d) while driving the vehicle at a speed of 92.1km per hour, the Defendant continued to drive the vehicle at a speed of 1 ton of the victim (25 years old); and (c) opened the front side of the instant car with the front side of the instant car (hereinafter referred to as “motor vehicle to as “the front side of the instant vehicle”); and (d) continued to drive the vehicle with the front side direction of the instant vehicle.

As above, even though the Defendant sufficiently predicted that F, a monthly string on the door of the driver’s seat opened in the instant car, could fall on the road surface or die with the shock with other vehicles, he attempted to kill F, by tightly driving, pushing ahead with F by hand, by breaking the central line, but did not bring about such intent, but did not bring about an attempted crime. The Defendant obstructed F’s legitimate performance of public duties concerning traffic control and traffic prevention, by using the instant car, which is a dangerous object, and suffered injury, such as waste f, socopty, heart mathy, and f, which requires medical treatment of approximately 14 weeks, and suffered injury, such as divers and 4 weeks, such as divershosis, and divershypous treatment for the instant vehicle, etc. (in the process, e.g., blood alcohol level 0., 0.140% alcohol level, and thus, e., e., e., e., the victim during the instant treatment period 3 weeks.

Summary of Evidence

1. The defendant's partial statement in the first protocol of trial;

1. Legal statement of the witness N;

1. Each police statement made to N, G,0, F.I;

1. Statement of the traffic accident prepared by K;

1. Situation reports, traffic accident reports, the ledger of driver's licenses, and the report on requests for appraisal;

1. Each written diagnosis;

1. Investigation report (Evidence 15, 31, 33, 48, 98, 102);

1. Reports on internal investigation (Evidence 35,49);

1. Before the judgment: Criminal records and criminal records (the defendant asserts that there was no intention to commit murder and bodily injury resulting from special obstruction of performance of official duties. However, the criminal intent in the crime of murder does not necessarily require the purpose of murder or planned intention to commit murder, and it is sufficient to recognize or anticipate the possibility or risk of causing death of another person due to his own act, and its perception or prediction is not only conclusive but also it is so-called willful negligence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2001Do3997, Sept. 28, 2001). In full view of the following circumstances, it can be sufficiently recognized that the defendant had an intention to commit murder, and it can also be recognized that the defendant had an intention to commit murder, and that there is also be possibility of predicting the injury as a result of special obstruction of official duties and as a result thereof.

First, at the time, the victim F and N were called to the scene of the patrol vehicle, and since the police uniform was put in place, anyone could easily be seen as police. The defendant also knew that he was the victim in light of the N's instructions that he was able to take the cryp (P) in the cryp (P), and the circumstances in which the victim dialogueed with the victim, etc., the defendant could be deemed to have sufficiently recognized that he was the police.

Second, the Defendant started a vehicle by accelerating the patrol vehicle that stopped on the front side of his vehicle, and operated approximately 200 meters of the driver's seat of the vehicle that the victim gets in transit of the central line, and in particular, tried to conflict with other vehicles or guards. The Defendant's driver's behavior is natural to view that the Defendant's driver's behavior was done with the intent of shocking the victim's shock on the vehicle to the front side of the vehicle.

Third, as above, it can be sufficiently predicted in light of the empirical rule that the physical part, such as head, may be faced with or passed on the opposite lane or the same lane in the vehicle operated in high speed, if the victim is diminished, can cause death by shocking the other vehicle.

Application of Statutes

1. Article applicable to criminal facts;

Articles 254, 250(1) of the Criminal Act, Articles 144(2) and (1), 136(1) of the Criminal Act, Article 5-11 (a) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, Articles 148-2(1)2 and 44(1) of the Road Traffic Act, Article 152 subparag. 1 and 43 of the Road Traffic Act

1. Commercial competition;

Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Act (the punishment on the crime of attempted death and the crime of bodily injury resulting from special obstruction of performance of official duties prescribed by the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes against M, etc. of Specific Crimes (the punishment on the crime of violating the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Death or Injury resulting from Dangerous Driving) and the punishment on the crime of violating the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (the punishment on the crime of attempted death and the crime of causing bodily injury resulting from special obstruction of official duties) and the punishment on the crime of violating the Road Traffic Act, which

1. Selection of punishment;

In regard to the crime of attempted murder, imprisonment for limited term, each violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Dangerous Driving) and imprisonment for violation of the Road Traffic Act, each choice shall be made.

1. Statutory mitigation;

Articles 25(2) and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act (with respect to attempted murder and attempted murder)

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

The former part of Article 37, Article 38 (1) 2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (Concurrent Punishment for homicide with the heaviest Punishment)

[Defendant asserts that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of committing the crime, and that he did not have the ability to discern things or make decisions, or that he had the ability to discern things under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crime. In light of the circumstances leading up to the crime, the means and method of the crime, and the situation before and after the crime, etc., it cannot be deemed that the Defendant did not have the ability to discern things at the time of each of the crimes of this case, or that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of each of the crimes of this case. However, it appears that the Defendant could have been aware that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the suspension of execution, as he had concerns over the cancellation of the suspension of execution. As seen earlier, the Defendant intentionally attempted to kill the victim who was exposed to the vehicle by intentionally driving the vehicle into the left side, etc., and that the Defendant did not have the ability to discern things at the time of each of the crimes, or

Reasons for sentencing (whether the sentencing criteria are not applied)

Recognizing the following circumstances: (a) the Defendant agreed with most victims of each of the instant crimes, including victimized police officers (unagreemented with the victim 1); (b) the victims agreed with the Defendant wanting to take the Defendant’s wife; (c) dolusent intent in the case of attempted murder; and (d) the Defendant’s family members want to take the lead of the Defendant; and (c) the Defendant’s family members want to take the lead of the Defendant.

However, this case also shows the following circumstances: (a) the victim F, a police officer, who was dispatched by the defendant after being reported by him on the road while driving under the influence of alcohol; (b) the victim F, a police officer sent out after being reported by him, caused a traffic accident by him/her; (c) the victim may lose his/her life by the instant case; (d) the victim could have lost his/her life by his/her self-harm; (e) the degree of interference with the performance of special official duties could have been serious and the degree of interference with the performance of official duties could have occurred; (e) the damage of other victims caused by the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Death and Injury Caused by Dangerous Driving) was not small; (e)

In addition, comprehensively taking into account the defendant's age, environment, family relations, the circumstances leading to each of the crimes of this case, and various circumstances leading to the sentencing specified in the records, such as the circumstances before and after the crime, the punishment shall be determined as ordered.

Presiding Judge and Senior Judge

Judges Jeong-won

Judges Lee Jae-chul